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Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
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CQID:WIND00366813
Reference: http://squashfs.git.sourceforge.net/git/gitweb.cgi?
p=squashfs/squashfs;a=patch;h=8515b3d420f502c5c0236b86e2d6d7e3b23c190e
Integer overflow in the queue_init function in unsquashfs.c in
unsquashfs in Squashfs 4.2 and earlier allows remote attackers
to execute arbitrary code via a crafted block_log field in the
superblock of a .sqsh file, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-4025
Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
[YOCTO #3564]
Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <sgw@linux.intel.com>
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Reference:http://squashfs.git.sourceforge.net/git/gitweb.cgi?p=
squashfs/squashfs;a=commit;h=19c38fba0be1ce949ab44310d7f49887576cc123
Fix potential stack overflow in get_component() where an individual
pathname component in an extract file (specified on the command line
or in an extract file) could exceed the 1024 byte sized targname
allocated on the stack.
Fix by dynamically allocating targname rather than storing it as
a fixed size on the stack.
[YOCTO #3513]
Signed-off-by: yanjun.zhu <yanjun.zhu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
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