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| author | fan.xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> | 2015-06-30 11:21:55 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2015-07-01 15:38:22 +0100 |
| commit | 61f2a6a18dcda22d7b0e236f9150674bff2764a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 760b2c066483d0506dd03afecded25386c269486 | |
| parent | 98d3607697da77bd79b367b2879ef6944e59d0a3 (diff) | |
| download | openembedded-core-61f2a6a18dcda22d7b0e236f9150674bff2764a7.tar.gz openembedded-core-61f2a6a18dcda22d7b0e236f9150674bff2764a7.tar.bz2 openembedded-core-61f2a6a18dcda22d7b0e236f9150674bff2764a7.zip | |
wpa-supplicant: Fix CVE-2015-4142
wpa-supplicant: backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4142
Backport patch to fix CVE-2015-4142. This patch is originally from:
http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch
Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch | 45 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..882674fe5b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-AP-WMM-Fix-integer-underflow-in-WMM-Action-frame-par.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport + +Signed-off-by: Fan Xin <fan.xin@jp.fujitsu.com> + +From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser + +The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the +length of the information elements (int left) could end up being +negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack +buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing +so, resulting in segmentation fault. + +This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service +attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses +hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based +drivers). + +Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and +reporting this issue. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> +--- + src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c +index 6d4177c..314e244 100644 +--- a/src/ap/wmm.c ++++ b/src/ap/wmm.c +@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd, + return; + } + ++ if (left < 0) ++ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */ ++ + /* extract the tspec info element */ + if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, +-- +1.9.1 + |