diff options
27 files changed, 3426 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/default b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/default index 0923a8c..0923a8c 100644 --- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/default +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/default diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/defconfig b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/defconfig index 321b7c1..321b7c1 100644 --- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/defconfig +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/defconfig diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/init b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/init index 12ea944..12ea944 100755 --- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/init +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/init diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7276848 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +index 4e04169..333035f 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + { + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; ++ int set = 1; + + /* + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and +@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that + * does not support full AP client state. ++ * ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for ++ * the same key. + */ +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); ++ set = 0; ++ } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) +@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, +- sta->added_unassoc)) { ++ set)) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); ++ set ? "set" : "add"); + + if (sta->added_unassoc) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 3587086..707971d 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event) + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R +@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + } + + ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + enum wpa_event { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + }; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1802d66 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key + +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the +sequence counter associated to the group key. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t tk_len; + }; + ++struct wpa_gtk { ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t gtk_len; ++}; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++struct wpa_igtk { ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t igtk_len; ++}; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + /* WPA IE version 1 + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", +@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + + ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++{ ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); ++ ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", ++ keyidx); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), ++ broadcast_ether_addr, ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ ++ ++ + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) + { +@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (ie->igtk) { + size_t len; + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; +- u16 keyidx; ++ + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) + return -1; ++ + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", +- igtk->igtk, len); +- if (keyidx > 4095) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); +- return -1; +- } +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } + } + + return 0; +@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) + */ + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + { +- int clear_ptk = 1; ++ int clear_keys = 1; + + if (sm == NULL) + return; +@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + /* Prepare for the next transition */ + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); + +- clear_ptk = 0; ++ clear_keys = 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + +- if (clear_ptk) { ++ if (clear_keys) { + /* + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. +@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS +@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); +@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; +- u16 keyidx; +- +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); +- +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); +- +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", +- igd.igtk, keylen); +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " +- "WNM mode"); +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; ++ ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ + +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2937b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep + Mode cases + +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to +detect a possible key reconfiguration. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { + + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, +- const u8 *key_rsc) ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) + { + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); +@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, + gtk_len, gtk_len, + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, ++ int wnm_sleep) + { + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", + keyidx); +@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + } + +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) + return -1; + } + +@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) + key_rsc = null_rsc; + +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) + goto failed; + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + +@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); +@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " + "WNM mode"); +@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) + return -1; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22ee217 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK + +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. + +This fixes the earlier fix in commit +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of +message 3/4. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index d200285..1021ccb 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t kck_len; + size_t kek_len; + size_t tk_len; ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ + }; + + struct wpa_gtk { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm, + os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + } + sm->tptk_set = 1; +- sm->tk_to_set = 1; + + kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; + kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; +@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + enum wpa_alg alg; + const u8 *key_rsc; + +- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); + return 0; +@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); +- sm->tk_to_set = 0; ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; + + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { + struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; + int ptk_set, tptk_set; + unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; +- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; + u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; + u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ + int renew_snonce; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c19c4c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. + +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) + } + + ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) + { + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; +@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); ++ else ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: + break; + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1bd5a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration + +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so +that behavior does not get modified. + +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. + +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +index e424168..9eb9738 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ + } tpk; + int tpk_set; ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ + int tpk_success; + int tpk_in_progress; + +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + u8 rsc[6]; + enum wpa_alg alg; + ++ if (peer->tk_set) { ++ /* ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must ++ * not allow that to happen. ++ */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); + + switch (peer->cipher) { +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + return -1; + } + ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " + "driver"); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 1; + return 0; + } + +@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + peer->cipher = 0; + peer->qos_info = 0; + peer->wmm_capable = 0; +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, + } + + ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { ++ if (nonce[i]) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + const u8 *buf, size_t len) + { +@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; + peer->cipher = cipher; + +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { + /* + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the +@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); + goto error; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + } + + #if 0 +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9678f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames + +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected +Reassociation Response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len, + u16 capab; + + sm->ft_completed = 0; ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; + + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); + return -1; +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; ++ + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) + return -1; + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { + size_t r0kh_id_len; + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; + int ft_completed; ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; + int over_the_ds_in_progress; + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ + int set_ptk_after_assoc; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc index 4f8ae21..23e71f6 100644 --- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc @@ -1,4 +1,15 @@ -SRC_URI += " file://cfg80211.conf" + + +# -p option is striplevel +SRC_URI += " file://cfg80211.conf \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch;patchdir=.. \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch;patchdir=.. \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch;patchdir=.. \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch;patchdir=.. \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch;patchdir=.. \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch;patchdir=.. \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch;patchdir=.. \ + " do_install() { install -d ${D}${sbindir} ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.4.bb b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.6.bb index 9244da4..e9e0f33 100644 --- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.4.bb +++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.6.bb @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ require hostap-daemon.inc HOMEPAGE = "http://hostap.epitest.fi" SECTION = "kernel/userland" LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;md5=4d53178f44d4b38418a4fa8de365e11c" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;md5=8aa4e8c78b59b12016c4cb2d0a8db350" DEPENDS = "libnl openssl sqlite3" SUMMARY = "User space daemon for extended IEEE 802.11 management" @@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ do_compile() { CONFFILES_${PN} += "${sysconfdir}/hostapd.conf" -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "04578f3f2c3eb1bec1adf30473813912" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe0eb6bd1c9cbd24952ece8586b6f7bd14ab358edfda99794e79b9b9dbd657f" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d" + do_install_append() { mkdir -p ${D}${sysconfdir}/default diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ab0a2b --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +SUMMARY = "Client for Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)" +HOMEPAGE = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/" +BUGTRACKER = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/bugz/" +SECTION = "network" +LICENSE = "BSD" +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=292eece3f2ebbaa25608eed8464018a3 \ + file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=3f01d778be8f953962388307ee38ed2b \ + file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=11;md5=06180ad70fe4a9bed87faeb55519e0dc \ + " +DEPENDS = "gnutls dbus libnl openssl libgcrypt" +RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli" + +inherit systemd + +SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "wpa_supplicant.service wpa_supplicant-nl80211@.service wpa_supplicant-wired@.service" +SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE = "disable" + +SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ + file://defconfig-gnutls \ + file://wpa-supplicant.sh \ + file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ + file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ + file://99_wpa_supplicant \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch \ + file://rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \ + " +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "091569eb4440b7d7f2b4276dbfc03c3c" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450" + + +S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}" + +PACKAGES_prepend = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli " +FILES_wpa-supplicant-passphrase = "${bindir}/wpa_passphrase" +FILES_wpa-supplicant-cli = "${sbindir}/wpa_cli" +FILES_${PN} += "${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/*" +CONFFILES_${PN} += "${sysconfdir}/wpa_supplicant.conf" + +do_configure () { + install -m 0755 ${WORKDIR}/defconfig-gnutls wpa_supplicant/.config + echo "CFLAGS +=\"-I${STAGING_INCDIR}/libnl3\"" >> wpa_supplicant/.config +} + +export EXTRA_CFLAGS = "${CFLAGS}" +export BINDIR = "${sbindir}" + +do_compile () { + unset CFLAGS CPPFLAGS CXXFLAGS + sed -e "s:CFLAGS\ =.*:& \$(EXTRA_CFLAGS):g" -i ${S}/src/lib.rules + oe_runmake -C wpa_supplicant +} + +do_install () { + install -d ${D}${sbindir} + install -m 755 wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant ${D}${sbindir} + install -m 755 wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli ${D}${sbindir} + + install -d ${D}${bindir} + install -m 755 wpa_supplicant/wpa_passphrase ${D}${bindir} + + install -d ${D}${docdir}/wpa_supplicant + install -m 644 wpa_supplicant/README ${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant.conf ${D}${docdir}/wpa_supplicant + + install -d ${D}${sysconfdir} + install -m 600 ${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane ${D}${sysconfdir}/wpa_supplicant.conf + + install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-pre-up.d/ + install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-post-down.d/ + install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-down.d/ + install -m 755 ${WORKDIR}/wpa-supplicant.sh ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-pre-up.d/wpa-supplicant + cd ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/ && \ + ln -sf ../if-pre-up.d/wpa-supplicant if-post-down.d/wpa-supplicant + + install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d + install -m 644 ${S}/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf ${D}/${sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d + install -d ${D}/${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services + install -m 644 ${S}/wpa_supplicant/dbus/*.service ${D}/${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services + + if ${@base_contains('DISTRO_FEATURES','systemd','true','false',d)}; then + install -d ${D}/${systemd_unitdir}/system + install -m 644 ${S}/wpa_supplicant/systemd/*.service ${D}/${systemd_unitdir}/system + fi + + install -d ${D}/etc/default/volatiles + install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/99_wpa_supplicant ${D}/etc/default/volatiles +} + +pkg_postinst_wpa-supplicant () { + # If we're offline, we don't need to do this. + if [ "x$D" = "x" ]; then + killall -q -HUP dbus-daemon || true + fi + +} diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/99_wpa_supplicant b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/99_wpa_supplicant new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ff4dd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/99_wpa_supplicant @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +d root root 0700 /var/run/wpa_supplicant none diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/defconfig-gnutls b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/defconfig-gnutls new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92ef823 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/defconfig-gnutls @@ -0,0 +1,552 @@ +# Example wpa_supplicant build time configuration +# +# This file lists the configuration options that are used when building the +# hostapd binary. All lines starting with # are ignored. Configuration option +# lines must be commented out complete, if they are not to be included, i.e., +# just setting VARIABLE=n is not disabling that variable. +# +# This file is included in Makefile, so variables like CFLAGS and LIBS can also +# be modified from here. In most cases, these lines should use += in order not +# to override previous values of the variables. + + +# Uncomment following two lines and fix the paths if you have installed OpenSSL +# or GnuTLS in non-default location +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/openssl/include +#LIBS += -L/usr/local/openssl/lib + +# Some Red Hat versions seem to include kerberos header files from OpenSSL, but +# the kerberos files are not in the default include path. Following line can be +# used to fix build issues on such systems (krb5.h not found). +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/kerberos + +# Example configuration for various cross-compilation platforms + +#### sveasoft (e.g., for Linksys WRT54G) ###################################### +#CC=mipsel-uclibc-gcc +#CC=/opt/brcm/hndtools-mipsel-uclibc/bin/mipsel-uclibc-gcc +#CFLAGS += -Os +#CPPFLAGS += -I../src/include -I../../src/router/openssl/include +#LIBS += -L/opt/brcm/hndtools-mipsel-uclibc-0.9.19/lib -lssl +############################################################################### + +#### openwrt (e.g., for Linksys WRT54G) ####################################### +#CC=mipsel-uclibc-gcc +#CC=/opt/brcm/hndtools-mipsel-uclibc/bin/mipsel-uclibc-gcc +#CFLAGS += -Os +#CPPFLAGS=-I../src/include -I../openssl-0.9.7d/include \ +# -I../WRT54GS/release/src/include +#LIBS = -lssl +############################################################################### + + +# Driver interface for Host AP driver +CONFIG_DRIVER_HOSTAP=y + +# Driver interface for Agere driver +#CONFIG_DRIVER_HERMES=y +# Change include directories to match with the local setup +#CFLAGS += -I../../hcf -I../../include -I../../include/hcf +#CFLAGS += -I../../include/wireless + +# Driver interface for madwifi driver +# Deprecated; use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y instead. +#CONFIG_DRIVER_MADWIFI=y +# Set include directory to the madwifi source tree +#CFLAGS += -I../../madwifi + +# Driver interface for ndiswrapper +# Deprecated; use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y instead. +#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDISWRAPPER=y + +# Driver interface for Atmel driver +# CONFIG_DRIVER_ATMEL=y + +# Driver interface for old Broadcom driver +# Please note that the newer Broadcom driver ("hybrid Linux driver") supports +# Linux wireless extensions and does not need (or even work) with the old +# driver wrapper. Use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y with that driver. +#CONFIG_DRIVER_BROADCOM=y +# Example path for wlioctl.h; change to match your configuration +#CFLAGS += -I/opt/WRT54GS/release/src/include + +# Driver interface for Intel ipw2100/2200 driver +# Deprecated; use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y instead. +#CONFIG_DRIVER_IPW=y + +# Driver interface for Ralink driver +#CONFIG_DRIVER_RALINK=y + +# Driver interface for generic Linux wireless extensions +# Note: WEXT is deprecated in the current Linux kernel version and no new +# functionality is added to it. nl80211-based interface is the new +# replacement for WEXT and its use allows wpa_supplicant to properly control +# the driver to improve existing functionality like roaming and to support new +# functionality. +CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y + +# Driver interface for Linux drivers using the nl80211 kernel interface +CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y + +# driver_nl80211.c requires libnl. If you are compiling it yourself +# you may need to point hostapd to your version of libnl. +# +#CFLAGS += -I$<path to libnl include files> +#LIBS += -L$<path to libnl library files> + +# Use libnl v2.0 (or 3.0) libraries. +#CONFIG_LIBNL20=y + +# Use libnl 3.2 libraries (if this is selected, CONFIG_LIBNL20 is ignored) +CONFIG_LIBNL32=y + + +# Driver interface for FreeBSD net80211 layer (e.g., Atheros driver) +#CONFIG_DRIVER_BSD=y +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include +#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib +#LIBS_p += -L/usr/local/lib +#LIBS_c += -L/usr/local/lib + +# Driver interface for Windows NDIS +#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDIS=y +#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/w32api/ddk +#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib +# For native build using mingw +#CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS=y +# Additional directories for cross-compilation on Linux host for mingw target +#CFLAGS += -I/opt/mingw/mingw32/include/ddk +#LIBS += -L/opt/mingw/mingw32/lib +#CC=mingw32-gcc +# By default, driver_ndis uses WinPcap for low-level operations. This can be +# replaced with the following option which replaces WinPcap calls with NDISUIO. +# However, this requires that WZC is disabled (net stop wzcsvc) before starting +# wpa_supplicant. +# CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y + +# Driver interface for development testing +#CONFIG_DRIVER_TEST=y + +# Driver interface for wired Ethernet drivers +CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y + +# Driver interface for the Broadcom RoboSwitch family +#CONFIG_DRIVER_ROBOSWITCH=y + +# Driver interface for no driver (e.g., WPS ER only) +#CONFIG_DRIVER_NONE=y + +# Enable IEEE 802.1X Supplicant (automatically included if any EAP method is +# included) +CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y + +# EAP-MD5 +CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y + +# EAP-MSCHAPv2 +CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y + +# EAP-TLS +CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y + +# EAL-PEAP +CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y + +# EAP-TTLS +CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y + +# EAP-FAST +# Note: If OpenSSL is used as the TLS library, OpenSSL 1.0 or newer is needed +# for EAP-FAST support. Older OpenSSL releases would need to be patched, e.g., +# with openssl-0.9.8x-tls-extensions.patch, to add the needed functions. +#CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y + +# EAP-GTC +CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y + +# EAP-OTP +CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y + +# EAP-SIM (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-SIM is used) +#CONFIG_EAP_SIM=y + +# EAP-PSK (experimental; this is _not_ needed for WPA-PSK) +#CONFIG_EAP_PSK=y + +# EAP-pwd (secure authentication using only a password) +#CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y + +# EAP-PAX +#CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y + +# LEAP +CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y + +# EAP-AKA (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA is used) +#CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y + +# EAP-AKA' (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA' is used). +# This requires CONFIG_EAP_AKA to be enabled, too. +#CONFIG_EAP_AKA_PRIME=y + +# Enable USIM simulator (Milenage) for EAP-AKA +#CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR=y + +# EAP-SAKE +#CONFIG_EAP_SAKE=y + +# EAP-GPSK +#CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y +# Include support for optional SHA256 cipher suite in EAP-GPSK +#CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y + +# EAP-TNC and related Trusted Network Connect support (experimental) +#CONFIG_EAP_TNC=y + +# Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) +CONFIG_WPS=y +# Enable WSC 2.0 support +#CONFIG_WPS2=y +# Enable WPS external registrar functionality +#CONFIG_WPS_ER=y +# Disable credentials for an open network by default when acting as a WPS +# registrar. +#CONFIG_WPS_REG_DISABLE_OPEN=y +# Enable WPS support with NFC config method +#CONFIG_WPS_NFC=y + +# EAP-IKEv2 +#CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y + +# EAP-EKE +#CONFIG_EAP_EKE=y + +# PKCS#12 (PFX) support (used to read private key and certificate file from +# a file that usually has extension .p12 or .pfx) +CONFIG_PKCS12=y + +# Smartcard support (i.e., private key on a smartcard), e.g., with openssl +# engine. +CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y + +# PC/SC interface for smartcards (USIM, GSM SIM) +# Enable this if EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA is included +#CONFIG_PCSC=y + +# Support HT overrides (disable HT/HT40, mask MCS rates, etc.) +#CONFIG_HT_OVERRIDES=y + +# Support VHT overrides (disable VHT, mask MCS rates, etc.) +#CONFIG_VHT_OVERRIDES=y + +# Development testing +#CONFIG_EAPOL_TEST=y + +# Select control interface backend for external programs, e.g, wpa_cli: +# unix = UNIX domain sockets (default for Linux/*BSD) +# udp = UDP sockets using localhost (127.0.0.1) +# named_pipe = Windows Named Pipe (default for Windows) +# udp-remote = UDP sockets with remote access (only for tests systems/purpose) +# y = use default (backwards compatibility) +# If this option is commented out, control interface is not included in the +# build. +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y + +# Include support for GNU Readline and History Libraries in wpa_cli. +# When building a wpa_cli binary for distribution, please note that these +# libraries are licensed under GPL and as such, BSD license may not apply for +# the resulting binary. +#CONFIG_READLINE=y + +# Include internal line edit mode in wpa_cli. This can be used as a replacement +# for GNU Readline to provide limited command line editing and history support. +#CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y + +# Remove debugging code that is printing out debug message to stdout. +# This can be used to reduce the size of the wpa_supplicant considerably +# if debugging code is not needed. The size reduction can be around 35% +# (e.g., 90 kB). +#CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG=y + +# Remove WPA support, e.g., for wired-only IEEE 802.1X supplicant, to save +# 35-50 kB in code size. +#CONFIG_NO_WPA=y + +# Remove IEEE 802.11i/WPA-Personal ASCII passphrase support +# This option can be used to reduce code size by removing support for +# converting ASCII passphrases into PSK. If this functionality is removed, the +# PSK can only be configured as the 64-octet hexstring (e.g., from +# wpa_passphrase). This saves about 0.5 kB in code size. +#CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE=y + +# Disable scan result processing (ap_mode=1) to save code size by about 1 kB. +# This can be used if ap_scan=1 mode is never enabled. +#CONFIG_NO_SCAN_PROCESSING=y + +# Select configuration backend: +# file = text file (e.g., wpa_supplicant.conf; note: the configuration file +# path is given on command line, not here; this option is just used to +# select the backend that allows configuration files to be used) +# winreg = Windows registry (see win_example.reg for an example) +CONFIG_BACKEND=file + +# Remove configuration write functionality (i.e., to allow the configuration +# file to be updated based on runtime configuration changes). The runtime +# configuration can still be changed, the changes are just not going to be +# persistent over restarts. This option can be used to reduce code size by +# about 3.5 kB. +#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE=y + +# Remove support for configuration blobs to reduce code size by about 1.5 kB. +#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS=y + +# Select program entry point implementation: +# main = UNIX/POSIX like main() function (default) +# main_winsvc = Windows service (read parameters from registry) +# main_none = Very basic example (development use only) +#CONFIG_MAIN=main + +# Select wrapper for operatins system and C library specific functions +# unix = UNIX/POSIX like systems (default) +# win32 = Windows systems +# none = Empty template +#CONFIG_OS=unix + +# Select event loop implementation +# eloop = select() loop (default) +# eloop_win = Windows events and WaitForMultipleObject() loop +#CONFIG_ELOOP=eloop + +# Should we use poll instead of select? Select is used by default. +#CONFIG_ELOOP_POLL=y + +# Select layer 2 packet implementation +# linux = Linux packet socket (default) +# pcap = libpcap/libdnet/WinPcap +# freebsd = FreeBSD libpcap +# winpcap = WinPcap with receive thread +# ndis = Windows NDISUIO (note: requires CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y) +# none = Empty template +#CONFIG_L2_PACKET=linux + +# PeerKey handshake for Station to Station Link (IEEE 802.11e DLS) +CONFIG_PEERKEY=y + +# IEEE 802.11w (management frame protection), also known as PMF +# Driver support is also needed for IEEE 802.11w. +#CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y + +# Select TLS implementation +# openssl = OpenSSL (default) +# gnutls = GnuTLS +# internal = Internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental) +# none = Empty template +#CONFIG_TLS=openssl + +# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.1) +# can be enabled to get a stronger construction of messages when block ciphers +# are used. It should be noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based +# implementation may not be compatible with TLS v1.1 message (ClientHello is +# sent prior to negotiating which version will be used) +#CONFIG_TLSV11=y + +# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.2) +# can be enabled to enable use of stronger crypto algorithms. It should be +# noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based implementation may not be compatible +# with TLS v1.2 message (ClientHello is sent prior to negotiating which version +# will be used) +#CONFIG_TLSV12=y + +# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are +# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of +# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits +# and drawbacks of this option. +#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH=y +#ifndef CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH +#LTM_PATH=/usr/src/libtommath-0.39 +#CFLAGS += -I$(LTM_PATH) +#LIBS += -L$(LTM_PATH) +#LIBS_p += -L$(LTM_PATH) +#endif +# At the cost of about 4 kB of additional binary size, the internal LibTomMath +# can be configured to include faster routines for exptmod, sqr, and div to +# speed up DH and RSA calculation considerably +#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH_FAST=y + +# Include NDIS event processing through WMI into wpa_supplicant/wpasvc. +# This is only for Windows builds and requires WMI-related header files and +# WbemUuid.Lib from Platform SDK even when building with MinGW. +#CONFIG_NDIS_EVENTS_INTEGRATED=y +#PLATFORMSDKLIB="/opt/Program Files/Microsoft Platform SDK/Lib" + +# Add support for old DBus control interface +# (fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant) +#CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y + +# Add support for new DBus control interface +# (fi.w1.hostap.wpa_supplicant1) +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y + +# Add introspection support for new DBus control interface +#CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y + +# Add support for loading EAP methods dynamically as shared libraries. +# When this option is enabled, each EAP method can be either included +# statically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=y) or dynamically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=dyn). +# Dynamic EAP methods are build as shared objects (eap_*.so) and they need to +# be loaded in the beginning of the wpa_supplicant configuration file +# (see load_dynamic_eap parameter in the example file) before being used in +# the network blocks. +# +# Note that some shared parts of EAP methods are included in the main program +# and in order to be able to use dynamic EAP methods using these parts, the +# main program must have been build with the EAP method enabled (=y or =dyn). +# This means that EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST cannot be added as dynamic libraries +# unless at least one of them was included in the main build to force inclusion +# of the shared code. Similarly, at least one of EAP-SIM/AKA must be included +# in the main build to be able to load these methods dynamically. +# +# Please also note that using dynamic libraries will increase the total binary +# size. Thus, it may not be the best option for targets that have limited +# amount of memory/flash. +#CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y + +# IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition) +#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y + +# Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt) +#CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y + +# Send debug messages to syslog instead of stdout +#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y +# Set syslog facility for debug messages +#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG_FACILITY=LOG_DAEMON + +# Add support for sending all debug messages (regardless of debug verbosity) +# to the Linux kernel tracing facility. This helps debug the entire stack by +# making it easy to record everything happening from the driver up into the +# same file, e.g., using trace-cmd. +#CONFIG_DEBUG_LINUX_TRACING=y + +# Enable privilege separation (see README 'Privilege separation' for details) +#CONFIG_PRIVSEP=y + +# Enable mitigation against certain attacks against TKIP by delaying Michael +# MIC error reports by a random amount of time between 0 and 60 seconds +#CONFIG_DELAYED_MIC_ERROR_REPORT=y + +# Enable tracing code for developer debugging +# This tracks use of memory allocations and other registrations and reports +# incorrect use with a backtrace of call (or allocation) location. +#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y +# For BSD, uncomment these. +#LIBS += -lexecinfo +#LIBS_p += -lexecinfo +#LIBS_c += -lexecinfo + +# Use libbfd to get more details for developer debugging +# This enables use of libbfd to get more detailed symbols for the backtraces +# generated by CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y. +#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE_BFD=y +# For BSD, uncomment these. +#LIBS += -lbfd -liberty -lz +#LIBS_p += -lbfd -liberty -lz +#LIBS_c += -lbfd -liberty -lz + +CONFIG_TLS = gnutls +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y +CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y + +# wpa_supplicant depends on strong random number generation being available +# from the operating system. os_get_random() function is used to fetch random +# data when needed, e.g., for key generation. On Linux and BSD systems, this +# works by reading /dev/urandom. It should be noted that the OS entropy pool +# needs to be properly initialized before wpa_supplicant is started. This is +# important especially on embedded devices that do not have a hardware random +# number generator and may by default start up with minimal entropy available +# for random number generation. +# +# As a safety net, wpa_supplicant is by default trying to internally collect +# additional entropy for generating random data to mix in with the data fetched +# from the OS. This by itself is not considered to be very strong, but it may +# help in cases where the system pool is not initialized properly. However, it +# is very strongly recommended that the system pool is initialized with enough +# entropy either by using hardware assisted random number generator or by +# storing state over device reboots. +# +# wpa_supplicant can be configured to maintain its own entropy store over +# restarts to enhance random number generation. This is not perfect, but it is +# much more secure than using the same sequence of random numbers after every +# reboot. This can be enabled with -e<entropy file> command line option. The +# specified file needs to be readable and writable by wpa_supplicant. +# +# If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong random data (e.g., on +# Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of random +# data from /dev/urandom), the internal wpa_supplicant random pool can be +# disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this +# should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on devices +# that meet the requirements described above. +#CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y + +# IEEE 802.11n (High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) +#CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y + +# IEEE 802.11ac (Very High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode) +# (depends on CONFIG_IEEE80211N) +#CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y + +# Wireless Network Management (IEEE Std 802.11v-2011) +# Note: This is experimental and not complete implementation. +#CONFIG_WNM=y + +# Interworking (IEEE 802.11u) +# This can be used to enable functionality to improve interworking with +# external networks (GAS/ANQP to learn more about the networks and network +# selection based on available credentials). +#CONFIG_INTERWORKING=y + +# Hotspot 2.0 +#CONFIG_HS20=y + +# Disable roaming in wpa_supplicant +#CONFIG_NO_ROAMING=y + +# AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant +# This can be used for controlling AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant. It +# should be noted that this is mainly aimed at simple cases like +# WPA2-Personal while more complex configurations like WPA2-Enterprise with an +# external RADIUS server can be supported with hostapd. +CONFIG_AP=y + +CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y + +# P2P (Wi-Fi Direct) +# This can be used to enable P2P support in wpa_supplicant. See README-P2P for +# more information on P2P operations. +#CONFIG_P2P=y + +# Enable TDLS support +#CONFIG_TDLS=y + +# Wi-Fi Direct +# This can be used to enable Wi-Fi Direct extensions for P2P using an external +# program to control the additional information exchanges in the messages. +#CONFIG_WIFI_DISPLAY=y + +# Autoscan +# This can be used to enable automatic scan support in wpa_supplicant. +# See wpa_supplicant.conf for more information on autoscan usage. +# +# Enabling directly a module will enable autoscan support. +# For exponential module: +CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_EXPONENTIAL=y +# For periodic module: +#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_PERIODIC=y + +# Password (and passphrase, etc.) backend for external storage +# These optional mechanisms can be used to add support for storing passwords +# and other secrets in external (to wpa_supplicant) location. This allows, for +# example, operating system specific key storage to be used +# +# External password backend for testing purposes (developer use) +#CONFIG_EXT_PASSWORD_TEST=y diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7276848 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +index 4e04169..333035f 100644 +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + { + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; ++ int set = 1; + + /* + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and +@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that + * does not support full AP client state. ++ * ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for ++ * the same key. + */ +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); ++ set = 0; ++ } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) +@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, +- sta->added_unassoc)) { ++ set)) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); ++ set ? "set" : "add"); + + if (sta->added_unassoc) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 3587086..707971d 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event) + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R +@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + } + + ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + enum wpa_event { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + }; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1802d66 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key + +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the +sequence counter associated to the group key. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t tk_len; + }; + ++struct wpa_gtk { ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t gtk_len; ++}; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++struct wpa_igtk { ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t igtk_len; ++}; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + /* WPA IE version 1 + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", +@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + + ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++{ ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); ++ ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", ++ keyidx); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), ++ broadcast_ether_addr, ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ ++ ++ + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) + { +@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (ie->igtk) { + size_t len; + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; +- u16 keyidx; ++ + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) + return -1; ++ + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", +- igtk->igtk, len); +- if (keyidx > 4095) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); +- return -1; +- } +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } + } + + return 0; +@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) + */ + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + { +- int clear_ptk = 1; ++ int clear_keys = 1; + + if (sm == NULL) + return; +@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + /* Prepare for the next transition */ + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); + +- clear_ptk = 0; ++ clear_keys = 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + +- if (clear_ptk) { ++ if (clear_keys) { + /* + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. +@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS +@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); +@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; +- u16 keyidx; +- +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); +- +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); +- +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", +- igd.igtk, keylen); +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " +- "WNM mode"); +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; ++ ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ + +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2937b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep + Mode cases + +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to +detect a possible key reconfiguration. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { + + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, +- const u8 *key_rsc) ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) + { + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); +@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, + gtk_len, gtk_len, + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, ++ int wnm_sleep) + { + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", + keyidx); +@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + } + +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + return -1; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) + return -1; + } + +@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm, + if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) + key_rsc = null_rsc; + +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) + goto failed; + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + +@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); +@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " + "WNM mode"); +@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf) + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) + return -1; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22ee217 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK + +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. + +This fixes the earlier fix in commit +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of +message 3/4. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h +index d200285..1021ccb 100644 +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t kck_len; + size_t kek_len; + size_t tk_len; ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ + }; + + struct wpa_gtk { +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm, + os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + } + sm->tptk_set = 1; +- sm->tk_to_set = 1; + + kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; + kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; +@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + enum wpa_alg alg; + const u8 *key_rsc; + +- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); + return 0; +@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); +- sm->tk_to_set = 0; ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; + + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { + struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; + int ptk_set, tptk_set; + unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; +- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; + u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; + u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ + int renew_snonce; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c19c4c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. + +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) + } + + ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) + { + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; +@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); ++ else ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: + break; + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1bd5a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration + +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so +that behavior does not get modified. + +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. + +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +index e424168..9eb9738 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ + } tpk; + int tpk_set; ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ + int tpk_success; + int tpk_in_progress; + +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + u8 rsc[6]; + enum wpa_alg alg; + ++ if (peer->tk_set) { ++ /* ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must ++ * not allow that to happen. ++ */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); + + switch (peer->cipher) { +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + return -1; + } + ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " + "driver"); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 1; + return 0; + } + +@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) + peer->cipher = 0; + peer->qos_info = 0; + peer->wmm_capable = 0; +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, + } + + ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { ++ if (nonce[i]) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + const u8 *buf, size_t len) + { +@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; + peer->cipher = cipher; + +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { + /* + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the +@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); + goto error; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + } + + #if 0 +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85ea1d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending + request + +Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep +Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the +response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the +association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when +successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of +protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + + if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, +- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association"); ++ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested"); + return; + } + +@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, + return; + } + ++ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0; ++ + if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT || + wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response " +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9678f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames + +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected +Reassociation Response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len, + u16 capab; + + sm->ft_completed = 0; ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; + + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); + return -1; +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies, + return -1; + } + ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; ++ + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) + return -1; + +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { + size_t r0kh_id_len; + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; + int ft_completed; ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; + int over_the_ds_in_progress; + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ + int set_ptk_after_assoc; +-- +2.7.4 + diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.sh b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c9e5d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.sh @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +#!/bin/sh + + +WPA_SUP_BIN="/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant" +WPA_SUP_PNAME="wpa_supplicant" +WPA_SUP_PIDFILE="/var/run/wpa_supplicant.$IFACE.pid" +WPA_SUP_OPTIONS="-B -P $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE -i $IFACE" + +VERBOSITY=0 + + +if [ -s "$IF_WPA_CONF" ]; then + WPA_SUP_CONF="-c $IF_WPA_CONF" +else + exit 0 +fi + +if [ ! -x "$WPA_SUP_BIN" ]; then + + if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then + echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: binaries not executable or missing from $WPA_SUP_BIN" + fi + + exit 1 +fi + +if [ "$MODE" = "start" ] ; then + # driver type of interface, defaults to wext when undefined + if [ -s "/etc/wpa_supplicant/driver.$IFACE" ]; then + IF_WPA_DRIVER=$(cat "/etc/wpa_supplicant/driver.$IFACE") + elif [ -z "$IF_WPA_DRIVER" ]; then + + if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then + echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: wpa-driver not provided, using \"wext\"" + fi + + IF_WPA_DRIVER="wext" + fi + + # if we have passed the criteria, start wpa_supplicant + if [ -n "$WPA_SUP_CONF" ]; then + + if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then + echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: $WPA_SUP_BIN $WPA_SUP_OPTIONS $WPA_SUP_CONF -D $IF_WPA_DRIVER" + fi + + start-stop-daemon --start --quiet \ + --name $WPA_SUP_PNAME --startas $WPA_SUP_BIN --pidfile $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE \ + -- $WPA_SUP_OPTIONS $WPA_SUP_CONF -D $IF_WPA_DRIVER + fi + + # if the interface socket exists, then wpa_supplicant was invoked successfully + if [ -S "$WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE" ]; then + + if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then + echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: ctrl_interface socket located at $WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE" + fi + + exit 0 + + fi + +elif [ "$MODE" = "stop" ]; then + + if [ -f "$WPA_SUP_PIDFILE" ]; then + + if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then + echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: terminating $WPA_SUP_PNAME daemon" + fi + + start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet \ + --name $WPA_SUP_PNAME --pidfile $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE + + if [ -S "$WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE" ]; then + rm -f $WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE + fi + + if [ -f "$WPA_SUP_PIDFILE" ]; then + rm -f $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE + fi + fi + +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68258f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf @@ -0,0 +1,690 @@ +##### Example wpa_supplicant configuration file ############################### +# +# This file describes configuration file format and lists all available option. +# Please also take a look at simpler configuration examples in 'examples' +# subdirectory. +# +# Empty lines and lines starting with # are ignored + +# NOTE! This file may contain password information and should probably be made +# readable only by root user on multiuser systems. + +# Note: All file paths in this configuration file should use full (absolute, +# not relative to working directory) path in order to allow working directory +# to be changed. This can happen if wpa_supplicant is run in the background. + +# Whether to allow wpa_supplicant to update (overwrite) configuration +# +# This option can be used to allow wpa_supplicant to overwrite configuration +# file whenever configuration is changed (e.g., new network block is added with +# wpa_cli or wpa_gui, or a password is changed). This is required for +# wpa_cli/wpa_gui to be able to store the configuration changes permanently. +# Please note that overwriting configuration file will remove the comments from +# it. +#update_config=1 + +# global configuration (shared by all network blocks) +# +# Parameters for the control interface. If this is specified, wpa_supplicant +# will open a control interface that is available for external programs to +# manage wpa_supplicant. The meaning of this string depends on which control +# interface mechanism is used. For all cases, the existence of this parameter +# in configuration is used to determine whether the control interface is +# enabled. +# +# For UNIX domain sockets (default on Linux and BSD): This is a directory that +# will be created for UNIX domain sockets for listening to requests from +# external programs (CLI/GUI, etc.) for status information and configuration. +# The socket file will be named based on the interface name, so multiple +# wpa_supplicant processes can be run at the same time if more than one +# interface is used. +# /var/run/wpa_supplicant is the recommended directory for sockets and by +# default, wpa_cli will use it when trying to connect with wpa_supplicant. +# +# Access control for the control interface can be configured by setting the +# directory to allow only members of a group to use sockets. This way, it is +# possible to run wpa_supplicant as root (since it needs to change network +# configuration and open raw sockets) and still allow GUI/CLI components to be +# run as non-root users. However, since the control interface can be used to +# change the network configuration, this access needs to be protected in many +# cases. By default, wpa_supplicant is configured to use gid 0 (root). If you +# want to allow non-root users to use the control interface, add a new group +# and change this value to match with that group. Add users that should have +# control interface access to this group. If this variable is commented out or +# not included in the configuration file, group will not be changed from the +# value it got by default when the directory or socket was created. +# +# When configuring both the directory and group, use following format: +# DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=wheel +# DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=0 +# (group can be either group name or gid) +# +# For UDP connections (default on Windows): The value will be ignored. This +# variable is just used to select that the control interface is to be created. +# The value can be set to, e.g., udp (ctrl_interface=udp) +# +# For Windows Named Pipe: This value can be used to set the security descriptor +# for controlling access to the control interface. Security descriptor can be +# set using Security Descriptor String Format (see http://msdn.microsoft.com/ +# library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/secauthz/security/ +# security_descriptor_string_format.asp). The descriptor string needs to be +# prefixed with SDDL=. For example, ctrl_interface=SDDL=D: would set an empty +# DACL (which will reject all connections). See README-Windows.txt for more +# information about SDDL string format. +# +ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant + +# IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL version +# wpa_supplicant is implemented based on IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 which defines +# EAPOL version 2. However, there are many APs that do not handle the new +# version number correctly (they seem to drop the frames completely). In order +# to make wpa_supplicant interoperate with these APs, the version number is set +# to 1 by default. This configuration value can be used to set it to the new +# version (2). +eapol_version=1 + +# AP scanning/selection +# By default, wpa_supplicant requests driver to perform AP scanning and then +# uses the scan results to select a suitable AP. Another alternative is to +# allow the driver to take care of AP scanning and selection and use +# wpa_supplicant just to process EAPOL frames based on IEEE 802.11 association +# information from the driver. +# 1: wpa_supplicant initiates scanning and AP selection +# 0: driver takes care of scanning, AP selection, and IEEE 802.11 association +# parameters (e.g., WPA IE generation); this mode can also be used with +# non-WPA drivers when using IEEE 802.1X mode; do not try to associate with +# APs (i.e., external program needs to control association). This mode must +# also be used when using wired Ethernet drivers. +# 2: like 0, but associate with APs using security policy and SSID (but not +# BSSID); this can be used, e.g., with ndiswrapper and NDIS drivers to +# enable operation with hidden SSIDs and optimized roaming; in this mode, +# the network blocks in the configuration file are tried one by one until +# the driver reports successful association; each network block should have +# explicit security policy (i.e., only one option in the lists) for +# key_mgmt, pairwise, group, proto variables +ap_scan=1 + +# EAP fast re-authentication +# By default, fast re-authentication is enabled for all EAP methods that +# support it. This variable can be used to disable fast re-authentication. +# Normally, there is no need to disable this. +fast_reauth=1 + +# OpenSSL Engine support +# These options can be used to load OpenSSL engines. +# The two engines that are supported currently are shown below: +# They are both from the opensc project (http://www.opensc.org/) +# By default no engines are loaded. +# make the opensc engine available +#opensc_engine_path=/usr/lib/opensc/engine_opensc.so +# make the pkcs11 engine available +#pkcs11_engine_path=/usr/lib/opensc/engine_pkcs11.so +# configure the path to the pkcs11 module required by the pkcs11 engine +#pkcs11_module_path=/usr/lib/pkcs11/opensc-pkcs11.so + +# Dynamic EAP methods +# If EAP methods were built dynamically as shared object files, they need to be +# loaded here before being used in the network blocks. By default, EAP methods +# are included statically in the build, so these lines are not needed +#load_dynamic_eap=/usr/lib/wpa_supplicant/eap_tls.so +#load_dynamic_eap=/usr/lib/wpa_supplicant/eap_md5.so + +# Driver interface parameters +# This field can be used to configure arbitrary driver interace parameters. The +# format is specific to the selected driver interface. This field is not used +# in most cases. +#driver_param="field=value" + +# Maximum lifetime for PMKSA in seconds; default 43200 +#dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=43200 +# Threshold for reauthentication (percentage of PMK lifetime); default 70 +#dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=70 +# Timeout for security association negotiation in seconds; default 60 +#dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=60 + +# network block +# +# Each network (usually AP's sharing the same SSID) is configured as a separate +# block in this configuration file. The network blocks are in preference order +# (the first match is used). +# +# network block fields: +# +# disabled: +# 0 = this network can be used (default) +# 1 = this network block is disabled (can be enabled through ctrl_iface, +# e.g., with wpa_cli or wpa_gui) +# +# id_str: Network identifier string for external scripts. This value is passed +# to external action script through wpa_cli as WPA_ID_STR environment +# variable to make it easier to do network specific configuration. +# +# ssid: SSID (mandatory); either as an ASCII string with double quotation or +# as hex string; network name +# +# scan_ssid: +# 0 = do not scan this SSID with specific Probe Request frames (default) +# 1 = scan with SSID-specific Probe Request frames (this can be used to +# find APs that do not accept broadcast SSID or use multiple SSIDs; +# this will add latency to scanning, so enable this only when needed) +# +# bssid: BSSID (optional); if set, this network block is used only when +# associating with the AP using the configured BSSID +# +# priority: priority group (integer) +# By default, all networks will get same priority group (0). If some of the +# networks are more desirable, this field can be used to change the order in +# which wpa_supplicant goes through the networks when selecting a BSS. The +# priority groups will be iterated in decreasing priority (i.e., the larger the +# priority value, the sooner the network is matched against the scan results). +# Within each priority group, networks will be selected based on security +# policy, signal strength, etc. +# Please note that AP scanning with scan_ssid=1 and ap_scan=2 mode are not +# using this priority to select the order for scanning. Instead, they try the +# networks in the order that used in the configuration file. +# +# mode: IEEE 802.11 operation mode +# 0 = infrastructure (Managed) mode, i.e., associate with an AP (default) +# 1 = IBSS (ad-hoc, peer-to-peer) +# Note: IBSS can only be used with key_mgmt NONE (plaintext and static WEP) +# and key_mgmt=WPA-NONE (fixed group key TKIP/CCMP). In addition, ap_scan has +# to be set to 2 for IBSS. WPA-None requires following network block options: +# proto=WPA, key_mgmt=WPA-NONE, pairwise=NONE, group=TKIP (or CCMP, but not +# both), and psk must also be set. +# +# proto: list of accepted protocols +# WPA = WPA/IEEE 802.11i/D3.0 +# RSN = WPA2/IEEE 802.11i (also WPA2 can be used as an alias for RSN) +# If not set, this defaults to: WPA RSN +# +# key_mgmt: list of accepted authenticated key management protocols +# WPA-PSK = WPA pre-shared key (this requires 'psk' field) +# WPA-EAP = WPA using EAP authentication (this can use an external +# program, e.g., Xsupplicant, for IEEE 802.1X EAP Authentication +# IEEE8021X = IEEE 802.1X using EAP authentication and (optionally) dynamically +# generated WEP keys +# NONE = WPA is not used; plaintext or static WEP could be used +# If not set, this defaults to: WPA-PSK WPA-EAP +# +# auth_alg: list of allowed IEEE 802.11 authentication algorithms +# OPEN = Open System authentication (required for WPA/WPA2) +# SHARED = Shared Key authentication (requires static WEP keys) +# LEAP = LEAP/Network EAP (only used with LEAP) +# If not set, automatic selection is used (Open System with LEAP enabled if +# LEAP is allowed as one of the EAP methods). +# +# pairwise: list of accepted pairwise (unicast) ciphers for WPA +# CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0] +# TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0] +# NONE = Use only Group Keys (deprecated, should not be included if APs support +# pairwise keys) +# If not set, this defaults to: CCMP TKIP +# +# group: list of accepted group (broadcast/multicast) ciphers for WPA +# CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0] +# TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0] +# WEP104 = WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) with 104-bit key +# WEP40 = WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) with 40-bit key [IEEE 802.11] +# If not set, this defaults to: CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40 +# +# psk: WPA preshared key; 256-bit pre-shared key +# The key used in WPA-PSK mode can be entered either as 64 hex-digits, i.e., +# 32 bytes or as an ASCII passphrase (in which case, the real PSK will be +# generated using the passphrase and SSID). ASCII passphrase must be between +# 8 and 63 characters (inclusive). +# This field is not needed, if WPA-EAP is used. +# Note: Separate tool, wpa_passphrase, can be used to generate 256-bit keys +# from ASCII passphrase. This process uses lot of CPU and wpa_supplicant +# startup and reconfiguration time can be optimized by generating the PSK only +# only when the passphrase or SSID has actually changed. +# +# eapol_flags: IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL options (bit field) +# Dynamic WEP key required for non-WPA mode +# bit0 (1): require dynamically generated unicast WEP key +# bit1 (2): require dynamically generated broadcast WEP key +# (3 = require both keys; default) +# Note: When using wired authentication, eapol_flags must be set to 0 for the +# authentication to be completed successfully. +# +# proactive_key_caching: +# Enable/disable opportunistic PMKSA caching for WPA2. +# 0 = disabled (default) +# 1 = enabled +# +# wep_key0..3: Static WEP key (ASCII in double quotation, e.g. "abcde" or +# hex without quotation, e.g., 0102030405) +# wep_tx_keyidx: Default WEP key index (TX) (0..3) +# +# peerkey: Whether PeerKey negotiation for direct links (IEEE 802.11e DLS) is +# allowed. This is only used with RSN/WPA2. +# 0 = disabled (default) +# 1 = enabled +#peerkey=1 +# +# Following fields are only used with internal EAP implementation. +# eap: space-separated list of accepted EAP methods +# MD5 = EAP-MD5 (unsecure and does not generate keying material -> +# cannot be used with WPA; to be used as a Phase 2 method +# with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS) +# MSCHAPV2 = EAP-MSCHAPv2 (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used +# as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS) +# OTP = EAP-OTP (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used +# as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS) +# GTC = EAP-GTC (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used +# as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS) +# TLS = EAP-TLS (client and server certificate) +# PEAP = EAP-PEAP (with tunnelled EAP authentication) +# TTLS = EAP-TTLS (with tunnelled EAP or PAP/CHAP/MSCHAP/MSCHAPV2 +# authentication) +# If not set, all compiled in methods are allowed. +# +# identity: Identity string for EAP +# anonymous_identity: Anonymous identity string for EAP (to be used as the +# unencrypted identity with EAP types that support different tunnelled +# identity, e.g., EAP-TTLS) +# password: Password string for EAP +# ca_cert: File path to CA certificate file (PEM/DER). This file can have one +# or more trusted CA certificates. If ca_cert and ca_path are not +# included, server certificate will not be verified. This is insecure and +# a trusted CA certificate should always be configured when using +# EAP-TLS/TTLS/PEAP. Full path should be used since working directory may +# change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background. +# On Windows, trusted CA certificates can be loaded from the system +# certificate store by setting this to cert_store://<name>, e.g., +# ca_cert="cert_store://CA" or ca_cert="cert_store://ROOT". +# Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user +# certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store +# (Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service. +# ca_path: Directory path for CA certificate files (PEM). This path may +# contain multiple CA certificates in OpenSSL format. Common use for this +# is to point to system trusted CA list which is often installed into +# directory like /etc/ssl/certs. If configured, these certificates are +# added to the list of trusted CAs. ca_cert may also be included in that +# case, but it is not required. +# client_cert: File path to client certificate file (PEM/DER) +# Full path should be used since working directory may change when +# wpa_supplicant is run in the background. +# Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting this +# to blob://<blob name>. +# private_key: File path to client private key file (PEM/DER/PFX) +# When PKCS#12/PFX file (.p12/.pfx) is used, client_cert should be +# commented out. Both the private key and certificate will be read from +# the PKCS#12 file in this case. Full path should be used since working +# directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background. +# Windows certificate store can be used by leaving client_cert out and +# configuring private_key in one of the following formats: +# cert://substring_to_match +# hash://certificate_thumbprint_in_hex +# for example: private_key="hash://63093aa9c47f56ae88334c7b65a4" +# Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user +# certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store +# (Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service. +# Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting this +# to blob://<blob name>. +# private_key_passwd: Password for private key file (if left out, this will be +# asked through control interface) +# dh_file: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format) +# This is an optional configuration file for setting parameters for an +# ephemeral DH key exchange. In most cases, the default RSA +# authentication does not use this configuration. However, it is possible +# setup RSA to use ephemeral DH key exchange. In addition, ciphers with +# DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys. This can be used to achieve +# forward secrecy. If the file is in DSA parameters format, it will be +# automatically converted into DH params. +# subject_match: Substring to be matched against the subject of the +# authentication server certificate. If this string is set, the server +# sertificate is only accepted if it contains this string in the subject. +# The subject string is in following format: +# /C=US/ST=CA/L=San Francisco/CN=Test AS/emailAddress=as@example.com +# altsubject_match: Semicolon separated string of entries to be matched against +# the alternative subject name of the authentication server certificate. +# If this string is set, the server sertificate is only accepted if it +# contains one of the entries in an alternative subject name extension. +# altSubjectName string is in following format: TYPE:VALUE +# Example: EMAIL:server@example.com +# Example: DNS:server.example.com;DNS:server2.example.com +# Following types are supported: EMAIL, DNS, URI +# phase1: Phase1 (outer authentication, i.e., TLS tunnel) parameters +# (string with field-value pairs, e.g., "peapver=0" or +# "peapver=1 peaplabel=1") +# 'peapver' can be used to force which PEAP version (0 or 1) is used. +# 'peaplabel=1' can be used to force new label, "client PEAP encryption", +# to be used during key derivation when PEAPv1 or newer. Most existing +# PEAPv1 implementation seem to be using the old label, "client EAP +# encryption", and wpa_supplicant is now using that as the default value. +# Some servers, e.g., Radiator, may require peaplabel=1 configuration to +# interoperate with PEAPv1; see eap_testing.txt for more details. +# 'peap_outer_success=0' can be used to terminate PEAP authentication on +# tunneled EAP-Success. This is required with some RADIUS servers that +# implement draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-05.txt (e.g., +# Lucent NavisRadius v4.4.0 with PEAP in "IETF Draft 5" mode) +# include_tls_length=1 can be used to force wpa_supplicant to include +# TLS Message Length field in all TLS messages even if they are not +# fragmented. +# sim_min_num_chal=3 can be used to configure EAP-SIM to require three +# challenges (by default, it accepts 2 or 3) +# phase2: Phase2 (inner authentication with TLS tunnel) parameters +# (string with field-value pairs, e.g., "auth=MSCHAPV2" for EAP-PEAP or +# "autheap=MSCHAPV2 autheap=MD5" for EAP-TTLS) +# Following certificate/private key fields are used in inner Phase2 +# authentication when using EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP. +# ca_cert2: File path to CA certificate file. This file can have one or more +# trusted CA certificates. If ca_cert2 and ca_path2 are not included, +# server certificate will not be verified. This is insecure and a trusted +# CA certificate should always be configured. +# ca_path2: Directory path for CA certificate files (PEM) +# client_cert2: File path to client certificate file +# private_key2: File path to client private key file +# private_key2_passwd: Password for private key file +# dh_file2: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format) +# subject_match2: Substring to be matched against the subject of the +# authentication server certificate. +# altsubject_match2: Substring to be matched against the alternative subject +# name of the authentication server certificate. +# +# fragment_size: Maximum EAP fragment size in bytes (default 1398). +# This value limits the fragment size for EAP methods that support +# fragmentation (e.g., EAP-TLS and EAP-PEAP). This value should be set +# small enough to make the EAP messages fit in MTU of the network +# interface used for EAPOL. The default value is suitable for most +# cases. +# +# EAP-PSK variables: +# eappsk: 16-byte (128-bit, 32 hex digits) pre-shared key in hex format +# nai: user NAI +# +# EAP-PAX variables: +# eappsk: 16-byte (128-bit, 32 hex digits) pre-shared key in hex format +# +# EAP-SAKE variables: +# eappsk: 32-byte (256-bit, 64 hex digits) pre-shared key in hex format +# (this is concatenation of Root-Secret-A and Root-Secret-B) +# nai: user NAI (PEERID) +# +# EAP-GPSK variables: +# eappsk: Pre-shared key in hex format (at least 128 bits, i.e., 32 hex digits) +# nai: user NAI (ID_Client) +# +# EAP-FAST variables: +# pac_file: File path for the PAC entries. wpa_supplicant will need to be able +# to create this file and write updates to it when PAC is being +# provisioned or refreshed. Full path to the file should be used since +# working directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the +# background. Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by +# setting this to blob://<blob name> +# phase1: fast_provisioning=1 option enables in-line provisioning of EAP-FAST +# credentials (PAC) +# +# wpa_supplicant supports number of "EAP workarounds" to work around +# interoperability issues with incorrectly behaving authentication servers. +# These are enabled by default because some of the issues are present in large +# number of authentication servers. Strict EAP conformance mode can be +# configured by disabling workarounds with eap_workaround=0. + +# Example blocks: + +# Simple case: WPA-PSK, PSK as an ASCII passphrase, allow all valid ciphers +network={ + ssid="simple" + psk="very secret passphrase" + priority=5 +} + +# Same as previous, but request SSID-specific scanning (for APs that reject +# broadcast SSID) +network={ + ssid="second ssid" + scan_ssid=1 + psk="very secret passphrase" + priority=2 +} + +# Only WPA-PSK is used. Any valid cipher combination is accepted. +network={ + ssid="example" + proto=WPA + key_mgmt=WPA-PSK + pairwise=CCMP TKIP + group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40 + psk=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029d4ab3db7a23ee92382eb0106c72ac7bb + priority=2 +} + +# Only WPA-EAP is used. Both CCMP and TKIP is accepted. An AP that used WEP104 +# or WEP40 as the group cipher will not be accepted. +network={ + ssid="example" + proto=RSN + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + pairwise=CCMP TKIP + group=CCMP TKIP + eap=TLS + identity="user@example.com" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem" + private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv" + private_key_passwd="password" + priority=1 +} + +# EAP-PEAP/MSCHAPv2 configuration for RADIUS servers that use the new peaplabel +# (e.g., Radiator) +network={ + ssid="example" + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + eap=PEAP + identity="user@example.com" + password="foobar" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + phase1="peaplabel=1" + phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2" + priority=10 +} + +# EAP-TTLS/EAP-MD5-Challenge configuration with anonymous identity for the +# unencrypted use. Real identity is sent only within an encrypted TLS tunnel. +network={ + ssid="example" + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + eap=TTLS + identity="user@example.com" + anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com" + password="foobar" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + priority=2 +} + +# EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 configuration with anonymous identity for the unencrypted +# use. Real identity is sent only within an encrypted TLS tunnel. +network={ + ssid="example" + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + eap=TTLS + identity="user@example.com" + anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com" + password="foobar" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2" +} + +# WPA-EAP, EAP-TTLS with different CA certificate used for outer and inner +# authentication. +network={ + ssid="example" + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + eap=TTLS + # Phase1 / outer authentication + anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + # Phase 2 / inner authentication + phase2="autheap=TLS" + ca_cert2="/etc/cert/ca2.pem" + client_cert2="/etc/cer/user.pem" + private_key2="/etc/cer/user.prv" + private_key2_passwd="password" + priority=2 +} + +# Both WPA-PSK and WPA-EAP is accepted. Only CCMP is accepted as pairwise and +# group cipher. +network={ + ssid="example" + bssid=00:11:22:33:44:55 + proto=WPA RSN + key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-EAP + pairwise=CCMP + group=CCMP + psk=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029d4ab3db7a23ee92382eb0106c72ac7bb +} + +# Special characters in SSID, so use hex string. Default to WPA-PSK, WPA-EAP +# and all valid ciphers. +network={ + ssid=00010203 + psk=000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f +} + + +# IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL with dynamically generated WEP keys (i.e., no WPA) using +# EAP-TLS for authentication and key generation; require both unicast and +# broadcast WEP keys. +network={ + ssid="1x-test" + key_mgmt=IEEE8021X + eap=TLS + identity="user@example.com" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem" + private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv" + private_key_passwd="password" + eapol_flags=3 +} + + +# LEAP with dynamic WEP keys +network={ + ssid="leap-example" + key_mgmt=IEEE8021X + eap=LEAP + identity="user" + password="foobar" +} + +# Plaintext connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X) +network={ + ssid="plaintext-test" + key_mgmt=NONE +} + + +# Shared WEP key connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X) +network={ + ssid="static-wep-test" + key_mgmt=NONE + wep_key0="abcde" + wep_key1=0102030405 + wep_key2="1234567890123" + wep_tx_keyidx=0 + priority=5 +} + + +# Shared WEP key connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X) using Shared Key +# IEEE 802.11 authentication +network={ + ssid="static-wep-test2" + key_mgmt=NONE + wep_key0="abcde" + wep_key1=0102030405 + wep_key2="1234567890123" + wep_tx_keyidx=0 + priority=5 + auth_alg=SHARED +} + + +# IBSS/ad-hoc network with WPA-None/TKIP. +network={ + ssid="test adhoc" + mode=1 + proto=WPA + key_mgmt=WPA-NONE + pairwise=NONE + group=TKIP + psk="secret passphrase" +} + + +# Catch all example that allows more or less all configuration modes +network={ + ssid="example" + scan_ssid=1 + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP WPA-PSK IEEE8021X NONE + pairwise=CCMP TKIP + group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40 + psk="very secret passphrase" + eap=TTLS PEAP TLS + identity="user@example.com" + password="foobar" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem" + private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv" + private_key_passwd="password" + phase1="peaplabel=0" +} + +# Example of EAP-TLS with smartcard (openssl engine) +network={ + ssid="example" + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + eap=TLS + proto=RSN + pairwise=CCMP TKIP + group=CCMP TKIP + identity="user@example.com" + ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem" + client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem" + + engine=1 + + # The engine configured here must be available. Look at + # OpenSSL engine support in the global section. + # The key available through the engine must be the private key + # matching the client certificate configured above. + + # use the opensc engine + #engine_id="opensc" + #key_id="45" + + # use the pkcs11 engine + engine_id="pkcs11" + key_id="id_45" + + # Optional PIN configuration; this can be left out and PIN will be + # asked through the control interface + pin="1234" +} + +# Example configuration showing how to use an inlined blob as a CA certificate +# data instead of using external file +network={ + ssid="example" + key_mgmt=WPA-EAP + eap=TTLS + identity="user@example.com" + anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com" + password="foobar" + ca_cert="blob://exampleblob" + priority=20 +} + +blob-base64-exampleblob={ +SGVsbG8gV29ybGQhCg== +} + + +# Wildcard match for SSID (plaintext APs only). This example select any +# open AP regardless of its SSID. +network={ + key_mgmt=NONE +} diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c91ffe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant +ctrl_interface_group=0 +update_config=1 + +network={ + key_mgmt=NONE +} diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb new file mode 100644 index 0000000..afd0654 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +require wpa-supplicant.inc + |