KRACK vulnerability patches for hostapd and wpa_supplicant

27 files changed, 3426 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/default b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/default
index 0923a8c..0923a8c 100644
--- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/default
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/default
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/defconfig b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/defconfig
index 321b7c1..321b7c1 100644
--- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/defconfig
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/defconfig
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/init b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/init
index 12ea944..12ea944 100755
--- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.4/init
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/init
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7276848
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c  | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c    | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h    |  3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h  |  1 +
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index 4e04169..333035f 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ {
+ 	struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
+ 	struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
++	int set = 1;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
+@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 	 * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
+ 	 * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
+ 	 * does not support full AP client state.
++	 *
++	 * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
++	 * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
++	 * the same key.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!sta->added_unassoc)
++	if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
++	    (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
++	     !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
+ 		hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
++		wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
++		set = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
+ 	if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
+@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 			    sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
+ 			    sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
+ 			    sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
+-			    sta->added_unassoc)) {
++			    set)) {
+ 		hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
+ 			       HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
+ 			       "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
+-			       sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
++			       set ? "set" : "add");
+ 
+ 		if (sta->added_unassoc) {
+ 			hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 3587086..707971d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++	case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++		sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++	if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++		return 0;
++	return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
++
++
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 			     struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ 		 u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ 	WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+-	WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++	WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 			     struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++		/* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++		 * PN in the driver */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	/* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ 	 * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ 	 * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ 
+ 	/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ 	sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++	sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 
+ 	sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ 	sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++	sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ 	wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+ 
+ 	buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ 	struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ 	Boolean PTK_valid;
+ 	Boolean pairwise_set;
++	Boolean tk_already_set;
+ 	int keycount;
+ 	Boolean Pair;
+ 	struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1802d66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h |  11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    |   4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ 	size_t tk_len;
+ };
+ 
++struct wpa_gtk {
++	u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++	size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++	u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++	size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+  * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ 	u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ 
++	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++	if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++	    os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++			gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ 	wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 		"WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	}
+ 	os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ 
++	sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++	os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++				       const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++	u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++	if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++	    os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++			keyidx);
++		return  0;
++	}
++
++	wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++		"WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++		keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++	if (keyidx > 4095) {
++		wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++			"WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++			   broadcast_ether_addr,
++			   keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++			   igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++		wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++			"WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++	os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
++
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 			       struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+ {
+@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	if (ie->igtk) {
+ 		size_t len;
+ 		const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+-		u16 keyidx;
++
+ 		len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ 		if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ 			return -1;
++
+ 		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+-		keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+-		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+-			"pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+-			keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+-		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+-				igtk->igtk, len);
+-		if (keyidx > 4095) {
+-			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+-				"WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+-			return -1;
+-		}
+-		if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+-				   broadcast_ether_addr,
+-				   keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+-				   igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+-			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+-				"WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+  */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+-	int clear_ptk = 1;
++	int clear_keys = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (sm == NULL)
+ 		return;
+@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ 		/* Prepare for the next transition */
+ 		wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+ 
+-		clear_ptk = 0;
++		clear_keys = 0;
+ 	}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 
+-	if (clear_ptk) {
++	if (clear_keys) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ 		 * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ 		os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 		sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ 		os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++		os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++		os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ 	os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++	os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++	os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ 	os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ 	os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 		os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 	} else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+-		struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+-		u16 keyidx;
+-
+-		os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+-		keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+-		os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+-		os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+-		keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+-		os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+-		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+-				igd.igtk, keylen);
+-		if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+-				   broadcast_ether_addr,
+-				   keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+-				   igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+-				   "WNM mode");
+-			os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++		const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-		}
+-		os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	} else {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ 	int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ 	u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++	struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++	struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ 	struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+ 
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2937b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c   | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+ 
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 				      const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+-				      const u8 *key_rsc)
++				      const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ 	const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ 	u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ 
+ 	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+-	if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+-	    os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++	if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++	    (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++		       sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ 			gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	}
+ 	os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ 
+-	sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+-	os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++	if (wnm_sleep) {
++		sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++			  sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++	} else {
++		sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	    (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ 					       gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ 					       &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+-	     wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
++	     wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ 		os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+-				       const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++				       const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++				       int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ 	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ 	u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+ 
+ 	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+-	if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+-	    os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++	if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++	    (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++		       sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ 			keyidx);
+@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+-	os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++	if (wnm_sleep) {
++		sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++			  sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++	} else {
++		sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+-		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
+ 		key_rsc = null_rsc;
+ 
+-	if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
++	if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
+ 	    wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
+ 		goto failed;
+ 	os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ 		sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ 		os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ 		os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++		os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 		os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++		os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ 	os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++	os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 	os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++	os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ 	os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 
+ 		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ 				gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+-		if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ 			os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ 				   "WNM mode");
+@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 		const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+ 
+ 		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+-		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	} else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ 	u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ 	struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++	struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 	struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++	struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ 	struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22ee217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+This fixes the earlier fix in commit
+ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
+driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
+possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
+message 3/4.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 5 ++---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    | 1 -
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index d200285..1021ccb 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ 	size_t kck_len;
+ 	size_t kek_len;
+ 	size_t tk_len;
++	int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+ 
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 		os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ 	}
+ 	sm->tptk_set = 1;
+-	sm->tk_to_set = 1;
+ 
+ 	kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
+ 	kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
+@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	enum wpa_alg alg;
+ 	const u8 *key_rsc;
+ 
+-	if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
++	if (sm->ptk.installed) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 
+ 	/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ 	os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+-	sm->tk_to_set = 0;
++	sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ 		eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
+ 	int ptk_set, tptk_set;
+ 	unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
+-	unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
+ 	u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
+ 	u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
+ 	int renew_snonce;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c19c4c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++	if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++			   "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++		sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++		return -1;
++	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++		    WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++	sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+ 	u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
+@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ 		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ 	else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ 		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+-	else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+-		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+-	else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++	else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++		if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++		else
++			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++	} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ 	case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ 		break;
+ 	case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1bd5a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index e424168..9eb9738 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ 		u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ 	} tpk;
+ 	int tpk_set;
++	int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ 	int tpk_success;
+ 	int tpk_in_progress;
+ 
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ 	u8 rsc[6];
+ 	enum wpa_alg alg;
+ 
++	if (peer->tk_set) {
++		/*
++		 * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++		 * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++		 * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++		 * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++		 * not allow that to happen.
++		 */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++			   " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++			   MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+ 
+ 	switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++		   MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ 	if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ 			   rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ 			   "driver");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	peer->tk_set = 1;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ 	peer->cipher = 0;
+ 	peer->qos_info = 0;
+ 	peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+-	peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++	peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ 	peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ 	os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ 	os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ 		wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ 	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ 		    peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ 	os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++		if (nonce[i])
++			return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ 				   const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ 	peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ 	peer->cipher = cipher;
+ 
+-	if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++	if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++	    !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ 		 * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ 				"TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ 			goto error;
+ 		}
++		peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ 	}
+ 
+ #if 0
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9678f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon-2.6/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c    | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h  | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ 	wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++	sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 
+ 	/* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ 	wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ 	u16 capab;
+ 
+ 	sm->ft_completed = 0;
++	sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+ 
+ 	buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 		2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ 	if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ 	u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ 	int ft_completed;
++	int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ 	int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ 	u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ 	int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc
index 4f8ae21..23e71f6 100644
--- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon.inc
@@ -1,4 +1,15 @@
-SRC_URI += " file://cfg80211.conf"
+
+
+# -p option is striplevel
+SRC_URI += " file://cfg80211.conf \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch;patchdir=.. \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch;patchdir=.. \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch;patchdir=.. \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch;patchdir=.. \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch;patchdir=.. \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch;patchdir=.. \
+             file://rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch;patchdir=.. \
+           "
 
 do_install() {
     install -d ${D}${sbindir} ${D}${sysconfdir}/init.d
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.4.bb b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.6.bb
index 9244da4..e9e0f33 100644
--- a/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.4.bb
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostap-daemon_2.6.bb
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ require hostap-daemon.inc
 HOMEPAGE = "http://hostap.epitest.fi"
 SECTION = "kernel/userland"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
-LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;md5=4d53178f44d4b38418a4fa8de365e11c"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://README;md5=8aa4e8c78b59b12016c4cb2d0a8db350"
 DEPENDS = "libnl openssl sqlite3"
 SUMMARY = "User space daemon for extended IEEE 802.11 management"
 
@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ do_compile() {
 
 CONFFILES_${PN} += "${sysconfdir}/hostapd.conf"
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "04578f3f2c3eb1bec1adf30473813912"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "6fe0eb6bd1c9cbd24952ece8586b6f7bd14ab358edfda99794e79b9b9dbd657f"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d"
+
 
 do_install_append() {
     mkdir -p ${D}${sysconfdir}/default
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ab0a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+SUMMARY = "Client for Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)"
+HOMEPAGE = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
+BUGTRACKER = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/bugz/"
+SECTION = "network"
+LICENSE = "BSD"
+LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=292eece3f2ebbaa25608eed8464018a3 \
+                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=3f01d778be8f953962388307ee38ed2b \
+                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=11;md5=06180ad70fe4a9bed87faeb55519e0dc \
+                   "
+DEPENDS = "gnutls dbus libnl openssl libgcrypt"
+RRECOMMENDS_${PN} = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli"
+
+inherit systemd
+
+SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN} = "wpa_supplicant.service wpa_supplicant-nl80211@.service wpa_supplicant-wired@.service"
+SYSTEMD_AUTO_ENABLE = "disable"
+
+SRC_URI = "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
+           file://defconfig-gnutls \
+           file://wpa-supplicant.sh \
+           file://wpa_supplicant.conf \
+           file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
+           file://99_wpa_supplicant \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch \
+           file://rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \
+           "
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "091569eb4440b7d7f2b4276dbfc03c3c"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450"
+
+
+S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}"
+
+PACKAGES_prepend = "wpa-supplicant-passphrase wpa-supplicant-cli "
+FILES_wpa-supplicant-passphrase = "${bindir}/wpa_passphrase"
+FILES_wpa-supplicant-cli = "${sbindir}/wpa_cli"
+FILES_${PN} += "${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services/*"
+CONFFILES_${PN} += "${sysconfdir}/wpa_supplicant.conf"
+
+do_configure () {
+	install -m 0755 ${WORKDIR}/defconfig-gnutls wpa_supplicant/.config
+	echo "CFLAGS +=\"-I${STAGING_INCDIR}/libnl3\"" >> wpa_supplicant/.config
+}
+
+export EXTRA_CFLAGS = "${CFLAGS}"
+export BINDIR = "${sbindir}"
+
+do_compile () {
+	unset CFLAGS CPPFLAGS CXXFLAGS
+	sed -e "s:CFLAGS\ =.*:& \$(EXTRA_CFLAGS):g" -i ${S}/src/lib.rules
+	oe_runmake -C wpa_supplicant
+}
+
+do_install () {
+	install -d ${D}${sbindir}
+	install -m 755 wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant ${D}${sbindir}
+	install -m 755 wpa_supplicant/wpa_cli        ${D}${sbindir}
+
+	install -d ${D}${bindir}
+	install -m 755 wpa_supplicant/wpa_passphrase ${D}${bindir}
+
+	install -d ${D}${docdir}/wpa_supplicant
+	install -m 644 wpa_supplicant/README ${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant.conf ${D}${docdir}/wpa_supplicant
+
+	install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}
+	install -m 600 ${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane ${D}${sysconfdir}/wpa_supplicant.conf
+
+	install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-pre-up.d/
+	install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-post-down.d/
+	install -d ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-down.d/
+	install -m 755 ${WORKDIR}/wpa-supplicant.sh ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/if-pre-up.d/wpa-supplicant
+	cd ${D}${sysconfdir}/network/ && \
+	ln -sf ../if-pre-up.d/wpa-supplicant if-post-down.d/wpa-supplicant
+
+	install -d ${D}/${sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d
+	install -m 644 ${S}/wpa_supplicant/dbus/dbus-wpa_supplicant.conf ${D}/${sysconfdir}/dbus-1/system.d
+	install -d ${D}/${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services
+	install -m 644 ${S}/wpa_supplicant/dbus/*.service ${D}/${datadir}/dbus-1/system-services
+
+	if ${@base_contains('DISTRO_FEATURES','systemd','true','false',d)}; then
+		install -d ${D}/${systemd_unitdir}/system
+		install -m 644 ${S}/wpa_supplicant/systemd/*.service ${D}/${systemd_unitdir}/system
+	fi
+
+	install -d ${D}/etc/default/volatiles
+	install -m 0644 ${WORKDIR}/99_wpa_supplicant ${D}/etc/default/volatiles
+}
+
+pkg_postinst_wpa-supplicant () {
+	# If we're offline, we don't need to do this.
+	if [ "x$D" = "x" ]; then
+		killall -q -HUP dbus-daemon || true
+	fi
+
+}
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/99_wpa_supplicant b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/99_wpa_supplicant
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ff4dd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/99_wpa_supplicant
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+d root root 0700 /var/run/wpa_supplicant none
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/defconfig-gnutls b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/defconfig-gnutls
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92ef823
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/defconfig-gnutls
@@ -0,0 +1,552 @@
+# Example wpa_supplicant build time configuration
+#
+# This file lists the configuration options that are used when building the
+# hostapd binary. All lines starting with # are ignored. Configuration option
+# lines must be commented out complete, if they are not to be included, i.e.,
+# just setting VARIABLE=n is not disabling that variable.
+#
+# This file is included in Makefile, so variables like CFLAGS and LIBS can also
+# be modified from here. In most cases, these lines should use += in order not
+# to override previous values of the variables.
+
+
+# Uncomment following two lines and fix the paths if you have installed OpenSSL
+# or GnuTLS in non-default location
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/openssl/include
+#LIBS += -L/usr/local/openssl/lib
+
+# Some Red Hat versions seem to include kerberos header files from OpenSSL, but
+# the kerberos files are not in the default include path. Following line can be
+# used to fix build issues on such systems (krb5.h not found).
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/kerberos
+
+# Example configuration for various cross-compilation platforms
+
+#### sveasoft (e.g., for Linksys WRT54G) ######################################
+#CC=mipsel-uclibc-gcc
+#CC=/opt/brcm/hndtools-mipsel-uclibc/bin/mipsel-uclibc-gcc
+#CFLAGS += -Os
+#CPPFLAGS += -I../src/include -I../../src/router/openssl/include
+#LIBS += -L/opt/brcm/hndtools-mipsel-uclibc-0.9.19/lib -lssl
+###############################################################################
+
+#### openwrt (e.g., for Linksys WRT54G) #######################################
+#CC=mipsel-uclibc-gcc
+#CC=/opt/brcm/hndtools-mipsel-uclibc/bin/mipsel-uclibc-gcc
+#CFLAGS += -Os
+#CPPFLAGS=-I../src/include -I../openssl-0.9.7d/include \
+#	-I../WRT54GS/release/src/include
+#LIBS = -lssl
+###############################################################################
+
+
+# Driver interface for Host AP driver
+CONFIG_DRIVER_HOSTAP=y
+
+# Driver interface for Agere driver
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_HERMES=y
+# Change include directories to match with the local setup
+#CFLAGS += -I../../hcf -I../../include -I../../include/hcf
+#CFLAGS += -I../../include/wireless
+
+# Driver interface for madwifi driver
+# Deprecated; use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y instead.
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_MADWIFI=y
+# Set include directory to the madwifi source tree
+#CFLAGS += -I../../madwifi
+
+# Driver interface for ndiswrapper
+# Deprecated; use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y instead.
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDISWRAPPER=y
+
+# Driver interface for Atmel driver
+# CONFIG_DRIVER_ATMEL=y
+
+# Driver interface for old Broadcom driver
+# Please note that the newer Broadcom driver ("hybrid Linux driver") supports
+# Linux wireless extensions and does not need (or even work) with the old
+# driver wrapper. Use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y with that driver.
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_BROADCOM=y
+# Example path for wlioctl.h; change to match your configuration
+#CFLAGS += -I/opt/WRT54GS/release/src/include
+
+# Driver interface for Intel ipw2100/2200 driver
+# Deprecated; use CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y instead.
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_IPW=y
+
+# Driver interface for Ralink driver
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_RALINK=y
+
+# Driver interface for generic Linux wireless extensions
+# Note: WEXT is deprecated in the current Linux kernel version and no new
+# functionality is added to it. nl80211-based interface is the new
+# replacement for WEXT and its use allows wpa_supplicant to properly control
+# the driver to improve existing functionality like roaming and to support new
+# functionality.
+CONFIG_DRIVER_WEXT=y
+
+# Driver interface for Linux drivers using the nl80211 kernel interface
+CONFIG_DRIVER_NL80211=y
+
+# driver_nl80211.c requires libnl. If you are compiling it yourself
+# you may need to point hostapd to your version of libnl.
+#
+#CFLAGS += -I$<path to libnl include files>
+#LIBS += -L$<path to libnl library files>
+
+# Use libnl v2.0 (or 3.0) libraries.
+#CONFIG_LIBNL20=y
+
+# Use libnl 3.2 libraries (if this is selected, CONFIG_LIBNL20 is ignored)
+CONFIG_LIBNL32=y
+
+
+# Driver interface for FreeBSD net80211 layer (e.g., Atheros driver)
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_BSD=y
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/local/include
+#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib
+#LIBS_p += -L/usr/local/lib
+#LIBS_c += -L/usr/local/lib
+
+# Driver interface for Windows NDIS
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_NDIS=y
+#CFLAGS += -I/usr/include/w32api/ddk
+#LIBS += -L/usr/local/lib
+# For native build using mingw
+#CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS=y
+# Additional directories for cross-compilation on Linux host for mingw target
+#CFLAGS += -I/opt/mingw/mingw32/include/ddk
+#LIBS += -L/opt/mingw/mingw32/lib
+#CC=mingw32-gcc
+# By default, driver_ndis uses WinPcap for low-level operations. This can be
+# replaced with the following option which replaces WinPcap calls with NDISUIO.
+# However, this requires that WZC is disabled (net stop wzcsvc) before starting
+# wpa_supplicant.
+# CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y
+
+# Driver interface for development testing
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_TEST=y
+
+# Driver interface for wired Ethernet drivers
+CONFIG_DRIVER_WIRED=y
+
+# Driver interface for the Broadcom RoboSwitch family
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_ROBOSWITCH=y
+
+# Driver interface for no driver (e.g., WPS ER only)
+#CONFIG_DRIVER_NONE=y
+
+# Enable IEEE 802.1X Supplicant (automatically included if any EAP method is
+# included)
+CONFIG_IEEE8021X_EAPOL=y
+
+# EAP-MD5
+CONFIG_EAP_MD5=y
+
+# EAP-MSCHAPv2
+CONFIG_EAP_MSCHAPV2=y
+
+# EAP-TLS
+CONFIG_EAP_TLS=y
+
+# EAL-PEAP
+CONFIG_EAP_PEAP=y
+
+# EAP-TTLS
+CONFIG_EAP_TTLS=y
+
+# EAP-FAST
+# Note: If OpenSSL is used as the TLS library, OpenSSL 1.0 or newer is needed
+# for EAP-FAST support. Older OpenSSL releases would need to be patched, e.g.,
+# with openssl-0.9.8x-tls-extensions.patch, to add the needed functions.
+#CONFIG_EAP_FAST=y
+
+# EAP-GTC
+CONFIG_EAP_GTC=y
+
+# EAP-OTP
+CONFIG_EAP_OTP=y
+
+# EAP-SIM (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-SIM is used)
+#CONFIG_EAP_SIM=y
+
+# EAP-PSK (experimental; this is _not_ needed for WPA-PSK)
+#CONFIG_EAP_PSK=y
+
+# EAP-pwd (secure authentication using only a password)
+#CONFIG_EAP_PWD=y
+
+# EAP-PAX
+#CONFIG_EAP_PAX=y
+
+# LEAP
+CONFIG_EAP_LEAP=y
+
+# EAP-AKA (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA is used)
+#CONFIG_EAP_AKA=y
+
+# EAP-AKA' (enable CONFIG_PCSC, if EAP-AKA' is used).
+# This requires CONFIG_EAP_AKA to be enabled, too.
+#CONFIG_EAP_AKA_PRIME=y
+
+# Enable USIM simulator (Milenage) for EAP-AKA
+#CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR=y
+
+# EAP-SAKE
+#CONFIG_EAP_SAKE=y
+
+# EAP-GPSK
+#CONFIG_EAP_GPSK=y
+# Include support for optional SHA256 cipher suite in EAP-GPSK
+#CONFIG_EAP_GPSK_SHA256=y
+
+# EAP-TNC and related Trusted Network Connect support (experimental)
+#CONFIG_EAP_TNC=y
+
+# Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS)
+CONFIG_WPS=y
+# Enable WSC 2.0 support
+#CONFIG_WPS2=y
+# Enable WPS external registrar functionality
+#CONFIG_WPS_ER=y
+# Disable credentials for an open network by default when acting as a WPS
+# registrar.
+#CONFIG_WPS_REG_DISABLE_OPEN=y
+# Enable WPS support with NFC config method
+#CONFIG_WPS_NFC=y
+
+# EAP-IKEv2
+#CONFIG_EAP_IKEV2=y
+
+# EAP-EKE
+#CONFIG_EAP_EKE=y
+
+# PKCS#12 (PFX) support (used to read private key and certificate file from
+# a file that usually has extension .p12 or .pfx)
+CONFIG_PKCS12=y
+
+# Smartcard support (i.e., private key on a smartcard), e.g., with openssl
+# engine.
+CONFIG_SMARTCARD=y
+
+# PC/SC interface for smartcards (USIM, GSM SIM)
+# Enable this if EAP-SIM or EAP-AKA is included
+#CONFIG_PCSC=y
+
+# Support HT overrides (disable HT/HT40, mask MCS rates, etc.)
+#CONFIG_HT_OVERRIDES=y
+
+# Support VHT overrides (disable VHT, mask MCS rates, etc.)
+#CONFIG_VHT_OVERRIDES=y
+
+# Development testing
+#CONFIG_EAPOL_TEST=y
+
+# Select control interface backend for external programs, e.g, wpa_cli:
+# unix = UNIX domain sockets (default for Linux/*BSD)
+# udp = UDP sockets using localhost (127.0.0.1)
+# named_pipe = Windows Named Pipe (default for Windows)
+# udp-remote = UDP sockets with remote access (only for tests systems/purpose)
+# y = use default (backwards compatibility)
+# If this option is commented out, control interface is not included in the
+# build.
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE=y
+
+# Include support for GNU Readline and History Libraries in wpa_cli.
+# When building a wpa_cli binary for distribution, please note that these
+# libraries are licensed under GPL and as such, BSD license may not apply for
+# the resulting binary.
+#CONFIG_READLINE=y
+
+# Include internal line edit mode in wpa_cli. This can be used as a replacement
+# for GNU Readline to provide limited command line editing and history support.
+#CONFIG_WPA_CLI_EDIT=y
+
+# Remove debugging code that is printing out debug message to stdout.
+# This can be used to reduce the size of the wpa_supplicant considerably
+# if debugging code is not needed. The size reduction can be around 35%
+# (e.g., 90 kB).
+#CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG=y
+
+# Remove WPA support, e.g., for wired-only IEEE 802.1X supplicant, to save
+# 35-50 kB in code size.
+#CONFIG_NO_WPA=y
+
+# Remove IEEE 802.11i/WPA-Personal ASCII passphrase support
+# This option can be used to reduce code size by removing support for
+# converting ASCII passphrases into PSK. If this functionality is removed, the
+# PSK can only be configured as the 64-octet hexstring (e.g., from
+# wpa_passphrase). This saves about 0.5 kB in code size.
+#CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE=y
+
+# Disable scan result processing (ap_mode=1) to save code size by about 1 kB.
+# This can be used if ap_scan=1 mode is never enabled.
+#CONFIG_NO_SCAN_PROCESSING=y
+
+# Select configuration backend:
+# file = text file (e.g., wpa_supplicant.conf; note: the configuration file
+#	path is given on command line, not here; this option is just used to
+#	select the backend that allows configuration files to be used)
+# winreg = Windows registry (see win_example.reg for an example)
+CONFIG_BACKEND=file
+
+# Remove configuration write functionality (i.e., to allow the configuration
+# file to be updated based on runtime configuration changes). The runtime
+# configuration can still be changed, the changes are just not going to be
+# persistent over restarts. This option can be used to reduce code size by
+# about 3.5 kB.
+#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_WRITE=y
+
+# Remove support for configuration blobs to reduce code size by about 1.5 kB.
+#CONFIG_NO_CONFIG_BLOBS=y
+
+# Select program entry point implementation:
+# main = UNIX/POSIX like main() function (default)
+# main_winsvc = Windows service (read parameters from registry)
+# main_none = Very basic example (development use only)
+#CONFIG_MAIN=main
+
+# Select wrapper for operatins system and C library specific functions
+# unix = UNIX/POSIX like systems (default)
+# win32 = Windows systems
+# none = Empty template
+#CONFIG_OS=unix
+
+# Select event loop implementation
+# eloop = select() loop (default)
+# eloop_win = Windows events and WaitForMultipleObject() loop
+#CONFIG_ELOOP=eloop
+
+# Should we use poll instead of select? Select is used by default.
+#CONFIG_ELOOP_POLL=y
+
+# Select layer 2 packet implementation
+# linux = Linux packet socket (default)
+# pcap = libpcap/libdnet/WinPcap
+# freebsd = FreeBSD libpcap
+# winpcap = WinPcap with receive thread
+# ndis = Windows NDISUIO (note: requires CONFIG_USE_NDISUIO=y)
+# none = Empty template
+#CONFIG_L2_PACKET=linux
+
+# PeerKey handshake for Station to Station Link (IEEE 802.11e DLS)
+CONFIG_PEERKEY=y
+
+# IEEE 802.11w (management frame protection), also known as PMF
+# Driver support is also needed for IEEE 802.11w.
+#CONFIG_IEEE80211W=y
+
+# Select TLS implementation
+# openssl = OpenSSL (default)
+# gnutls = GnuTLS
+# internal = Internal TLSv1 implementation (experimental)
+# none = Empty template
+#CONFIG_TLS=openssl
+
+# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.1)
+# can be enabled to get a stronger construction of messages when block ciphers
+# are used. It should be noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based
+# implementation may not be compatible with TLS v1.1 message (ClientHello is
+# sent prior to negotiating which version will be used)
+#CONFIG_TLSV11=y
+
+# TLS-based EAP methods require at least TLS v1.0. Newer version of TLS (v1.2)
+# can be enabled to enable use of stronger crypto algorithms. It should be
+# noted that some existing TLS v1.0 -based implementation may not be compatible
+# with TLS v1.2 message (ClientHello is sent prior to negotiating which version
+# will be used)
+#CONFIG_TLSV12=y
+
+# If CONFIG_TLS=internal is used, additional library and include paths are
+# needed for LibTomMath. Alternatively, an integrated, minimal version of
+# LibTomMath can be used. See beginning of libtommath.c for details on benefits
+# and drawbacks of this option.
+#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH=y
+#ifndef CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH
+#LTM_PATH=/usr/src/libtommath-0.39
+#CFLAGS += -I$(LTM_PATH)
+#LIBS += -L$(LTM_PATH)
+#LIBS_p += -L$(LTM_PATH)
+#endif
+# At the cost of about 4 kB of additional binary size, the internal LibTomMath
+# can be configured to include faster routines for exptmod, sqr, and div to
+# speed up DH and RSA calculation considerably
+#CONFIG_INTERNAL_LIBTOMMATH_FAST=y
+
+# Include NDIS event processing through WMI into wpa_supplicant/wpasvc.
+# This is only for Windows builds and requires WMI-related header files and
+# WbemUuid.Lib from Platform SDK even when building with MinGW.
+#CONFIG_NDIS_EVENTS_INTEGRATED=y
+#PLATFORMSDKLIB="/opt/Program Files/Microsoft Platform SDK/Lib"
+
+# Add support for old DBus control interface
+# (fi.epitest.hostap.WPASupplicant)
+#CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y
+
+# Add support for new DBus control interface
+# (fi.w1.hostap.wpa_supplicant1)
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y
+
+# Add introspection support for new DBus control interface
+#CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_INTRO=y
+
+# Add support for loading EAP methods dynamically as shared libraries.
+# When this option is enabled, each EAP method can be either included
+# statically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=y) or dynamically (CONFIG_EAP_<method>=dyn).
+# Dynamic EAP methods are build as shared objects (eap_*.so) and they need to
+# be loaded in the beginning of the wpa_supplicant configuration file
+# (see load_dynamic_eap parameter in the example file) before being used in
+# the network blocks.
+#
+# Note that some shared parts of EAP methods are included in the main program
+# and in order to be able to use dynamic EAP methods using these parts, the
+# main program must have been build with the EAP method enabled (=y or =dyn).
+# This means that EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS/FAST cannot be added as dynamic libraries
+# unless at least one of them was included in the main build to force inclusion
+# of the shared code. Similarly, at least one of EAP-SIM/AKA must be included
+# in the main build to be able to load these methods dynamically.
+#
+# Please also note that using dynamic libraries will increase the total binary
+# size. Thus, it may not be the best option for targets that have limited
+# amount of memory/flash.
+#CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EAP_METHODS=y
+
+# IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 (Fast BSS Transition)
+#CONFIG_IEEE80211R=y
+
+# Add support for writing debug log to a file (/tmp/wpa_supplicant-log-#.txt)
+#CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE=y
+
+# Send debug messages to syslog instead of stdout
+#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG=y
+# Set syslog facility for debug messages
+#CONFIG_DEBUG_SYSLOG_FACILITY=LOG_DAEMON
+
+# Add support for sending all debug messages (regardless of debug verbosity)
+# to the Linux kernel tracing facility. This helps debug the entire stack by
+# making it easy to record everything happening from the driver up into the
+# same file, e.g., using trace-cmd.
+#CONFIG_DEBUG_LINUX_TRACING=y
+
+# Enable privilege separation (see README 'Privilege separation' for details)
+#CONFIG_PRIVSEP=y
+
+# Enable mitigation against certain attacks against TKIP by delaying Michael
+# MIC error reports by a random amount of time between 0 and 60 seconds
+#CONFIG_DELAYED_MIC_ERROR_REPORT=y
+
+# Enable tracing code for developer debugging
+# This tracks use of memory allocations and other registrations and reports
+# incorrect use with a backtrace of call (or allocation) location.
+#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y
+# For BSD, uncomment these.
+#LIBS += -lexecinfo
+#LIBS_p += -lexecinfo
+#LIBS_c += -lexecinfo
+
+# Use libbfd to get more details for developer debugging
+# This enables use of libbfd to get more detailed symbols for the backtraces
+# generated by CONFIG_WPA_TRACE=y.
+#CONFIG_WPA_TRACE_BFD=y
+# For BSD, uncomment these.
+#LIBS += -lbfd -liberty -lz
+#LIBS_p += -lbfd -liberty -lz
+#LIBS_c += -lbfd -liberty -lz
+
+CONFIG_TLS = gnutls
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS=y
+CONFIG_CTRL_IFACE_DBUS_NEW=y
+
+# wpa_supplicant depends on strong random number generation being available
+# from the operating system. os_get_random() function is used to fetch random
+# data when needed, e.g., for key generation. On Linux and BSD systems, this
+# works by reading /dev/urandom. It should be noted that the OS entropy pool
+# needs to be properly initialized before wpa_supplicant is started. This is
+# important especially on embedded devices that do not have a hardware random
+# number generator and may by default start up with minimal entropy available
+# for random number generation.
+#
+# As a safety net, wpa_supplicant is by default trying to internally collect
+# additional entropy for generating random data to mix in with the data fetched
+# from the OS. This by itself is not considered to be very strong, but it may
+# help in cases where the system pool is not initialized properly. However, it
+# is very strongly recommended that the system pool is initialized with enough
+# entropy either by using hardware assisted random number generator or by
+# storing state over device reboots.
+#
+# wpa_supplicant can be configured to maintain its own entropy store over
+# restarts to enhance random number generation. This is not perfect, but it is
+# much more secure than using the same sequence of random numbers after every
+# reboot. This can be enabled with -e<entropy file> command line option. The
+# specified file needs to be readable and writable by wpa_supplicant.
+#
+# If the os_get_random() is known to provide strong random data (e.g., on
+# Linux/BSD, the board in question is known to have reliable source of random
+# data from /dev/urandom), the internal wpa_supplicant random pool can be
+# disabled. This will save some in binary size and CPU use. However, this
+# should only be considered for builds that are known to be used on devices
+# that meet the requirements described above.
+#CONFIG_NO_RANDOM_POOL=y
+
+# IEEE 802.11n (High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode)
+#CONFIG_IEEE80211N=y
+
+# IEEE 802.11ac (Very High Throughput) support (mainly for AP mode)
+# (depends on CONFIG_IEEE80211N)
+#CONFIG_IEEE80211AC=y
+
+# Wireless Network Management (IEEE Std 802.11v-2011)
+# Note: This is experimental and not complete implementation.
+#CONFIG_WNM=y
+
+# Interworking (IEEE 802.11u)
+# This can be used to enable functionality to improve interworking with
+# external networks (GAS/ANQP to learn more about the networks and network
+# selection based on available credentials).
+#CONFIG_INTERWORKING=y
+
+# Hotspot 2.0
+#CONFIG_HS20=y
+
+# Disable roaming in wpa_supplicant
+#CONFIG_NO_ROAMING=y
+
+# AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant
+# This can be used for controlling AP mode operations with wpa_supplicant. It
+# should be noted that this is mainly aimed at simple cases like
+# WPA2-Personal while more complex configurations like WPA2-Enterprise with an
+# external RADIUS server can be supported with hostapd.
+CONFIG_AP=y
+
+CONFIG_BGSCAN_SIMPLE=y
+
+# P2P (Wi-Fi Direct)
+# This can be used to enable P2P support in wpa_supplicant. See README-P2P for
+# more information on P2P operations.
+#CONFIG_P2P=y
+
+# Enable TDLS support
+#CONFIG_TDLS=y
+
+# Wi-Fi Direct
+# This can be used to enable Wi-Fi Direct extensions for P2P using an external
+# program to control the additional information exchanges in the messages.
+#CONFIG_WIFI_DISPLAY=y
+
+# Autoscan
+# This can be used to enable automatic scan support in wpa_supplicant.
+# See wpa_supplicant.conf for more information on autoscan usage.
+#
+# Enabling directly a module will enable autoscan support.
+# For exponential module:
+CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_EXPONENTIAL=y
+# For periodic module:
+#CONFIG_AUTOSCAN_PERIODIC=y
+
+# Password (and passphrase, etc.) backend for external storage
+# These optional mechanisms can be used to add support for storing passwords
+# and other secrets in external (to wpa_supplicant) location. This allows, for
+# example, operating system specific key storage to be used
+#
+# External password backend for testing purposes (developer use)
+#CONFIG_EXT_PASSWORD_TEST=y
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7276848
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
+
+Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
+processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
+issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
+same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
+also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
+frames on RX side.
+
+This issue was introduced by the commit
+0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
+authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
+times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
+needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
+failed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c  | 16 +++++++++++++---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c    | 11 +++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.h    |  3 ++-
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h  |  1 +
+ 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index 4e04169..333035f 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ {
+ 	struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap;
+ 	struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap;
++	int set = 1;
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and
+@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 	 * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but
+ 	 * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that
+ 	 * does not support full AP client state.
++	 *
++	 * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the
++	 * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for
++	 * the same key.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!sta->added_unassoc)
++	if (!sta->added_unassoc &&
++	    (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) ||
++	     !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) {
+ 		hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
++		wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED);
++		set = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N
+ 	if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT)
+@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
+ 			    sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL,
+ 			    sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo,
+ 			    sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0,
+-			    sta->added_unassoc)) {
++			    set)) {
+ 		hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr,
+ 			       HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE,
+ 			       "Could not %s STA to kernel driver",
+-			       sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add");
++			       set ? "set" : "add");
+ 
+ 		if (sta->added_unassoc) {
+ 			hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr);
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 3587086..707971d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
+ #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 		break;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
++	case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
++		sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
++		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++	if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
++		return 0;
++	return sm->tk_already_set;
++}
++
++
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 			     struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
+ 		 u8 *data, size_t data_len);
+ enum wpa_event {
+ 	WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
+-	WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
++	WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
+ };
+ void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
+@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+ int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 			     struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (sm->tk_already_set) {
++		/* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
++		 * PN in the driver */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	/* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
+ 	 * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
+ 	 * after association has been completed. This function will be called
+@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+ 
+ 	/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
+ 	sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
++	sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+ 
+@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
+ 
+ 	sm->pairwise = pairwise;
+ 	sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
++	sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ 	wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
+ 
+ 	buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
+ 	struct wpa_ptk PTK;
+ 	Boolean PTK_valid;
+ 	Boolean pairwise_set;
++	Boolean tk_already_set;
+ 	int keycount;
+ 	Boolean Pair;
+ 	struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1802d66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
+
+Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
+(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
+not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
+attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
+sequence counter associated to the group key.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h |  11 +++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 116 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    |   4 ++
+ 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index af1d0f0..d200285 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ 	size_t tk_len;
+ };
+ 
++struct wpa_gtk {
++	u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
++	size_t gtk_len;
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++struct wpa_igtk {
++	u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
++	size_t igtk_len;
++};
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ /* WPA IE version 1
+  * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ 	u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ 
++	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++	if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++	    os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
++			gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
+ 	wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 		"WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	}
+ 	os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ 
++	sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++	os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
++				       const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++{
++	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
++	u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
++
++	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
++	if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++	    os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
++			keyidx);
++		return  0;
++	}
++
++	wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
++		"WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
++		keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
++	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
++	if (keyidx > 4095) {
++		wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++			"WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
++			   broadcast_ether_addr,
++			   keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
++			   igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
++		wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
++			"WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++	os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++
++	return 0;
++}
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
++
++
+ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 			       struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
+ {
+@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	if (ie->igtk) {
+ 		size_t len;
+ 		const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+-		u16 keyidx;
++
+ 		len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ 		if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
+ 			return -1;
++
+ 		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+-		keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+-		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
+-			"pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+-			keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+-		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
+-				igtk->igtk, len);
+-		if (keyidx > 4095) {
+-			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+-				"WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+-			return -1;
+-		}
+-		if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+-				   broadcast_ether_addr,
+-				   keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+-				   igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+-			wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+-				"WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+  */
+ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ {
+-	int clear_ptk = 1;
++	int clear_keys = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (sm == NULL)
+ 		return;
+@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ 		/* Prepare for the next transition */
+ 		wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
+ 
+-		clear_ptk = 0;
++		clear_keys = 0;
+ 	}
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 
+-	if (clear_ptk) {
++	if (clear_keys) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
+ 		 * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
+@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ 		os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 		sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ 		os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++		os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++		os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	}
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ 	os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
++	os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++	os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ 	os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+ 	os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
+@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 		os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 	} else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
+-		struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
+-		u16 keyidx;
+-
+-		os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+-		keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+-		os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
+-		os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
+-
+-		keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
+-		os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
+-
+-		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+-				igd.igtk, keylen);
+-		if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+-				   broadcast_ether_addr,
+-				   keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
+-				   igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
+-			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
+-				   "WNM mode");
+-			os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
++		const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
++
++		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+-		}
+-		os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	} else {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ 	int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ 	u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
++	struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
++	struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ 	struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+ 
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2937b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
+ Mode cases
+
+This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
+separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
+corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
+GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
+detect a possible key reconfiguration.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c   | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h |  2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
+ 
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 				      const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
+-				      const u8 *key_rsc)
++				      const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ 	const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
+ 	u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ 
+ 	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+-	if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+-	    os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
++	if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
++	    (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++		       sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ 			gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	}
+ 	os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ 
+-	sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+-	os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++	if (wnm_sleep) {
++		sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
++			  sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
++	} else {
++		sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
++	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	    (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
+ 					       gtk_len, gtk_len,
+ 					       &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
+-	     wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) {
++	     wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"RSN: Failed to install GTK");
+ 		os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+-				       const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
++				       const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
++				       int wnm_sleep)
+ {
+ 	size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ 	u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+ 
+ 	/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+-	if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+-	    os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
++	if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
++	    (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
++	     os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++		       sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ 			keyidx);
+@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+-	os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++	if (wnm_sleep) {
++		sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
++			  sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
++	} else {
++		sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
++		os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
++	}
+ 
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 			return -1;
+ 
+ 		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
+-		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc))
+ 		key_rsc = null_rsc;
+ 
+-	if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) ||
++	if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) ||
+ 	    wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0)
+ 		goto failed;
+ 	os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
+ 		sm->tptk_set = 0;
+ 		os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ 		os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++		os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 		os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++		os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ 	os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ 	os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
++	os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 	os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
++	os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ 	os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
+@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 
+ 		wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
+ 				gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
+-		if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
+ 			os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
+ 				   "WNM mode");
+@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
+ 		const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+ 
+ 		igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+-		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
++		if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
+ 			return -1;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 	} else {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index afc9e37..9a54631 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	int rx_replay_counter_set;
+ 	u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ 	struct wpa_gtk gtk;
++	struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ 	struct wpa_igtk igtk;
++	struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+ 
+ 	struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22ee217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
+
+Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
+and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
+trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
+
+This fixes the earlier fix in commit
+ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
+driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
+possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
+message 3/4.
+
+Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
+---
+ src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c      | 5 ++---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h    | 1 -
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+index d200285..1021ccb 100644
+--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
+ 	size_t kck_len;
+ 	size_t kek_len;
+ 	size_t tk_len;
++	int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
+ };
+ 
+ struct wpa_gtk {
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 		os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ 	}
+ 	sm->tptk_set = 1;
+-	sm->tk_to_set = 1;
+ 
+ 	kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie;
+ 	kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len;
+@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 	enum wpa_alg alg;
+ 	const u8 *key_rsc;
+ 
+-	if (!sm->tk_to_set) {
++	if (sm->ptk.installed) {
+ 		wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ 			"WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ 
+ 	/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
+ 	os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+-	sm->tk_to_set = 0;
++	sm->ptk.installed = 1;
+ 
+ 	if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
+ 		eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 9a54631..41f371f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk;
+ 	int ptk_set, tptk_set;
+ 	unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1;
+-	unsigned int tk_to_set:1;
+ 	u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN];
+ 	u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */
+ 	int renew_snonce;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c19c4c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
+
+The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
+the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
+directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
+determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
+new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
+
+Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
+for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644
+--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
++{
++	if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
++			   "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
++		sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
++		return -1;
++	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
++		    WPA_NONCE_LEN);
++	sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
+ {
+ 	u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
+@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
+ 		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
+ 	else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
+ 		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
+-	else if (sm->PTKRequest)
+-		SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+-	else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
++	else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
++		if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
++			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
++		else
++			SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
++	} else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ 	case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
+ 		break;
+ 	case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1bd5a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
+
+Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
+been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
+related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
+for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
+that behavior does not get modified.
+
+For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
+followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
+the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
+ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
+and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
+
+As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
+the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+index e424168..9eb9738 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
+ 		u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
+ 	} tpk;
+ 	int tpk_set;
++	int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
+ 	int tpk_success;
+ 	int tpk_in_progress;
+ 
+@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ 	u8 rsc[6];
+ 	enum wpa_alg alg;
+ 
++	if (peer->tk_set) {
++		/*
++		 * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
++		 * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
++		 * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
++		 * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
++		 * not allow that to happen.
++		 */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
++			   " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
++			   MAC2STR(peer->addr));
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
+ 
+ 	switch (peer->cipher) {
+@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
++		   MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ 	if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
+ 			   rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
+ 			   "driver");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	peer->tk_set = 1;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
+ 	peer->cipher = 0;
+ 	peer->qos_info = 0;
+ 	peer->wmm_capable = 0;
+-	peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
++	peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ 	peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
+ 	os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
+ 	os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
+ 		wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ 	wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
+ 		    peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ 	os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
+ }
+ 
+ 
++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
++{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
++		if (nonce[i])
++			return 1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++
+ static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
+ 				   const u8 *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
+ 	peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
+ 	peer->cipher = cipher;
+ 
+-	if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
++	if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
++	    !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
+ 		/*
+ 		 * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
+ 		 * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
+@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
+ 				"TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
+ 			goto error;
+ 		}
++		peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
+ 	}
+ 
+ #if 0
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85ea1d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0007-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 53c5eb58e95004f86e65ee9fbfccbc291b139057 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending
+ request
+
+Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
+Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
+response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
+association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
+successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
+protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+index 1b3409c..67a07ff 100644
+--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 
+ 	if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+-			   "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association");
++			   "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested");
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0;
++
+ 	if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT ||
+ 	    wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response "
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9678f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/rebased-v2.6-0008-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
+
+The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
+the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
+case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
+pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
+be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
+even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
+Reassociation Response frame.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa.c    | 3 +++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
+ src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h  | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
+ 	wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
+ #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
++	sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ 
+ 	/* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
+ 	wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
+ 	u16 capab;
+ 
+ 	sm->ft_completed = 0;
++	sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+ 
+ 	buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
+ 		2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
+@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
++
+ 	if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644
+--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
+ 	size_t r0kh_id_len;
+ 	u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
+ 	int ft_completed;
++	int ft_reassoc_completed;
+ 	int over_the_ds_in_progress;
+ 	u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
+ 	int set_ptk_after_assoc;
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.sh b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c9e5d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+
+WPA_SUP_BIN="/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant"
+WPA_SUP_PNAME="wpa_supplicant"
+WPA_SUP_PIDFILE="/var/run/wpa_supplicant.$IFACE.pid"
+WPA_SUP_OPTIONS="-B -P $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE -i $IFACE"
+
+VERBOSITY=0
+
+
+if [ -s "$IF_WPA_CONF" ]; then
+	WPA_SUP_CONF="-c $IF_WPA_CONF"
+else
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if [ ! -x "$WPA_SUP_BIN" ]; then
+	
+	if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then
+		echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: binaries not executable or missing from $WPA_SUP_BIN"
+	fi
+	
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ "$MODE" = "start" ] ; then
+	# driver type of interface, defaults to wext when undefined
+	if [ -s "/etc/wpa_supplicant/driver.$IFACE" ]; then
+		IF_WPA_DRIVER=$(cat "/etc/wpa_supplicant/driver.$IFACE")
+	elif [ -z "$IF_WPA_DRIVER" ]; then
+		
+		if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then
+			echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: wpa-driver not provided, using \"wext\""
+		fi
+		
+		IF_WPA_DRIVER="wext"
+	fi
+	
+	# if we have passed the criteria, start wpa_supplicant
+	if [ -n "$WPA_SUP_CONF" ]; then
+		
+		if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then
+			echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: $WPA_SUP_BIN $WPA_SUP_OPTIONS $WPA_SUP_CONF -D $IF_WPA_DRIVER"
+		fi
+		
+		start-stop-daemon --start --quiet \
+			--name $WPA_SUP_PNAME --startas $WPA_SUP_BIN --pidfile $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE \
+			--  $WPA_SUP_OPTIONS $WPA_SUP_CONF -D $IF_WPA_DRIVER
+	fi
+
+	# if the interface socket exists, then wpa_supplicant was invoked successfully
+	if [ -S "$WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE" ]; then
+	
+		if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then
+			echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: ctrl_interface socket located at $WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE"
+		fi
+
+		exit 0
+		
+	fi
+	
+elif [ "$MODE" = "stop" ]; then
+
+	if [ -f "$WPA_SUP_PIDFILE" ]; then
+		
+		if [ "$VERBOSITY" = "1" ]; then
+			echo "$WPA_SUP_PNAME: terminating $WPA_SUP_PNAME daemon"
+		fi
+		
+		start-stop-daemon --stop --quiet \
+			--name $WPA_SUP_PNAME --pidfile	$WPA_SUP_PIDFILE
+			
+		if [ -S "$WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE" ]; then
+			rm -f $WPA_COMMON_CTRL_IFACE/$IFACE
+		fi
+			
+		if [ -f "$WPA_SUP_PIDFILE" ]; then
+			rm -f $WPA_SUP_PIDFILE
+		fi
+	fi
+
+fi
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68258f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,690 @@
+##### Example wpa_supplicant configuration file ###############################
+#
+# This file describes configuration file format and lists all available option.
+# Please also take a look at simpler configuration examples in 'examples'
+# subdirectory.
+#
+# Empty lines and lines starting with # are ignored
+
+# NOTE! This file may contain password information and should probably be made
+# readable only by root user on multiuser systems.
+
+# Note: All file paths in this configuration file should use full (absolute,
+# not relative to working directory) path in order to allow working directory
+# to be changed. This can happen if wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
+
+# Whether to allow wpa_supplicant to update (overwrite) configuration
+#
+# This option can be used to allow wpa_supplicant to overwrite configuration
+# file whenever configuration is changed (e.g., new network block is added with
+# wpa_cli or wpa_gui, or a password is changed). This is required for
+# wpa_cli/wpa_gui to be able to store the configuration changes permanently.
+# Please note that overwriting configuration file will remove the comments from
+# it.
+#update_config=1
+
+# global configuration (shared by all network blocks)
+#
+# Parameters for the control interface. If this is specified, wpa_supplicant
+# will open a control interface that is available for external programs to
+# manage wpa_supplicant. The meaning of this string depends on which control
+# interface mechanism is used. For all cases, the existence of this parameter
+# in configuration is used to determine whether the control interface is
+# enabled.
+#
+# For UNIX domain sockets (default on Linux and BSD): This is a directory that
+# will be created for UNIX domain sockets for listening to requests from
+# external programs (CLI/GUI, etc.) for status information and configuration.
+# The socket file will be named based on the interface name, so multiple
+# wpa_supplicant processes can be run at the same time if more than one
+# interface is used.
+# /var/run/wpa_supplicant is the recommended directory for sockets and by
+# default, wpa_cli will use it when trying to connect with wpa_supplicant.
+#
+# Access control for the control interface can be configured by setting the
+# directory to allow only members of a group to use sockets. This way, it is
+# possible to run wpa_supplicant as root (since it needs to change network
+# configuration and open raw sockets) and still allow GUI/CLI components to be
+# run as non-root users. However, since the control interface can be used to
+# change the network configuration, this access needs to be protected in many
+# cases. By default, wpa_supplicant is configured to use gid 0 (root). If you
+# want to allow non-root users to use the control interface, add a new group
+# and change this value to match with that group. Add users that should have
+# control interface access to this group. If this variable is commented out or
+# not included in the configuration file, group will not be changed from the
+# value it got by default when the directory or socket was created.
+#
+# When configuring both the directory and group, use following format:
+# DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=wheel
+# DIR=/var/run/wpa_supplicant GROUP=0
+# (group can be either group name or gid)
+#
+# For UDP connections (default on Windows): The value will be ignored. This
+# variable is just used to select that the control interface is to be created.
+# The value can be set to, e.g., udp (ctrl_interface=udp)
+#
+# For Windows Named Pipe: This value can be used to set the security descriptor
+# for controlling access to the control interface. Security descriptor can be
+# set using Security Descriptor String Format (see http://msdn.microsoft.com/
+# library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/secauthz/security/
+# security_descriptor_string_format.asp). The descriptor string needs to be
+# prefixed with SDDL=. For example, ctrl_interface=SDDL=D: would set an empty
+# DACL (which will reject all connections). See README-Windows.txt for more
+# information about SDDL string format.
+#
+ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
+
+# IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL version
+# wpa_supplicant is implemented based on IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 which defines
+# EAPOL version 2. However, there are many APs that do not handle the new
+# version number correctly (they seem to drop the frames completely). In order
+# to make wpa_supplicant interoperate with these APs, the version number is set
+# to 1 by default. This configuration value can be used to set it to the new
+# version (2).
+eapol_version=1
+
+# AP scanning/selection
+# By default, wpa_supplicant requests driver to perform AP scanning and then
+# uses the scan results to select a suitable AP. Another alternative is to
+# allow the driver to take care of AP scanning and selection and use
+# wpa_supplicant just to process EAPOL frames based on IEEE 802.11 association
+# information from the driver.
+# 1: wpa_supplicant initiates scanning and AP selection
+# 0: driver takes care of scanning, AP selection, and IEEE 802.11 association
+#    parameters (e.g., WPA IE generation); this mode can also be used with
+#    non-WPA drivers when using IEEE 802.1X mode; do not try to associate with
+#    APs (i.e., external program needs to control association). This mode must
+#    also be used when using wired Ethernet drivers.
+# 2: like 0, but associate with APs using security policy and SSID (but not
+#    BSSID); this can be used, e.g., with ndiswrapper and NDIS drivers to
+#    enable operation with hidden SSIDs and optimized roaming; in this mode,
+#    the network blocks in the configuration file are tried one by one until
+#    the driver reports successful association; each network block should have
+#    explicit security policy (i.e., only one option in the lists) for
+#    key_mgmt, pairwise, group, proto variables
+ap_scan=1
+
+# EAP fast re-authentication
+# By default, fast re-authentication is enabled for all EAP methods that
+# support it. This variable can be used to disable fast re-authentication.
+# Normally, there is no need to disable this.
+fast_reauth=1
+
+# OpenSSL Engine support
+# These options can be used to load OpenSSL engines.
+# The two engines that are supported currently are shown below:
+# They are both from the opensc project (http://www.opensc.org/)
+# By default no engines are loaded.
+# make the opensc engine available
+#opensc_engine_path=/usr/lib/opensc/engine_opensc.so
+# make the pkcs11 engine available
+#pkcs11_engine_path=/usr/lib/opensc/engine_pkcs11.so
+# configure the path to the pkcs11 module required by the pkcs11 engine
+#pkcs11_module_path=/usr/lib/pkcs11/opensc-pkcs11.so
+
+# Dynamic EAP methods
+# If EAP methods were built dynamically as shared object files, they need to be
+# loaded here before being used in the network blocks. By default, EAP methods
+# are included statically in the build, so these lines are not needed
+#load_dynamic_eap=/usr/lib/wpa_supplicant/eap_tls.so
+#load_dynamic_eap=/usr/lib/wpa_supplicant/eap_md5.so
+
+# Driver interface parameters
+# This field can be used to configure arbitrary driver interace parameters. The
+# format is specific to the selected driver interface. This field is not used
+# in most cases.
+#driver_param="field=value"
+
+# Maximum lifetime for PMKSA in seconds; default 43200
+#dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=43200
+# Threshold for reauthentication (percentage of PMK lifetime); default 70
+#dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=70
+# Timeout for security association negotiation in seconds; default 60
+#dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=60
+
+# network block
+#
+# Each network (usually AP's sharing the same SSID) is configured as a separate
+# block in this configuration file. The network blocks are in preference order
+# (the first match is used).
+#
+# network block fields:
+#
+# disabled:
+#	0 = this network can be used (default)
+#	1 = this network block is disabled (can be enabled through ctrl_iface,
+#	    e.g., with wpa_cli or wpa_gui)
+#
+# id_str: Network identifier string for external scripts. This value is passed
+#	to external action script through wpa_cli as WPA_ID_STR environment
+#	variable to make it easier to do network specific configuration.
+#
+# ssid: SSID (mandatory); either as an ASCII string with double quotation or
+#	as hex string; network name
+#
+# scan_ssid:
+#	0 = do not scan this SSID with specific Probe Request frames (default)
+#	1 = scan with SSID-specific Probe Request frames (this can be used to
+#	    find APs that do not accept broadcast SSID or use multiple SSIDs;
+#	    this will add latency to scanning, so enable this only when needed)
+#
+# bssid: BSSID (optional); if set, this network block is used only when
+#	associating with the AP using the configured BSSID
+#
+# priority: priority group (integer)
+# By default, all networks will get same priority group (0). If some of the
+# networks are more desirable, this field can be used to change the order in
+# which wpa_supplicant goes through the networks when selecting a BSS. The
+# priority groups will be iterated in decreasing priority (i.e., the larger the
+# priority value, the sooner the network is matched against the scan results).
+# Within each priority group, networks will be selected based on security
+# policy, signal strength, etc.
+# Please note that AP scanning with scan_ssid=1 and ap_scan=2 mode are not
+# using this priority to select the order for scanning. Instead, they try the
+# networks in the order that used in the configuration file.
+#
+# mode: IEEE 802.11 operation mode
+# 0 = infrastructure (Managed) mode, i.e., associate with an AP (default)
+# 1 = IBSS (ad-hoc, peer-to-peer)
+# Note: IBSS can only be used with key_mgmt NONE (plaintext and static WEP)
+# and key_mgmt=WPA-NONE (fixed group key TKIP/CCMP). In addition, ap_scan has
+# to be set to 2 for IBSS. WPA-None requires following network block options:
+# proto=WPA, key_mgmt=WPA-NONE, pairwise=NONE, group=TKIP (or CCMP, but not
+# both), and psk must also be set.
+#
+# proto: list of accepted protocols
+# WPA = WPA/IEEE 802.11i/D3.0
+# RSN = WPA2/IEEE 802.11i (also WPA2 can be used as an alias for RSN)
+# If not set, this defaults to: WPA RSN
+#
+# key_mgmt: list of accepted authenticated key management protocols
+# WPA-PSK = WPA pre-shared key (this requires 'psk' field)
+# WPA-EAP = WPA using EAP authentication (this can use an external
+#	program, e.g., Xsupplicant, for IEEE 802.1X EAP Authentication
+# IEEE8021X = IEEE 802.1X using EAP authentication and (optionally) dynamically
+#	generated WEP keys
+# NONE = WPA is not used; plaintext or static WEP could be used
+# If not set, this defaults to: WPA-PSK WPA-EAP
+#
+# auth_alg: list of allowed IEEE 802.11 authentication algorithms
+# OPEN = Open System authentication (required for WPA/WPA2)
+# SHARED = Shared Key authentication (requires static WEP keys)
+# LEAP = LEAP/Network EAP (only used with LEAP)
+# If not set, automatic selection is used (Open System with LEAP enabled if
+# LEAP is allowed as one of the EAP methods).
+#
+# pairwise: list of accepted pairwise (unicast) ciphers for WPA
+# CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
+# TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
+# NONE = Use only Group Keys (deprecated, should not be included if APs support
+#	pairwise keys)
+# If not set, this defaults to: CCMP TKIP
+#
+# group: list of accepted group (broadcast/multicast) ciphers for WPA
+# CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
+# TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0]
+# WEP104 = WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) with 104-bit key
+# WEP40 = WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) with 40-bit key [IEEE 802.11]
+# If not set, this defaults to: CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
+#
+# psk: WPA preshared key; 256-bit pre-shared key
+# The key used in WPA-PSK mode can be entered either as 64 hex-digits, i.e.,
+# 32 bytes or as an ASCII passphrase (in which case, the real PSK will be
+# generated using the passphrase and SSID). ASCII passphrase must be between
+# 8 and 63 characters (inclusive).
+# This field is not needed, if WPA-EAP is used.
+# Note: Separate tool, wpa_passphrase, can be used to generate 256-bit keys
+# from ASCII passphrase. This process uses lot of CPU and wpa_supplicant
+# startup and reconfiguration time can be optimized by generating the PSK only
+# only when the passphrase or SSID has actually changed.
+#
+# eapol_flags: IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL options (bit field)
+# Dynamic WEP key required for non-WPA mode
+# bit0 (1): require dynamically generated unicast WEP key
+# bit1 (2): require dynamically generated broadcast WEP key
+# 	(3 = require both keys; default)
+# Note: When using wired authentication, eapol_flags must be set to 0 for the
+# authentication to be completed successfully.
+#
+# proactive_key_caching:
+# Enable/disable opportunistic PMKSA caching for WPA2.
+# 0 = disabled (default)
+# 1 = enabled
+#
+# wep_key0..3: Static WEP key (ASCII in double quotation, e.g. "abcde" or
+# hex without quotation, e.g., 0102030405)
+# wep_tx_keyidx: Default WEP key index (TX) (0..3)
+#
+# peerkey: Whether PeerKey negotiation for direct links (IEEE 802.11e DLS) is
+# allowed. This is only used with RSN/WPA2.
+# 0 = disabled (default)
+# 1 = enabled
+#peerkey=1
+#
+# Following fields are only used with internal EAP implementation.
+# eap: space-separated list of accepted EAP methods
+#	MD5 = EAP-MD5 (unsecure and does not generate keying material ->
+#			cannot be used with WPA; to be used as a Phase 2 method
+#			with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
+#       MSCHAPV2 = EAP-MSCHAPv2 (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used
+#		as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
+#       OTP = EAP-OTP (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used
+#		as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
+#       GTC = EAP-GTC (cannot be used separately with WPA; to be used
+#		as a Phase 2 method with EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS)
+#	TLS = EAP-TLS (client and server certificate)
+#	PEAP = EAP-PEAP (with tunnelled EAP authentication)
+#	TTLS = EAP-TTLS (with tunnelled EAP or PAP/CHAP/MSCHAP/MSCHAPV2
+#			 authentication)
+#	If not set, all compiled in methods are allowed.
+#
+# identity: Identity string for EAP
+# anonymous_identity: Anonymous identity string for EAP (to be used as the
+#	unencrypted identity with EAP types that support different tunnelled
+#	identity, e.g., EAP-TTLS)
+# password: Password string for EAP
+# ca_cert: File path to CA certificate file (PEM/DER). This file can have one
+#	or more trusted CA certificates. If ca_cert and ca_path are not
+#	included, server certificate will not be verified. This is insecure and
+#	a trusted CA certificate should always be configured when using
+#	EAP-TLS/TTLS/PEAP. Full path should be used since working directory may
+#	change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
+#	On Windows, trusted CA certificates can be loaded from the system
+#	certificate store by setting this to cert_store://<name>, e.g.,
+#	ca_cert="cert_store://CA" or ca_cert="cert_store://ROOT".
+#	Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user
+#	certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store
+#	(Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service.
+# ca_path: Directory path for CA certificate files (PEM). This path may
+#	contain multiple CA certificates in OpenSSL format. Common use for this
+#	is to point to system trusted CA list which is often installed into
+#	directory like /etc/ssl/certs. If configured, these certificates are
+#	added to the list of trusted CAs. ca_cert may also be included in that
+#	case, but it is not required.
+# client_cert: File path to client certificate file (PEM/DER)
+#	Full path should be used since working directory may change when
+#	wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
+#	Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting this
+#	to blob://<blob name>.
+# private_key: File path to client private key file (PEM/DER/PFX)
+#	When PKCS#12/PFX file (.p12/.pfx) is used, client_cert should be
+#	commented out. Both the private key and certificate will be read from
+#	the PKCS#12 file in this case. Full path should be used since working
+#	directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the background.
+#	Windows certificate store can be used by leaving client_cert out and
+#	configuring private_key in one of the following formats:
+#	cert://substring_to_match
+#	hash://certificate_thumbprint_in_hex
+#	for example: private_key="hash://63093aa9c47f56ae88334c7b65a4"
+#	Note that when running wpa_supplicant as an application, the user
+#	certificate store (My user account) is used, whereas computer store
+#	(Computer account) is used when running wpasvc as a service.
+#	Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by setting this
+#	to blob://<blob name>.
+# private_key_passwd: Password for private key file (if left out, this will be
+#	asked through control interface)
+# dh_file: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format)
+#	This is an optional configuration file for setting parameters for an
+#	ephemeral DH key exchange. In most cases, the default RSA
+#	authentication does not use this configuration. However, it is possible
+#	setup RSA to use ephemeral DH key exchange. In addition, ciphers with
+#	DSA keys always use ephemeral DH keys. This can be used to achieve
+#	forward secrecy. If the file is in DSA parameters format, it will be
+#	automatically converted into DH params.
+# subject_match: Substring to be matched against the subject of the
+#	authentication server certificate. If this string is set, the server
+#	sertificate is only accepted if it contains this string in the subject.
+#	The subject string is in following format:
+#	/C=US/ST=CA/L=San Francisco/CN=Test AS/emailAddress=as@example.com
+# altsubject_match: Semicolon separated string of entries to be matched against
+#	the alternative subject name of the authentication server certificate.
+#	If this string is set, the server sertificate is only accepted if it
+#	contains one of the entries in an alternative subject name extension.
+#	altSubjectName string is in following format: TYPE:VALUE
+#	Example: EMAIL:server@example.com
+#	Example: DNS:server.example.com;DNS:server2.example.com
+#	Following types are supported: EMAIL, DNS, URI
+# phase1: Phase1 (outer authentication, i.e., TLS tunnel) parameters
+#	(string with field-value pairs, e.g., "peapver=0" or
+#	"peapver=1 peaplabel=1")
+#	'peapver' can be used to force which PEAP version (0 or 1) is used.
+#	'peaplabel=1' can be used to force new label, "client PEAP encryption",
+#	to be used during key derivation when PEAPv1 or newer. Most existing
+#	PEAPv1 implementation seem to be using the old label, "client EAP
+#	encryption", and wpa_supplicant is now using that as the default value.
+#	Some servers, e.g., Radiator, may require peaplabel=1 configuration to
+#	interoperate with PEAPv1; see eap_testing.txt for more details.
+#	'peap_outer_success=0' can be used to terminate PEAP authentication on
+#	tunneled EAP-Success. This is required with some RADIUS servers that
+#	implement draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-05.txt (e.g.,
+#	Lucent NavisRadius v4.4.0 with PEAP in "IETF Draft 5" mode)
+#	include_tls_length=1 can be used to force wpa_supplicant to include
+#	TLS Message Length field in all TLS messages even if they are not
+#	fragmented.
+#	sim_min_num_chal=3 can be used to configure EAP-SIM to require three
+#	challenges (by default, it accepts 2 or 3)
+# phase2: Phase2 (inner authentication with TLS tunnel) parameters
+#	(string with field-value pairs, e.g., "auth=MSCHAPV2" for EAP-PEAP or
+#	"autheap=MSCHAPV2 autheap=MD5" for EAP-TTLS)
+# Following certificate/private key fields are used in inner Phase2
+# authentication when using EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP.
+# ca_cert2: File path to CA certificate file. This file can have one or more
+#	trusted CA certificates. If ca_cert2 and ca_path2 are not included,
+#	server certificate will not be verified. This is insecure and a trusted
+#	CA certificate should always be configured.
+# ca_path2: Directory path for CA certificate files (PEM)
+# client_cert2: File path to client certificate file
+# private_key2: File path to client private key file
+# private_key2_passwd: Password for private key file
+# dh_file2: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format)
+# subject_match2: Substring to be matched against the subject of the
+#	authentication server certificate.
+# altsubject_match2: Substring to be matched against the alternative subject
+#	name of the authentication server certificate.
+#
+# fragment_size: Maximum EAP fragment size in bytes (default 1398).
+#	This value limits the fragment size for EAP methods that support
+#	fragmentation (e.g., EAP-TLS and EAP-PEAP). This value should be set
+#	small enough to make the EAP messages fit in MTU of the network
+#	interface used for EAPOL. The default value is suitable for most
+#	cases.
+#
+# EAP-PSK variables:
+# eappsk: 16-byte (128-bit, 32 hex digits) pre-shared key in hex format
+# nai: user NAI
+#
+# EAP-PAX variables:
+# eappsk: 16-byte (128-bit, 32 hex digits) pre-shared key in hex format
+#
+# EAP-SAKE variables:
+# eappsk: 32-byte (256-bit, 64 hex digits) pre-shared key in hex format
+#	(this is concatenation of Root-Secret-A and Root-Secret-B)
+# nai: user NAI (PEERID)
+#
+# EAP-GPSK variables:
+# eappsk: Pre-shared key in hex format (at least 128 bits, i.e., 32 hex digits)
+# nai: user NAI (ID_Client)
+#
+# EAP-FAST variables:
+# pac_file: File path for the PAC entries. wpa_supplicant will need to be able
+#	to create this file and write updates to it when PAC is being
+#	provisioned or refreshed. Full path to the file should be used since
+#	working directory may change when wpa_supplicant is run in the
+#	background. Alternatively, a named configuration blob can be used by
+#	setting this to blob://<blob name>
+# phase1: fast_provisioning=1 option enables in-line provisioning of EAP-FAST
+#	credentials (PAC)
+#
+# wpa_supplicant supports number of "EAP workarounds" to work around
+# interoperability issues with incorrectly behaving authentication servers.
+# These are enabled by default because some of the issues are present in large
+# number of authentication servers. Strict EAP conformance mode can be
+# configured by disabling workarounds with eap_workaround=0.
+
+# Example blocks:
+
+# Simple case: WPA-PSK, PSK as an ASCII passphrase, allow all valid ciphers
+network={
+	ssid="simple"
+	psk="very secret passphrase"
+	priority=5
+}
+
+# Same as previous, but request SSID-specific scanning (for APs that reject
+# broadcast SSID)
+network={
+	ssid="second ssid"
+	scan_ssid=1
+	psk="very secret passphrase"
+	priority=2
+}
+
+# Only WPA-PSK is used. Any valid cipher combination is accepted.
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	proto=WPA
+	key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
+	pairwise=CCMP TKIP
+	group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
+	psk=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029d4ab3db7a23ee92382eb0106c72ac7bb
+	priority=2
+}
+
+# Only WPA-EAP is used. Both CCMP and TKIP is accepted. An AP that used WEP104
+# or WEP40 as the group cipher will not be accepted.
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	proto=RSN
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	pairwise=CCMP TKIP
+	group=CCMP TKIP
+	eap=TLS
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
+	private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
+	private_key_passwd="password"
+	priority=1
+}
+
+# EAP-PEAP/MSCHAPv2 configuration for RADIUS servers that use the new peaplabel
+# (e.g., Radiator)
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	eap=PEAP
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	password="foobar"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	phase1="peaplabel=1"
+	phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2"
+	priority=10
+}
+
+# EAP-TTLS/EAP-MD5-Challenge configuration with anonymous identity for the
+# unencrypted use. Real identity is sent only within an encrypted TLS tunnel.
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	eap=TTLS
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
+	password="foobar"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	priority=2
+}
+
+# EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 configuration with anonymous identity for the unencrypted
+# use. Real identity is sent only within an encrypted TLS tunnel.
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	eap=TTLS
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
+	password="foobar"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	phase2="auth=MSCHAPV2"
+}
+
+# WPA-EAP, EAP-TTLS with different CA certificate used for outer and inner
+# authentication.
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	eap=TTLS
+	# Phase1 / outer authentication
+	anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	# Phase 2 / inner authentication
+	phase2="autheap=TLS"
+	ca_cert2="/etc/cert/ca2.pem"
+	client_cert2="/etc/cer/user.pem"
+	private_key2="/etc/cer/user.prv"
+	private_key2_passwd="password"
+	priority=2
+}
+
+# Both WPA-PSK and WPA-EAP is accepted. Only CCMP is accepted as pairwise and
+# group cipher.
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	bssid=00:11:22:33:44:55
+	proto=WPA RSN
+	key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-EAP
+	pairwise=CCMP
+	group=CCMP
+	psk=06b4be19da289f475aa46a33cb793029d4ab3db7a23ee92382eb0106c72ac7bb
+}
+
+# Special characters in SSID, so use hex string. Default to WPA-PSK, WPA-EAP
+# and all valid ciphers.
+network={
+	ssid=00010203
+	psk=000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
+}
+
+
+# IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL with dynamically generated WEP keys (i.e., no WPA) using
+# EAP-TLS for authentication and key generation; require both unicast and
+# broadcast WEP keys.
+network={
+	ssid="1x-test"
+	key_mgmt=IEEE8021X
+	eap=TLS
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
+	private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
+	private_key_passwd="password"
+	eapol_flags=3
+}
+
+
+# LEAP with dynamic WEP keys
+network={
+	ssid="leap-example"
+	key_mgmt=IEEE8021X
+	eap=LEAP
+	identity="user"
+	password="foobar"
+}
+
+# Plaintext connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X)
+network={
+	ssid="plaintext-test"
+	key_mgmt=NONE
+}
+
+
+# Shared WEP key connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X)
+network={
+	ssid="static-wep-test"
+	key_mgmt=NONE
+	wep_key0="abcde"
+	wep_key1=0102030405
+	wep_key2="1234567890123"
+	wep_tx_keyidx=0
+	priority=5
+}
+
+
+# Shared WEP key connection (no WPA, no IEEE 802.1X) using Shared Key
+# IEEE 802.11 authentication
+network={
+	ssid="static-wep-test2"
+	key_mgmt=NONE
+	wep_key0="abcde"
+	wep_key1=0102030405
+	wep_key2="1234567890123"
+	wep_tx_keyidx=0
+	priority=5
+	auth_alg=SHARED
+}
+
+
+# IBSS/ad-hoc network with WPA-None/TKIP.
+network={
+	ssid="test adhoc"
+	mode=1
+	proto=WPA
+	key_mgmt=WPA-NONE
+	pairwise=NONE
+	group=TKIP
+	psk="secret passphrase"
+}
+
+
+# Catch all example that allows more or less all configuration modes
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	scan_ssid=1
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP WPA-PSK IEEE8021X NONE
+	pairwise=CCMP TKIP
+	group=CCMP TKIP WEP104 WEP40
+	psk="very secret passphrase"
+	eap=TTLS PEAP TLS
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	password="foobar"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
+	private_key="/etc/cert/user.prv"
+	private_key_passwd="password"
+	phase1="peaplabel=0"
+}
+
+# Example of EAP-TLS with smartcard (openssl engine)
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	eap=TLS
+	proto=RSN
+	pairwise=CCMP TKIP
+	group=CCMP TKIP
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	ca_cert="/etc/cert/ca.pem"
+	client_cert="/etc/cert/user.pem"
+
+	engine=1
+
+	# The engine configured here must be available. Look at
+	# OpenSSL engine support in the global section.
+	# The key available through the engine must be the private key
+	# matching the client certificate configured above.
+
+	# use the opensc engine
+	#engine_id="opensc"
+	#key_id="45"
+
+	# use the pkcs11 engine
+	engine_id="pkcs11"
+	key_id="id_45"
+
+	# Optional PIN configuration; this can be left out and PIN will be
+	# asked through the control interface
+	pin="1234"
+}
+
+# Example configuration showing how to use an inlined blob as a CA certificate
+# data instead of using external file
+network={
+	ssid="example"
+	key_mgmt=WPA-EAP
+	eap=TTLS
+	identity="user@example.com"
+	anonymous_identity="anonymous@example.com"
+	password="foobar"
+	ca_cert="blob://exampleblob"
+	priority=20
+}
+
+blob-base64-exampleblob={
+SGVsbG8gV29ybGQhCg==
+}
+
+
+# Wildcard match for SSID (plaintext APs only). This example select any
+# open AP regardless of its SSID.
+network={
+	key_mgmt=NONE
+}
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c91ffe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf-sane
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
+ctrl_interface_group=0
+update_config=1
+
+network={
+        key_mgmt=NONE
+}
diff --git a/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afd0654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.6.bb
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+require wpa-supplicant.inc
+