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| author | Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | 2014-06-09 16:53:43 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-10 17:05:53 +0100 |
| commit | c707b3ea9e1fbff2c6a82670e4b1af2b4f53d5e2 (patch) | |
| tree | f159e6f39dd29d88f17d86eb2c29cbe50534f0d0 /meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | |
| parent | 68da848e0f7f026bf18707d8d59143177ff66f9b (diff) | |
| download | openembedded-core-c707b3ea9e1fbff2c6a82670e4b1af2b4f53d5e2.tar.gz openembedded-core-c707b3ea9e1fbff2c6a82670e4b1af2b4f53d5e2.tar.bz2 openembedded-core-c707b3ea9e1fbff2c6a82670e4b1af2b4f53d5e2.zip | |
openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195
http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt
DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability (CVE-2014-0195)
A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client or server affected.
(Patch borrowed from Fedora.)
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch | 40 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0c43919427 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612 +Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> +Date: Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100 + + Fix for CVE-2014-0195 + + A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments + to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to + run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. + + Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments. + + Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. + +Patch borrowed from Fedora +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> + +diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c +index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644 +--- a/ssl/d1_both.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c +@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) + frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; + } + else ++ { + frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; ++ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) ++ { ++ item = NULL; ++ frag = NULL; ++ goto err; ++ } ++ } ++ + + /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a + * retransmit and can be dropped. + |