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author | Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> | 2014-12-26 15:05:36 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org> | 2015-01-07 23:33:02 +0000 |
commit | 59e0833e24e4945569d36928dc0f231e822670ba (patch) | |
tree | 9a2f7b0a967b2cce80835832c045f6f564033034 | |
parent | bb872893cd5d2bef21b081a424ea6766729fa0dc (diff) | |
download | openembedded-core-59e0833e24e4945569d36928dc0f231e822670ba.tar.gz openembedded-core-59e0833e24e4945569d36928dc0f231e822670ba.tar.bz2 openembedded-core-59e0833e24e4945569d36928dc0f231e822670ba.zip |
openssh: upgrade to 6.7p1
* Drop two CVE patches already handled upstream.
* Drop nostrip.patch which no longer applies and use the existing
--disable-strip configure option instead.
* OpenSSH 6.7+ no longer supports tcp wrappers. We could apply the
Debian patch to add support back in, but it seems best to follow
upstream here unless we have a good reason to do otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch | 29 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch | 114 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_6.7p1.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_6.6p1.bb) | 14 |
4 files changed, 5 insertions, 172 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 33111f5494..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/nostrip.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -Disable stripping binaries during make install. - -Upstream-Status: Inappropriate [configuration] - -Build system specific. - -Signed-off-by: Scott Garman <scott.a.garman@intel.com> - -diff -ur openssh-5.6p1.orig/Makefile.in openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-5.6p1.orig/Makefile.in 2010-05-11 23:51:39.000000000 -0700 -+++ openssh-5.6p1/Makefile.in 2010-08-30 16:49:54.000000000 -0700 -@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ - RAND_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper - PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ - SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ --STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ -+STRIP_OPT= - - PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ - -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 30c11cf432..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -openssh-CVE-2011-4327 - -A security flaw was found in the way ssh-keysign, -a ssh helper program for host based authentication, -attempted to retrieve enough entropy information on configurations that -lacked a built-in entropy pool in OpenSSL (a ssh-rand-helper program would -be executed to retrieve the entropy from the system environment). -A local attacker could use this flaw to obtain unauthorized access to host keys -via ptrace(2) process trace attached to the 'ssh-rand-helper' program. - -https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2011-4327 -http://www.openssh.com/txt/portable-keysign-rand-helper.adv - -Upstream-Status: Pending - -Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com> ---- a/ssh-keysign.c -+++ b/ssh-keysign.c -@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ - key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); - key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); - key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); -+ if (fcntl(key_fd[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0 || -+ fcntl(key_fd[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0 || -+ fcntl(key_fd[2], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0) -+ fatal("fcntl failed"); - - original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */ - if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 674d186044..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,114 +0,0 @@ -Upstream-Status: Backport - -This CVE could be removed if openssh is upgrade to 6.6 or higher. -Below are some details. - -Attempt SSHFP lookup even if server presents a certificate - -Reference: -https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=742513 - -If an ssh server presents a certificate to the client, then the client -does not check the DNS for SSHFP records. This means that a malicious -server can essentially disable DNS-host-key-checking, which means the -client will fall back to asking the user (who will just say "yes" to -the fingerprint, sadly). - -This patch means that the ssh client will, if necessary, extract the -server key from the proffered certificate, and attempt to verify it -against the DNS. The patch was written by Mark Wooding -<mdw@distorted.org.uk>. I modified it to add one debug2 call, reviewed -it, and tested it. - -Signed-off-by: Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org> -Signed-off-by: Chen Qi <Qi.Chen@windriver.com> ---- ---- a/sshconnect.c -+++ b/sshconnect.c -@@ -1210,36 +1210,63 @@ fail: - return -1; - } - -+static int -+check_host_key_sshfp(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) -+{ -+ int rc = -1; -+ int flags = 0; -+ Key *raw_key = NULL; -+ -+ if (!options.verify_host_key_dns) -+ goto done; -+ -+ /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS; try looking the raw key -+ * up in the DNS anyway. -+ */ -+ if (key_is_cert(host_key)) { -+ debug2("Extracting key from cert for SSHFP lookup"); -+ raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); -+ if (key_drop_cert(raw_key)) -+ fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); -+ host_key = raw_key; -+ } -+ -+ if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags)) -+ goto done; -+ -+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { -+ -+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && -+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && -+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { -+ rc = 0; -+ } else if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { -+ matching_host_key_dns = 1; -+ } else { -+ warn_changed_key(host_key); -+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " -+ "host key to get rid of this message."); -+ } -+ } -+ -+done: -+ if (raw_key) -+ key_free(raw_key); -+ return rc; -+} -+ - /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ - int - verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) - { -- int flags = 0; - char *fp; - - fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp); - free(fp); - -- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ -- if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns && -- verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) { -- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { -- -- if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && -- flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && -- flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) -- return 0; -- -- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { -- matching_host_key_dns = 1; -- } else { -- warn_changed_key(host_key); -- error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " -- "host key to get rid of this message."); -- } -- } -- } -+ if (check_host_key_sshfp(host, hostaddr, host_key) == 0) -+ return 0; - - return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, - options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, --- -1.7.9.5 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_6.6p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_6.7p1.bb index abc302b90f..19093fc992 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_6.6p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_6.7p1.bb @@ -11,11 +11,9 @@ DEPENDS = "zlib openssl" DEPENDS += "${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'libpam', '', d)}" SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar.gz \ - file://nostrip.patch \ file://sshd_config \ file://ssh_config \ file://init \ - file://openssh-CVE-2011-4327.patch \ ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \ file://sshd.socket \ file://sshd@.service \ @@ -23,13 +21,12 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar. file://volatiles.99_sshd \ file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \ file://run-ptest \ - file://openssh-CVE-2014-2653.patch \ file://auth2-none.c-avoid-authenticate-empty-passwords-to-m.patch" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd" -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3e9800e6bca1fbac0eea4d41baa7f239" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "48c1f0664b4534875038004cc4f3555b8329c2a81c1df48db5c517800de203bb" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3246aa79317b1d23cae783a3bf8275d6" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b2f8394eae858dabbdef7dac10b99aec00c95462753e80342e530bbb6f725507" inherit useradd update-rc.d update-alternatives systemd @@ -42,9 +39,6 @@ INITSCRIPT_PARAMS_${PN}-sshd = "defaults 9" SYSTEMD_PACKAGES = "${PN}-sshd" SYSTEMD_SERVICE_${PN}-sshd = "sshd.socket" -PACKAGECONFIG ??= "tcp-wrappers" -PACKAGECONFIG[tcp-wrappers] = "--with-tcp-wrappers,,tcp-wrappers" - inherit autotools-brokensep ptest # LFS support: @@ -56,7 +50,9 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "'LOGIN_PROGRAM=${base_bindir}/login' \ --without-zlib-version-check \ --with-privsep-path=/var/run/sshd \ --sysconfdir=${sysconfdir}/ssh \ - --with-xauth=/usr/bin/xauth" + --with-xauth=/usr/bin/xauth \ + --disable-strip \ + " # Since we do not depend on libbsd, we do not want configure to use it # just because it finds libutil.h. But, specifying --disable-libutil |