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author | Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com> | 2016-12-21 09:18:05 +0100 |
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committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-02-28 11:26:33 +0000 |
commit | 1913ace7d0898b5a23a2dbdc574ab1d8648927c5 (patch) | |
tree | 8df460b8a0fefb3c2d538f23fd1af13fbb3ca419 /meta/recipes-kernel | |
parent | b91fc0893651b9e3069893e36439de0b4e70ad13 (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-1913ace7d0898b5a23a2dbdc574ab1d8648927c5.tar.gz openembedded-core-1913ace7d0898b5a23a2dbdc574ab1d8648927c5.tar.bz2 openembedded-core-1913ace7d0898b5a23a2dbdc574ab1d8648927c5.zip |
ovmf: build image which enrolls standard keys
When booting a qemu virtual machine with ovmf.secboot, it comes up
with no keys installed and thus Secure Boot disabled. To lock down
the machine like a typical PC, one has to enroll the same keys
that PC vendors normally install, i.e. the ones from Microsoft.
This can be done manually (see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/SecureBoot and
https://github.com/tianocore-docs/Docs/raw/master/White_Papers/A_Tour_Beyond_BIOS_into_UEFI_Secure_Boot_White_Paper.pdf) or automatically with the EnrollDefaultKeys.efi helper
from the Fedora ovmf rpm.
To use this with qemu:
$ bitbake ovmf-shell-image
...
$ runqemu serial nographic qemux86 ovmf-shell-image wic ovmf.secboot
...
UEFI Interactive Shell v2.1
EDK II
UEFI v2.60 (EDK II, 0x00010000)
Mapping table
FS0: Alias(s):HD2b:;BLK4:
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x5,0x0)/HD(1,GPT,06AEF759-3982-4AF6-B517-70BA6304FC1C,0x800,0x566C)
BLK0: Alias(s):
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x0)/Floppy(0x0)
BLK1: Alias(s):
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x0)/Floppy(0x1)
BLK2: Alias(s):
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x1,0x1)/Ata(0x0)
BLK3: Alias(s):
PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x5,0x0)
Press ESC in 1 seconds to skip startup.nsh or any other key to continue.
Shell> fs0:EnrollDefaultKeys.efi
info: SetupMode=1 SecureBoot=0 SecureBootEnable=0 CustomMode=0 VendorKeys=1
info: SetupMode=0 SecureBoot=1 SecureBootEnable=1 CustomMode=0 VendorKeys=0
info: success
Shell> reset
Remember that this will modify
deploy/images/qemux86/ovmf.secboot.qcow2, so make a copy and use the
full path of that copy instead of the "ovmf" argument if needed.
The ovmf-shell-image contains an EFI shell, which is what got started
here directly. After enrolling the keys, Secure Boot is active and the
same image cannot be booted anymore, so the BIOS goes through the
normal boot targets (including network boot, which can take a while to
time out), and ends up in the internal EFI shell. Trying to invoke
bootia32.efi (the shell from the image) or EnrollDefaultKeys.efi then
fails:
Shell> bootia32.efi
Command Error Status: Security Violation
The main purpose at the moment is to test that Secure Boot enforcement
really works. If we had a way to sign generated images, that part could
also be tested by booting in a locked down qemu instance.
0007-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-application-for-enrolling-.patch is
from
https://src.fedoraproject.org/cgit/rpms/edk2.git/tree/0007-OvmfPkg-EnrollDefaultKeys-application-for-enrolling-.patch?id=b1781931894bf2057464e634beed68b1e3218c9e
with one line changed to fix
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=132502:
"EFI_STATUS Status = EFI_SUCCESS;" in EnrollListOfX509Certs() lacked
the initializer.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-kernel')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions