diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6')
23 files changed, 2740 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/00_man_quoting.diff b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/00_man_quoting.diff new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff60a843e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/00_man_quoting.diff @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 1995-01-30 19:51:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2004-04-09 16:59:45.000000000 +0200 +@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ + Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different internet + addresses with different internet hostnames. Service providers can use + this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives with internet names +-that may even belong to different organizations. See also the `twist' ++that may even belong to different organizations. See also the `twist\' + option in the hosts_options(5) document. Some systems (Solaris, + FreeBSD) can have more than one internet address on one physical + interface; with other systems you may have to resort to SLIP or PPP +@@ -236,10 +236,10 @@ + Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the IDENT + service to find out that the client did not send the request at all. + When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup +-result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host ++result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host\') is strong evidence of a host + spoofing attack. + .PP +-A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is ++A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host\') is + less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the + client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much + harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_options.5 1994-12-28 17:42:29.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 2004-04-09 16:59:49.000000000 +0200 +@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ + value is taken. + .SH MISCELLANEOUS + .IP "banners /some/directory" +-Look for a file in `/some/directory' with the same name as the daemon ++Look for a file in `/some/directory\' with the same name as the daemon + process (for example in.telnetd for the telnet service), and copy its + contents to the client. Newline characters are replaced by + carriage-return newline, and %<letter> sequences are expanded (see +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdmatch.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdmatch.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdmatch.8 1996-02-11 17:01:36.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdmatch.8 2004-04-09 17:00:49.000000000 +0200 +@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ + A daemon process name. Typically, the last component of a daemon + executable pathname. + .IP client +-A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown' or `paranoid' ++A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown\' or `paranoid\' + wildcard patterns. + .sp + When a client host name is specified, \fItcpdmatch\fR gives a +@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ + .PP + Optional information specified with the \fIdaemon@server\fR form: + .IP server +-A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown' or `paranoid' +-wildcard patterns. The default server name is `unknown'. ++A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown\' or `paranoid\' ++wildcard patterns. The default server name is `unknown\'. + .PP + Optional information specified with the \fIuser@client\fR form: + .IP user + A client user identifier. Typically, a login name or a numeric userid. +-The default user name is `unknown'. ++The default user name is `unknown\'. + .SH OPTIONS + .IP -d + Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.deny\fR files in the current +@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ + .ti +5 + tcpdmatch in.telnetd paranoid + .PP +-On some systems, daemon names have no `in.' prefix, or \fItcpdmatch\fR ++On some systems, daemon names have no `in.\' prefix, or \fItcpdmatch\fR + may need some help to locate the inetd configuration file. + .SH FILES + .PP diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/01_man_portability b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/01_man_portability new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4963f82eb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/01_man_portability @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.3 2005-03-09 18:30:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 2005-03-09 18:27:03.000000000 +0100 +@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ + hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library + .SH SYNOPSIS + .nf +-#include "tcpd.h" ++#include <tcpd.h> + + extern int allow_severity; + extern int deny_severity; +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2005-03-09 18:30:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2005-03-09 18:30:18.000000000 +0100 +@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ name, host name/address) patterns. Exam + impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a + quick introduction. + .PP +-An extended version of the access control language is described in the +-\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at +-program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. ++The extended version of the access control language is described in the ++\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes ++the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR + .PP + In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a + network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of +@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain + /etc/hosts.deny: + .in +3 + .nf +-in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ +- /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & ++in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ ++ /usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) & + .fi + .PP + The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be +@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ that shouldn\'t. All problems are repor + .fi + .SH SEE ALSO + .nf ++hosts_options(5) extended syntax. + tcpd(8) tcp/ip daemon wrapper program. + tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8), test programs. + .SH BUGS +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_options.5 2005-03-09 18:30:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 2005-03-09 18:27:03.000000000 +0100 +@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@ + .SH NAME + hosts_options \- host access control language extensions + .SH DESCRIPTION +-This document describes optional extensions to the language described +-in the hosts_access(5) document. The extensions are enabled at program +-build time. For example, by editing the Makefile and turning on the +-PROCESS_OPTIONS compile-time option. ++This document describes extensions to the language described ++in the hosts_access(5) document. + .PP + The extensible language uses the following format: + .sp +@@ -58,12 +56,12 @@ Notice the leading dot on the domain nam + Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after + performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5) + manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr +-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the ++connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the + conversation with the client host. Example: + .sp + .nf + .ti +3 +-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & ++spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) & + .fi + .sp + executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/inetcf.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/inetcf.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/inetcf.c 1997-02-12 02:13:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/inetcf.c 2005-03-09 18:27:03.000000000 +0100 +@@ -26,13 +26,17 @@ extern void exit(); + * guesses. Shorter names follow longer ones. + */ + char *inet_files[] = { ++#if 0 + "/private/etc/inetd.conf", /* NEXT */ + "/etc/inet/inetd.conf", /* SYSV4 */ + "/usr/etc/inetd.conf", /* IRIX?? */ ++#endif + "/etc/inetd.conf", /* BSD */ ++#if 0 + "/etc/net/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ + "/etc/saf/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ + "/etc/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ ++#endif + 0, + }; + +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.8 1996-02-21 16:39:16.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 2005-03-09 18:27:03.000000000 +0100 +@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ The program supports both 4.3BSD-style s + TLI. Functionality may be limited when the protocol underneath TLI is + not an internet protocol. + .PP +-Operation is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives, the ++There are two possible modes of operation: execution of \fItcpd\fP ++before a service started by \fIinetd\fP, or linking a daemon with ++the \fIlibwrap\fP shared library as documented in the \fIhosts_access\fR(3) ++manual page. Operation when started by \fIinetd\fP ++is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives, the + \fIinetd\fP daemon is tricked into running the \fItcpd\fP program + instead of the desired server. \fItcpd\fP logs the request and does + some additional checks. When all is well, \fItcpd\fP runs the +@@ -88,11 +92,11 @@ configuration files. + .sp + .in +5 + # mkdir /other/place +-# mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd /other/place +-# cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd ++# mv /usr/sbin/in.fingerd /other/place ++# cp tcpd /usr/sbin/in.fingerd + .fi + .PP +-The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some ++The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/sbin. On some + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have + no `in.\' prefix to their name. + .SH EXAMPLE 2 +@@ -101,35 +105,34 @@ are left in their original place. + .PP + In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, perform the + following edits on the \fIinetd\fR configuration file (usually +-\fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR or \fI/etc/inet/inetd.conf\fR): ++\fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR): + .nf + .sp + .ti +5 +-finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/in.fingerd in.fingerd ++finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/in.fingerd in.fingerd + .sp + becomes: + .sp + .ti +5 +-finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd ++finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/sbin/tcpd in.fingerd + .sp + .fi + .PP +-The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some ++The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/sbin. On some + systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the + daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid + field in the inetd configuration file. + .PP + Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be + covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) +-process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to +-execute the `inetimp\' command. ++process to make the changes effective. + .SH EXAMPLE 3 + In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" + or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it + specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: + .nf + .sp +- ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd ++ ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd + .sp + .fi + .PP +@@ -164,6 +167,7 @@ The default locations of the host access + .SH SEE ALSO + .na + .nf ++hosts_access(3), functions provided by the libwrap library. + hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. + syslog.conf(5), format of the syslogd control file. + inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.8 1995-01-08 17:00:31.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.8 2005-03-09 18:27:03.000000000 +0100 +@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ tcpdchk [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v] + potential and real problems it can find. The program examines the + \fItcpd\fR access control files (by default, these are + \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR and \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR), and compares the +-entries in these files against entries in the \fIinetd\fR or \fItlid\fR +-network configuration files. ++entries in these files against entries in the \fIinetd\fR ++network configuration file. + .PP + \fItcpdchk\fR reports problems such as non-existent pathnames; services + that appear in \fItcpd\fR access control rules, but are not controlled +@@ -26,14 +26,13 @@ problem. + .SH OPTIONS + .IP -a + Report access control rules that permit access without an explicit +-ALLOW keyword. This applies only when the extended access control +-language is enabled (build with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS). ++ALLOW keyword. + .IP -d + Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.deny\fR files in the current + directory instead of the default ones. + .IP "-i inet_conf" + Specify this option when \fItcpdchk\fR is unable to find your +-\fIinetd.conf\fR or \fItlid.conf\fR network configuration file, or when ++\fIinetd.conf\fR network configuration file, or when + you suspect that the program uses the wrong one. + .IP -v + Display the contents of each access control rule. Daemon lists, client +@@ -54,7 +53,6 @@ tcpdmatch(8), explain what tcpd would do + hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. + hosts_options(5), format of the language extensions. + inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. +-tlid.conf(5), format of the tlid control file. + .SH AUTHORS + .na + .nf +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdmatch.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdmatch.8 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdmatch.8 2005-03-09 18:30:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdmatch.8 2005-03-09 18:27:03.000000000 +0100 +@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ request for service. Examples are given + The program examines the \fItcpd\fR access control tables (default + \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR and \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR) and prints its + conclusion. For maximal accuracy, it extracts additional information +-from your \fIinetd\fR or \fItlid\fR network configuration file. ++from your \fIinetd\fR network configuration file. + .PP + When \fItcpdmatch\fR finds a match in the access control tables, it + identifies the matched rule. In addition, it displays the optional +@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.d + directory instead of the default ones. + .IP "-i inet_conf" + Specify this option when \fItcpdmatch\fR is unable to find your +-\fIinetd.conf\fR or \fItlid.conf\fR network configuration file, or when ++\fIinetd.conf\fR network configuration file, or when + you suspect that the program uses the wrong one. + .SH EXAMPLES + To predict how \fItcpd\fR would handle a telnet request from the local +@@ -86,7 +86,6 @@ tcpdchk(8), tcpd configuration checker + hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. + hosts_options(5), format of the language extensions. + inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. +-tlid.conf(5), format of the tlid control file. + .SH AUTHORS + .na + .nf diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/05_wildcard_matching b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/05_wildcard_matching new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a168f6d5a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/05_wildcard_matching @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17847 + +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2004-04-10 18:54:33.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2004-04-10 18:54:27.000000000 +0200 +@@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ + bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask + pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the + range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. ++.IP \(bu ++Wildcards `*\' and `?\' can be used to match hostnames or IP addresses. This ++method of matching cannot be used in conjunction with `net/mask\' matching, ++hostname matching beginning with `.\' or IP address matching ending with `.\'. + .SH WILDCARDS + The access control language supports explicit wildcards: + .IP ALL +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c 1997-02-12 02:13:23.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 2004-04-10 18:52:21.000000000 +0200 +@@ -289,6 +289,11 @@ + { + int n; + ++#ifndef DISABLE_WILDCARD_MATCHING ++ if (strchr(tok, '*') || strchr(tok,'?')) { /* contains '*' or '?' */ ++ return (match_pattern_ylo(string,tok)); ++ } else ++#endif + if (tok[0] == '.') { /* suffix */ + n = strlen(string) - strlen(tok); + return (n > 0 && STR_EQ(tok, string + n)); +@@ -329,3 +334,71 @@ + } + return ((addr & mask) == net); + } ++ ++#ifndef DISABLE_WILDCARD_MATCHING ++/* Note: this feature has been adapted in a pretty straightforward way ++ from Tatu Ylonen's last SSH version under free license by ++ Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi>. ++ ++ Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland ++*/ ++ ++/* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ++ ? and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. */ ++ ++int match_pattern_ylo(const char *s, const char *pattern) ++{ ++ while (1) ++ { ++ /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ ++ if (!*pattern) ++ return !*s; ++ ++ /* Process '*'. */ ++ if (*pattern == '*') ++ { ++ /* Skip the asterisk. */ ++ pattern++; ++ ++ /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ ++ if (!*pattern) ++ return 1; ++ ++ /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ ++ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') ++ { ++ /* Look instances of the next character in pattern, and try ++ to match starting from those. */ ++ for (; *s; s++) ++ if (*s == *pattern && ++ match_pattern_ylo(s + 1, pattern + 1)) ++ return 1; ++ /* Failed. */ ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Move ahead one character at a time and try to match at each ++ position. */ ++ for (; *s; s++) ++ if (match_pattern_ylo(s, pattern)) ++ return 1; ++ /* Failed. */ ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* There must be at least one more character in the string. If we are ++ at the end, fail. */ ++ if (!*s) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ ++ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) ++ return 0; ++ ++ /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ ++ s++; ++ pattern++; ++ } ++ /*NOTREACHED*/ ++} ++#endif /* DISABLE_WILDCARD_MATCHING */ diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/06_fix_gethostbyname b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/06_fix_gethostbyname new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d06aaef13b --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/06_fix_gethostbyname @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +* Mon Feb 5 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com> +- fix gethostbyname to work better with dot "." notation (#16949) + +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c.fixgethostbyname Fri Mar 21 13:27:25 1997 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c Mon Feb 5 14:09:40 2001 +@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ + char *name; + { + char dot_name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; +- ++ struct hostent *hp; ++ + /* + * Don't append dots to unqualified names. Such names are likely to come + * from local hosts files or from NIS. +@@ -61,8 +62,12 @@ + if (strchr(name, '.') == 0 || strlen(name) >= MAXHOSTNAMELEN - 1) { + return (gethostbyname(name)); + } else { +- sprintf(dot_name, "%s.", name); +- return (gethostbyname(dot_name)); ++ sprintf(dot_name, "%s.", name); ++ hp = gethostbyname(dot_name); ++ if (hp) ++ return hp; ++ else ++ return (gethostbyname(name)); + } + } + diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/10_usagi-ipv6 b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/10_usagi-ipv6 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c8be5c27c --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/10_usagi-ipv6 @@ -0,0 +1,1253 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/fix_options.c 1997-04-08 02:29:19.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ + + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/param.h> ++#ifdef INET6 ++#include <sys/socket.h> ++#endif + #include <netinet/in.h> + #include <netinet/in_systm.h> + #include <netinet/ip.h> +@@ -41,6 +44,22 @@ + unsigned int opt; + int optlen; + struct in_addr dummy; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr_storage ss; ++ int sslen; ++ ++ /* ++ * check if this is AF_INET socket ++ * XXX IPv6 support? ++ */ ++ sslen = sizeof(ss); ++ if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ss, &sslen) < 0) { ++ syslog(LOG_ERR, "getpeername: %m"); ++ clean_exit(request); ++ } ++ if (ss.ss_family != AF_INET) ++ return; ++#endif + + if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != 0) + ipproto = ip->p_proto; +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2004-04-10 19:22:58.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -85,11 +85,18 @@ + for daemon process names or for client user names. + .IP \(bu + An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a +-`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the ++`net/mask\' pair. An IPv4 host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the + bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask + pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the + range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. + .IP \(bu ++An expression of the form `[n:n:n:n:n:n:n:n]/m\' is interpreted as a ++`[net]/prefixlen\' pair. An IPv6 host address is matched if ++`prefixlen\' bits of `net\' is equal to the `prefixlen\' bits of the ++address. For example, the [net]/prefixlen pattern ++`[3ffe:505:2:1::]/64\' matches every address in the range ++`3ffe:505:2:1::\' through `3ffe:505:2:1:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff\'. ++.IP \(bu + Wildcards `*\' and `?\' can be used to match hostnames or IP addresses. This + method of matching cannot be used in conjunction with `net/mask\' matching, + hostname matching beginning with `.\' or IP address matching ending with `.\'. +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c 2004-04-10 19:22:58.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -24,7 +24,13 @@ + /* System libraries. */ + + #include <sys/types.h> ++#ifdef INT32_T ++ typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; ++#endif + #include <sys/param.h> ++#ifdef INET6 ++#include <sys/socket.h> ++#endif + #include <netinet/in.h> + #include <arpa/inet.h> + #include <stdio.h> +@@ -33,6 +39,9 @@ + #include <errno.h> + #include <setjmp.h> + #include <string.h> ++#ifdef INET6 ++#include <netdb.h> ++#endif + + extern char *fgets(); + extern int errno; +@@ -82,6 +91,10 @@ + static int host_match(); + static int string_match(); + static int masked_match(); ++#ifdef INET6 ++static int masked_match4(); ++static int masked_match6(); ++#endif + + /* Size of logical line buffer. */ + +@@ -289,6 +302,13 @@ + { + int n; + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ /* convert IPv4 mapped IPv6 address to IPv4 address */ ++ if (STRN_EQ(string, "::ffff:", 7) ++ && dot_quad_addr(string + 7) != INADDR_NONE) { ++ string += 7; ++ } ++#endif + #ifndef DISABLE_WILDCARD_MATCHING + if (strchr(tok, '*') || strchr(tok,'?')) { /* contains '*' or '?' */ + return (match_pattern_ylo(string,tok)); +@@ -304,20 +324,72 @@ + } else if (tok[(n = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.') { /* prefix */ + return (STRN_EQ(tok, string, n)); + } else { /* exact match */ ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct addrinfo hints, *res; ++ struct sockaddr_in6 pat, addr; ++ int len, ret; ++ char ch; ++ ++ len = strlen(tok); ++ if (*tok == '[' && tok[len - 1] == ']') { ++ ch = tok[len - 1]; ++ tok[len - 1] = '\0'; ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if ((ret = getaddrinfo(tok + 1, NULL, &hints, &res)) == 0) { ++ memcpy(&pat, res->ai_addr, sizeof(pat)); ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++ } ++ tok[len - 1] = ch; ++ if (ret != 0 || getaddrinfo(string, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) ++ return NO; ++ memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, sizeof(addr)); ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++#ifdef NI_WITHSCOPEID ++ if (pat.sin6_scope_id != 0 && ++ addr.sin6_scope_id != pat.sin6_scope_id) ++ return NO; ++#endif ++ return (!memcmp(&pat.sin6_addr, &addr.sin6_addr, ++ sizeof(struct in6_addr))); ++ return (ret); ++ } ++#endif + return (STR_EQ(tok, string)); + } + } + + /* masked_match - match address against netnumber/netmask */ + ++#ifdef INET6 + static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string) + char *net_tok; + char *mask_tok; + char *string; + { ++ return (masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string) || ++ masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string)); ++} ++ ++static int masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string) ++#else ++static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string) ++#endif ++char *net_tok; ++char *mask_tok; ++char *string; ++{ ++#ifdef INET6 ++ u_int32_t net; ++ u_int32_t mask; ++ u_int32_t addr; ++#else + unsigned long net; + unsigned long mask; + unsigned long addr; ++#endif + + /* + * Disallow forms other than dotted quad: the treatment that inet_addr() +@@ -329,12 +401,78 @@ + return (NO); + if ((net = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE + || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) { ++#ifndef INET6 + tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok); ++#endif + return (NO); /* not tcpd_jump() */ + } + return ((addr & mask) == net); + } + ++#ifdef INET6 ++static int masked_match6(net_tok, mask_tok, string) ++char *net_tok; ++char *mask_tok; ++char *string; ++{ ++ struct addrinfo hints, *res; ++ struct sockaddr_in6 net, addr; ++ u_int32_t mask; ++ int len, mask_len, i = 0; ++ char ch; ++ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(string, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) ++ return NO; ++ memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, sizeof(addr)); ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++ ++ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&addr.sin6_addr)) { ++ if ((*(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12] = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE ++ || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) ++ return (NO); ++ return ((*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12] & mask) == *(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12]); ++ } ++ ++ /* match IPv6 address against netnumber/prefixlen */ ++ len = strlen(net_tok); ++ if (*net_tok != '[' || net_tok[len - 1] != ']') ++ return NO; ++ ch = net_tok[len - 1]; ++ net_tok[len - 1] = '\0'; ++ if (getaddrinfo(net_tok + 1, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) { ++ net_tok[len - 1] = ch; ++ return NO; ++ } ++ memcpy(&net, res->ai_addr, sizeof(net)); ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++ net_tok[len - 1] = ch; ++ if ((mask_len = atoi(mask_tok)) < 0 || mask_len > 128) ++ return NO; ++ ++#ifdef NI_WITHSCOPEID ++ if (net.sin6_scope_id != 0 && addr.sin6_scope_id != net.sin6_scope_id) ++ return NO; ++#endif ++ while (mask_len > 0) { ++ if (mask_len < 32) { ++ mask = htonl(~(0xffffffff >> mask_len)); ++ if ((*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] & mask) != (*(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] & mask)) ++ return NO; ++ break; ++ } ++ if (*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i] != *(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[i]) ++ return NO; ++ i += 4; ++ mask_len -= 32; ++ } ++ return YES; ++} ++#endif /* INET6 */ ++ + #ifndef DISABLE_WILDCARD_MATCHING + /* Note: this feature has been adapted in a pretty straightforward way + from Tatu Ylonen's last SSH version under free license by +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/Makefile 1997-03-21 19:27:21.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 2004-04-10 19:22:44.000000000 +0200 +@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ + @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" + @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" + @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" +- @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" ++ @echo " sunos40 sunos5 solaris8 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" + @echo " uts215 uxp" + @echo + @echo "If none of these match your environment, edit the system" +@@ -131,20 +131,34 @@ + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= SYSTYPE="-systype bsd43" all + + # Freebsd and linux by default have no NIS. +-386bsd netbsd bsdos: ++386bsd bsdos: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ + LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ + EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all + + freebsd: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ ++ LIBS="-L/usr/local/v6/lib -linet6" \ + LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ +- EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DINET6 -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dss_len=__ss_len" \ ++ VSYSLOG= all ++ ++netbsd: ++ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ ++ LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DINET6 -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dss_len=__ss_len" VSYSLOG= all + + linux: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ +- LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ +- NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all ++ LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= \ ++ NETGROUP="-DNETGROUP" TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= \ ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_STRERROR -DINET6=1 -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dss_len=__ss_len" all ++ ++gnu: ++ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ ++ LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= \ ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= \ ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_STRERROR" all + + # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. + hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: +@@ -196,6 +210,13 @@ + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI \ + BUGS="$(BUGS) -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG" all + ++# SunOS 5.8 is another SYSV4 variant, but has IPv6 support ++solaris8: ++ @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ ++ LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv VSYSLOG= \ ++ NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI \ ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DINET6 -DNO_CLONE_DEVICE -DINT32_T" all ++ + # Generic SYSV40 + esix sysv4: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/misc.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/misc.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/misc.c 1996-02-11 17:01:30.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/misc.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -58,9 +58,31 @@ + { + char *cp; + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ int bracket = 0; ++ ++ for (cp = string; cp && *cp; cp++) { ++ switch (*cp) { ++ case '[': ++ bracket++; ++ break; ++ case ']': ++ bracket--; ++ break; ++ default: ++ if (bracket == 0 && *cp == delimiter) { ++ *cp++ = 0; ++ return cp; ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ return (NULL); ++#else + if ((cp = strchr(string, delimiter)) != 0) + *cp++ = 0; + return (cp); ++#endif + } + + /* dot_quad_addr - convert dotted quad to internal form */ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/refuse.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/refuse.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/refuse.c 1994-12-28 17:42:40.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/refuse.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -25,7 +25,12 @@ + void refuse(request) + struct request_info *request; + { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ syslog(deny_severity, "refused connect from %s (%s)", ++ eval_client(request), eval_hostaddr(request->client)); ++#else + syslog(deny_severity, "refused connect from %s", eval_client(request)); ++#endif + clean_exit(request); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/rfc931.c 1995-01-02 16:11:34.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -68,20 +68,50 @@ + /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ + + void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) ++#ifdef INET6 ++struct sockaddr *rmt_sin; ++struct sockaddr *our_sin; ++#else + struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; + struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; ++#endif + char *dest; + { + unsigned rmt_port; + unsigned our_port; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr_storage rmt_query_sin; ++ struct sockaddr_storage our_query_sin; ++ int alen; ++#else + struct sockaddr_in rmt_query_sin; + struct sockaddr_in our_query_sin; ++#endif + char user[256]; /* XXX */ + char buffer[512]; /* XXX */ + char *cp; + char *result = unknown; + FILE *fp; + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ /* address family must be the same */ ++ if (rmt_sin->sa_family != our_sin->sa_family) { ++ STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); ++ return; ++ } ++ switch (our_sin->sa_family) { ++ case AF_INET: ++ alen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); ++ break; ++ case AF_INET6: ++ alen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ break; ++ default: ++ STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); ++ return; ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* + * Use one unbuffered stdio stream for writing to and for reading from + * the RFC931 etc. server. This is done because of a bug in the SunOS +@@ -92,7 +122,11 @@ + * sockets. + */ + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ if ((fp = fsocket(our_sin->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) != 0) { ++#else + if ((fp = fsocket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) != 0) { ++#endif + setbuf(fp, (char *) 0); + + /* +@@ -112,6 +146,25 @@ + * addresses from the query socket. + */ + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ memcpy(&our_query_sin, our_sin, alen); ++ memcpy(&rmt_query_sin, rmt_sin, alen); ++ switch (our_sin->sa_family) { ++ case AF_INET: ++ ((struct sockaddr_in *)&our_query_sin)->sin_port = htons(ANY_PORT); ++ ((struct sockaddr_in *)&rmt_query_sin)->sin_port = htons(RFC931_PORT); ++ break; ++ case AF_INET6: ++ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&our_query_sin)->sin6_port = htons(ANY_PORT); ++ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&rmt_query_sin)->sin6_port = htons(RFC931_PORT); ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (bind(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & our_query_sin, ++ alen) >= 0 && ++ connect(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & rmt_query_sin, ++ alen) >= 0) { ++#else + our_query_sin = *our_sin; + our_query_sin.sin_port = htons(ANY_PORT); + rmt_query_sin = *rmt_sin; +@@ -121,6 +174,7 @@ + sizeof(our_query_sin)) >= 0 && + connect(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & rmt_query_sin, + sizeof(rmt_query_sin)) >= 0) { ++#endif + + /* + * Send query to server. Neglect the risk that a 13-byte +@@ -129,8 +183,13 @@ + */ + + fprintf(fp, "%u,%u\r\n", ++#ifdef INET6 ++ ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)rmt_sin)->sin_port), ++ ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)our_sin)->sin_port)); ++#else + ntohs(rmt_sin->sin_port), + ntohs(our_sin->sin_port)); ++#endif + fflush(fp); + + /* +@@ -144,8 +203,13 @@ + && ferror(fp) == 0 && feof(fp) == 0 + && sscanf(buffer, "%u , %u : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s", + &rmt_port, &our_port, user) == 3 ++#ifdef INET6 ++ && ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)rmt_sin)->sin_port) == rmt_port ++ && ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)our_sin)->sin_port) == our_port) { ++#else + && ntohs(rmt_sin->sin_port) == rmt_port + && ntohs(our_sin->sin_port) == our_port) { ++#endif + + /* + * Strip trailing carriage return. It is part of the +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/scaffold.c 1997-03-21 19:27:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ + #define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ + #endif + ++#ifndef INET6 + extern char *malloc(); ++#endif + + /* Application-specific. */ + +@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ + int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; + int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT; + ++#ifndef INET6 + /* dup_hostent - create hostent in one memory block */ + + static struct hostent *dup_hostent(hp) +@@ -73,9 +76,46 @@ + } + return (&hb->host); + } ++#endif + + /* find_inet_addr - find all addresses for this host, result to free() */ + ++#ifdef INET6 ++struct addrinfo *find_inet_addr(host) ++char *host; ++{ ++ struct addrinfo hints, *res; ++ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) ++ return (res); ++ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME; ++ if (getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res) != 0) { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: host not found", host); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ if (res->ai_family != AF_INET6 && res->ai_family != AF_INET) { ++ tcpd_warn("%d: not an internet host", res->ai_family); ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ if (!res->ai_canonname) { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: hostname alias", host); ++ tcpd_warn("(cannot obtain official name)", res->ai_canonname); ++ } else if (STR_NE(host, res->ai_canonname)) { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: hostname alias", host); ++ tcpd_warn("(official name: %.*s)", STRING_LENGTH, res->ai_canonname); ++ } ++ return (res); ++} ++#else + struct hostent *find_inet_addr(host) + char *host; + { +@@ -118,6 +158,7 @@ + } + return (dup_hostent(hp)); + } ++#endif + + /* check_dns - give each address thorough workout, return address count */ + +@@ -125,8 +166,13 @@ + char *host; + { + struct request_info request; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr_storage sin; ++ struct addrinfo *hp, *res; ++#else + struct sockaddr_in sin; + struct hostent *hp; ++#endif + int count; + char *addr; + +@@ -134,11 +180,18 @@ + return (0); + request_init(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &sin, 0); + sock_methods(&request); ++#ifndef INET6 + memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); + sin.sin_family = AF_INET; ++#endif + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ for (res = hp, count = 0; res; res = res->ai_next, count++) { ++ memcpy(&sin, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); ++#else + for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { + memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr, sizeof(sin.sin_addr)); ++#endif + + /* + * Force host name and address conversions. Use the request structure +@@ -151,7 +204,11 @@ + tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", + eval_hostaddr(request.client)); + } ++#ifdef INET6 ++ freeaddrinfo(hp); ++#else + free((char *) hp); ++#endif + return (count); + } + +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/scaffold.h tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.h +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/scaffold.h 1994-12-31 18:19:20.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.h 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + */ + ++#ifdef INET6 ++extern struct addrinfo *find_inet_addr(); ++#else + extern struct hostent *find_inet_addr(); ++#endif + extern int check_dns(); + extern int check_path(); +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/socket.c 2004-04-10 19:22:58.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -24,13 +24,22 @@ + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/param.h> + #include <sys/socket.h> ++#ifdef INT32_T ++typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; ++#endif + #include <netinet/in.h> + #include <netdb.h> + #include <stdio.h> + #include <syslog.h> + #include <string.h> + ++#ifdef INET6 ++#ifndef NI_WITHSCOPEID ++#define NI_WITHSCOPEID 0 ++#endif ++#else + extern char *inet_ntoa(); ++#endif + + /* Local stuff. */ + +@@ -79,8 +88,13 @@ + void sock_host(request) + struct request_info *request; + { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ static struct sockaddr_storage client; ++ static struct sockaddr_storage server; ++#else + static struct sockaddr_in client; + static struct sockaddr_in server; ++#endif + int len; + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int fd = request->fd; +@@ -109,7 +123,11 @@ + memset(buf, 0 sizeof(buf)); + #endif + } ++#ifdef INET6 ++ request->client->sin = (struct sockaddr *)&client; ++#else + request->client->sin = &client; ++#endif + + /* + * Determine the server binding. This is used for client username +@@ -122,7 +140,11 @@ + tcpd_warn("getsockname: %m"); + return; + } ++#ifdef INET6 ++ request->server->sin = (struct sockaddr *)&server; ++#else + request->server->sin = &server; ++#endif + } + + /* sock_hostaddr - map endpoint address to printable form */ +@@ -130,10 +152,26 @@ + void sock_hostaddr(host) + struct host_info *host; + { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr *sin = host->sin; ++ int salen; ++ ++ if (!sin) ++ return; ++#ifdef SIN6_LEN ++ salen = sin->sa_len; ++#else ++ salen = (sin->sa_family == AF_INET) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ++ : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++#endif ++ getnameinfo(sin, salen, host->addr, sizeof(host->addr), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_WITHSCOPEID); ++#else + struct sockaddr_in *sin = host->sin; + + if (sin != 0) + STRN_CPY(host->addr, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), sizeof(host->addr)); ++#endif + } + + /* sock_hostname - map endpoint address to host name */ +@@ -141,6 +179,160 @@ + void sock_hostname(host) + struct host_info *host; + { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr *sin = host->sin; ++ struct sockaddr_in sin4; ++ struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0 = NULL; ++ int salen, alen, err = 1; ++ char *ap = NULL, *rap, hname[NI_MAXHOST]; ++ ++ if (sin != NULL) { ++ if (sin->sa_family == AF_INET6) { ++ struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sin; ++ ++ if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sin6->sin6_addr)) { ++ memset(&sin4, 0, sizeof(sin4)); ++#ifdef SIN6_LEN ++ sin4.sin_len = sizeof(sin4); ++#endif ++ sin4.sin_family = AF_INET; ++ sin4.sin_port = sin6->sin6_port; ++ sin4.sin_addr.s_addr = *(u_int32_t *)&sin6->sin6_addr.s6_addr[12]; ++ sin = (struct sockaddr *)&sin4; ++ } ++ } ++ switch (sin->sa_family) { ++ case AF_INET: ++ ap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)sin)->sin_addr; ++ alen = sizeof(struct in_addr); ++ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); ++ break; ++ case AF_INET6: ++ ap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sin)->sin6_addr; ++ alen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); ++ salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ if (ap) ++ err = getnameinfo(sin, salen, hname, sizeof(hname), ++ NULL, 0, NI_WITHSCOPEID | NI_NAMEREQD); ++ } ++ if (!err) { ++ ++ STRN_CPY(host->name, hname, sizeof(host->name)); ++ ++ /* reject numeric addresses */ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = sin->sa_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME | AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if ((err = getaddrinfo(host->name, NULL, &hints, &res0) == 0)) { ++ freeaddrinfo(res0); ++ res0 = NULL; ++ tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: " ++ "reverse lookup results in non-FQDN %s", ++ host->name); ++ strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ ++ } ++ err = !err; ++ } ++ if (!err) { ++ /* we are now sure that this is non-numeric */ ++ ++ /* ++ * Verify that the address is a member of the address list returned ++ * by gethostbyname(hostname). ++ * ++ * Verify also that gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() return the same ++ * hostname, or rshd and rlogind may still end up being spoofed. ++ * ++ * On some sites, gethostbyname("localhost") returns "localhost.domain". ++ * This is a DNS artefact. We treat it as a special case. When we ++ * can't believe the address list from gethostbyname("localhost") ++ * we're in big trouble anyway. ++ */ ++ ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = sin->sa_family; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME; ++ if (getaddrinfo(host->name, NULL, &hints, &res0) != 0) { ++ ++ /* ++ * Unable to verify that the host name matches the address. This ++ * may be a transient problem or a botched name server setup. ++ */ ++ ++ tcpd_warn("can't verify hostname: getaddrinfo(%s, %s) failed", ++ host->name, ++ (sin->sa_family == AF_INET) ? "AF_INET" : "AF_INET6"); ++ ++ } else if ((res0->ai_canonname == NULL ++ || STR_NE(host->name, res0->ai_canonname)) ++ && STR_NE(host->name, "localhost")) { ++ ++ /* ++ * The gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() calls did not return ++ * the same hostname. This could be a nameserver configuration ++ * problem. It could also be that someone is trying to spoof us. ++ */ ++ ++ tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: %s != %.*s", ++ host->name, STRING_LENGTH, ++ (res0->ai_canonname == NULL) ? "" : res0->ai_canonname); ++ ++ } else { ++ ++ /* ++ * The address should be a member of the address list returned by ++ * gethostbyname(). We should first verify that the h_addrtype ++ * field is AF_INET, but this program has already caused too much ++ * grief on systems with broken library code. ++ */ ++ ++ for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) { ++ if (res->ai_family != sin->sa_family) ++ continue; ++ switch (res->ai_family) { ++ case AF_INET: ++ rap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr)->sin_addr; ++ break; ++ case AF_INET6: ++ /* need to check scope_id */ ++ if (((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sin)->sin6_scope_id != ++ ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_scope_id) { ++ continue; ++ } ++ rap = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr; ++ break; ++ default: ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (memcmp(rap, ap, alen) == 0) { ++ freeaddrinfo(res0); ++ return; /* name is good, keep it */ ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * The host name does not map to the initial address. Perhaps ++ * someone has messed up. Perhaps someone compromised a name ++ * server. ++ */ ++ ++ getnameinfo(sin, salen, hname, sizeof(hname), ++ NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_WITHSCOPEID); ++ tcpd_warn("host name/address mismatch: %s != %.*s", ++ hname, STRING_LENGTH, ++ (res0->ai_canonname == NULL) ? "" : res0->ai_canonname); ++ } ++ strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ ++ if (res0) ++ freeaddrinfo(res0); ++ } ++#else /* INET6 */ + struct sockaddr_in *sin = host->sin; + struct hostent *hp; + int i; +@@ -220,6 +412,7 @@ + } + strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ + } ++#endif /* INET6 */ + } + + /* sock_sink - absorb unreceived IP datagram */ +@@ -228,7 +421,11 @@ + int fd; + { + char buf[BUFSIZ]; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr_storage sin; ++#else + struct sockaddr_in sin; ++#endif + int size = sizeof(sin); + + /* +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.c 1996-02-11 17:01:33.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -120,7 +120,12 @@ + + /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */ + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s (%s)", ++ eval_client(&request), eval_hostaddr(request.client)); ++#else + syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request)); ++#endif + closelog(); + (void) execv(path, argv); + syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path); +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c 1997-02-12 02:13:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ + + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/stat.h> ++#ifdef INET6 ++#include <sys/socket.h> ++#endif + #include <netinet/in.h> + #include <arpa/inet.h> + #include <stdio.h> +@@ -397,6 +400,31 @@ + } + } + ++#ifdef INET6 ++static int is_inet6_addr(pat) ++ char *pat; ++{ ++ struct addrinfo hints, *res; ++ int len, ret; ++ char ch; ++ ++ if (*pat != '[') ++ return (0); ++ len = strlen(pat); ++ if ((ch = pat[len - 1]) != ']') ++ return (0); ++ pat[len - 1] = '\0'; ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if ((ret = getaddrinfo(pat + 1, NULL, &hints, &res)) == 0) ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++ pat[len - 1] = ch; ++ return (ret == 0); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* check_host - criticize host pattern */ + + static int check_host(pat) +@@ -423,14 +451,27 @@ + #endif + #endif + } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ ++#ifdef INET6 ++ int mask_len; ++ ++ if ((dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE ++ || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) ++ && (!is_inet6_addr(pat) ++ || ((mask_len = atoi(mask)) < 0 || mask_len > 128))) ++#else + if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE + || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) ++#endif + tcpd_warn("%s/%s: bad net/mask pattern", pat, mask); + } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ + tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); + tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); + } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { /* other reserved */ + /* void */ ; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ } else if (is_inet6_addr(pat)) { /* IPv6 address */ ++ addr_count = 1; ++#endif + } else if (NOT_INADDR(pat)) { /* internet name */ + if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { + tcpd_warn("%s: domain or host name ends in dot", pat); +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h 1996-03-19 16:22:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ + struct host_info { + char name[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_hostname(host) */ + char addr[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_hostaddr(host) */ ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr *sin; /* socket address or 0 */ ++#else + struct sockaddr_in *sin; /* socket address or 0 */ ++#endif + struct t_unitdata *unit; /* TLI transport address or 0 */ + struct request_info *request; /* for shared information */ + }; +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdmatch.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdmatch.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdmatch.c 1996-02-11 17:01:36.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdmatch.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -57,7 +57,11 @@ + int argc; + char **argv; + { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct addrinfo hints, *hp, *res; ++#else + struct hostent *hp; ++#endif + char *myname = argv[0]; + char *client; + char *server; +@@ -68,8 +72,13 @@ + int ch; + char *inetcf = 0; + int count; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr_storage server_sin; ++ struct sockaddr_storage client_sin; ++#else + struct sockaddr_in server_sin; + struct sockaddr_in client_sin; ++#endif + struct stat st; + + /* +@@ -172,13 +181,20 @@ + if (NOT_INADDR(server) == 0 || HOSTNAME_KNOWN(server)) { + if ((hp = find_inet_addr(server)) == 0) + exit(1); ++#ifndef INET6 + memset((char *) &server_sin, 0, sizeof(server_sin)); + server_sin.sin_family = AF_INET; ++#endif + request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_SIN, &server_sin, 0); + ++#ifdef INET6 ++ for (res = hp, count = 0; res; res = res->ai_next, count++) { ++ memcpy(&server_sin, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); ++#else + for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { + memcpy((char *) &server_sin.sin_addr, addr, + sizeof(server_sin.sin_addr)); ++#endif + + /* + * Force evaluation of server host name and address. Host name +@@ -194,7 +210,11 @@ + fprintf(stderr, "Please specify an address instead\n"); + exit(1); + } ++#ifdef INET6 ++ freeaddrinfo(hp); ++#else + free((char *) hp); ++#endif + } else { + request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_NAME, server, 0); + } +@@ -208,6 +228,18 @@ + tcpdmatch(&request); + exit(0); + } ++#ifdef INET6 ++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); ++ hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; ++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ++ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_NUMERICHOST; ++ if (getaddrinfo(client, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) { ++ freeaddrinfo(res); ++ request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, client, 0); ++ tcpdmatch(&request); ++ exit(0); ++ } ++#endif + + /* + * Perhaps they are testing special client hostname patterns that aren't +@@ -229,6 +261,34 @@ + */ + if ((hp = find_inet_addr(client)) == 0) + exit(1); ++#ifdef INET6 ++ request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &client_sin, 0); ++ ++ for (res = hp, count = 0; res; res = res->ai_next, count++) { ++ memcpy(&client_sin, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); ++ ++ /* ++ * getnameinfo() doesn't do reverse lookup against link-local ++ * address. So, we pass through host name evaluation against ++ * such addresses. ++ */ ++ if (res->ai_family != AF_INET6 || ++ !IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr)) { ++ /* ++ * Force evaluation of client host name and address. Host name ++ * conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does its job. ++ */ ++ request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", 0); ++ if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), unknown)) ++ tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", ++ eval_hostaddr(request.client)); ++ } ++ tcpdmatch(&request); ++ if (res->ai_next) ++ printf("\n"); ++ } ++ freeaddrinfo(hp); ++#else + memset((char *) &client_sin, 0, sizeof(client_sin)); + client_sin.sin_family = AF_INET; + request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &client_sin, 0); +@@ -250,6 +310,7 @@ + printf("\n"); + } + free((char *) hp); ++#endif + exit(0); + } + +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tli.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tli.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tli.c 1997-03-21 19:27:26.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tli.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -65,8 +65,13 @@ + void tli_host(request) + struct request_info *request; + { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ static struct sockaddr_storage client; ++ static struct sockaddr_storage server; ++#else + static struct sockaddr_in client; + static struct sockaddr_in server; ++#endif + + /* + * If we discover that we are using an IP transport, pretend we never +@@ -76,14 +81,29 @@ + + tli_endpoints(request); + if ((request->config = tli_transport(request->fd)) != 0 ++#ifdef INET6 ++ && (STR_EQ(request->config->nc_protofmly, "inet") || ++ STR_EQ(request->config->nc_protofmly, "inet6"))) { ++#else + && STR_EQ(request->config->nc_protofmly, "inet")) { ++#endif + if (request->client->unit != 0) { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ client = *(struct sockaddr_storage *) request->client->unit->addr.buf; ++ request->client->sin = (struct sockaddr *) &client; ++#else + client = *(struct sockaddr_in *) request->client->unit->addr.buf; + request->client->sin = &client; ++#endif + } + if (request->server->unit != 0) { ++#ifdef INET6 ++ server = *(struct sockaddr_storage *) request->server->unit->addr.buf; ++ request->server->sin = (struct sockaddr *) &server; ++#else + server = *(struct sockaddr_in *) request->server->unit->addr.buf; + request->server->sin = &server; ++#endif + } + tli_cleanup(request); + sock_methods(request); +@@ -187,7 +207,15 @@ + } + while (config = getnetconfig(handlep)) { + if (stat(config->nc_device, &from_config) == 0) { ++#ifdef NO_CLONE_DEVICE ++ /* ++ * If the network devices are not cloned (as is the case for ++ * Solaris 8 Beta), we must compare the major device numbers. ++ */ ++ if (major(from_config.st_rdev) == major(from_client.st_rdev)) ++#else + if (minor(from_config.st_rdev) == major(from_client.st_rdev)) ++#endif + break; + } + } +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/update.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/update.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/update.c 1994-12-28 17:42:56.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/update.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -46,10 +46,18 @@ + request->fd = va_arg(ap, int); + continue; + case RQ_CLIENT_SIN: ++#ifdef INET6 ++ request->client->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr *); ++#else + request->client->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr_in *); ++#endif + continue; + case RQ_SERVER_SIN: ++#ifdef INET6 ++ request->server->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr *); ++#else + request->server->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr_in *); ++#endif + continue; + + /* +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/workarounds.c 1996-03-19 16:22:26.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c 2004-04-10 19:07:43.000000000 +0200 +@@ -166,11 +166,22 @@ + int *len; + { + int ret; ++#ifdef INET6 ++ struct sockaddr *sin = sa; ++#else + struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa; ++#endif + + if ((ret = getpeername(sock, sa, len)) >= 0 ++#ifdef INET6 ++ && ((sin->su_si.si_family == AF_INET6 ++ && IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&sin->su_sin6.sin6_addr)) ++ || (sin->su_si.si_family == AF_INET ++ && sin->su_sin.sin_addr.s_addr == 0))) { ++#else + && sa->sa_family == AF_INET + && sin->sin_addr.s_addr == 0) { ++#endif + errno = ENOTCONN; + return (-1); + } else { diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/11_tcpd_blacklist b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/11_tcpd_blacklist new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0238e35208 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/11_tcpd_blacklist @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +Path: news.porcupine.org!news.porcupine.org!not-for-mail +From: Wietse Venema <wietse@((no)(spam)(please))wzv.win.tue.nl> +Newsgroups: comp.mail.sendmail,comp.security.unix +Subject: TCP Wrapper Blacklist Extension +Followup-To: poster +Date: 8 Sep 1997 18:53:13 -0400 +Organization: Wietse's hangout while on sabattical in the USA +Lines: 147 +Sender: wietse@spike.porcupine.org +Message-ID: <5v1vkp$h4f$1@spike.porcupine.org> +NNTP-Posting-Host: spike.porcupine.org +Xref: news.porcupine.org comp.mail.sendmail:3541 comp.security.unix:7158 + +The patch below adds a new host pattern to the TCP Wrapper access +control language. Instead of a host name or address pattern, you +can specify an external /file/name with host name or address +patterns. The feature can be used recursively. + +The /file/name extension makes it easy to blacklist bad sites, for +example, to block unwanted electronic mail when libwrap is linked +into sendmail. Adding hosts to a simple text file is much easier +than having to edit a more complex hosts.allow/deny file. + +I developed this a year or so ago as a substitute for NIS netgroups. +At that time, I did not consider it of sufficient interest for +inclusion in the TCP Wrapper distribution. How times have changed. + +The patch is relative to TCP Wrappers version 7.6. The main archive +site is ftp://ftp.win.tue.nl/pub/security/tcp_wrappers_7.6.tar.gz + +Thanks to the Debian LINUX folks for expressing their interest in +this patch. + + Wietse + + +[diff updated by Md] + +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2004-04-10 19:28:09.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2004-04-10 19:28:01.000000000 +0200 +@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@ + `[3ffe:505:2:1::]/64\' matches every address in the range + `3ffe:505:2:1::\' through `3ffe:505:2:1:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff\'. + .IP \(bu ++A string that begins with a `/\' character is treated as a file ++name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name ++or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is ++zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns ++separated by whitespace. A file name pattern can be used anywhere ++a host name or address pattern can be used. ++.IP \(bu + Wildcards `*\' and `?\' can be used to match hostnames or IP addresses. This + method of matching cannot be used in conjunction with `net/mask\' matching, + hostname matching beginning with `.\' or IP address matching ending with `.\'. +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c 2004-04-10 19:28:09.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 2004-04-10 19:27:05.000000000 +0200 +@@ -253,6 +253,26 @@ + } + } + ++/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */ ++ ++static int hostfile_match(path, host) ++char *path; ++struct hosts_info *host; ++{ ++ char tok[BUFSIZ]; ++ int match = NO; ++ FILE *fp; ++ ++ if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { ++ while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host))) ++ /* void */ ; ++ fclose(fp); ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path); ++ } ++ return (match); ++} ++ + /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ + + static int host_match(tok, host) +@@ -280,6 +300,8 @@ + tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ + return (NO); + #endif ++ } else if (tok[0] == '/') { /* /file hack */ ++ return (hostfile_match(tok, host)); + } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ + char *name = eval_hostname(host); + return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c 2004-04-10 19:28:09.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 2004-04-10 19:27:05.000000000 +0200 +@@ -353,6 +353,8 @@ + { + if (pat[0] == '@') { + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { + tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { +@@ -385,6 +387,8 @@ + { + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { ++ tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat); + } else if (pat[0] == '.') { + tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); + } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { +@@ -430,8 +434,13 @@ + static int check_host(pat) + char *pat; + { ++ char buf[BUFSIZ]; + char *mask; + int addr_count = 1; ++ FILE *fp; ++ struct tcpd_context saved_context; ++ char *cp; ++ char *wsp = " \t\r\n"; + + if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ + #ifdef NO_NETGRENT +@@ -450,6 +459,21 @@ + tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); + #endif + #endif ++ } else if (pat[0] == '/') { /* /path/name */ ++ if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) { ++ saved_context = tcpd_context; ++ tcpd_context.file = pat; ++ tcpd_context.line = 0; ++ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { ++ tcpd_context.line++; ++ for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp)) ++ check_host(cp); ++ } ++ tcpd_context = saved_context; ++ fclose(fp); ++ } else if (errno != ENOENT) { ++ tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat); ++ } + } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ + #ifdef INET6 + int mask_len; diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/11_usagi_fix b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/11_usagi_fix new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..88a2b5e43b --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/11_usagi_fix @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +diff -uN tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.new/hosts_access.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c Mon May 20 14:00:56 2002 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.new/hosts_access.c Mon May 20 14:25:05 2002 +@@ -448,6 +448,15 @@ + int len, mask_len, i = 0; + char ch; + ++ /* ++ * Behavior of getaddrinfo() against IPv4-mapped IPv6 address is ++ * different between KAME and Solaris8. While KAME returns ++ * AF_INET6, Solaris8 returns AF_INET. So, we avoid this here. ++ */ ++ if (STRN_EQ(string, "::ffff:", 7) ++ && dot_quad_addr(string + 7) != INADDR_NONE) ++ return (masked_match4(net_tok, mask_tok, string + 7)); ++ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = AF_INET6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +@@ -457,13 +466,6 @@ + memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, sizeof(addr)); + freeaddrinfo(res); + +- if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&addr.sin6_addr)) { +- if ((*(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12] = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE +- || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) +- return (NO); +- return ((*(u_int32_t *)&addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12] & mask) == *(u_int32_t *)&net.sin6_addr.s6_addr[12]); +- } +- + /* match IPv6 address against netnumber/prefixlen */ + len = strlen(net_tok); + if (*net_tok != '[' || net_tok[len - 1] != ']') +diff -uN tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.new/socket.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c Mon May 20 13:48:35 2002 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.new/socket.c Mon May 20 14:22:27 2002 +@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ + hints.ai_family = sin->sa_family; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE | AI_CANONNAME | AI_NUMERICHOST; +- if ((err = getaddrinfo(host->name, NULL, &hints, &res0) == 0)) { ++ if ((err = getaddrinfo(host->name, NULL, &hints, &res0)) == 0) { + freeaddrinfo(res0); + res0 = NULL; + tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: " diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/12_makefile_config b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/12_makefile_config new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..60ca594bee --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/12_makefile_config @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/Makefile 2003-08-21 01:43:39.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 2003-08-21 01:43:35.000000000 +0200 +@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ + # + # SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin +-# ++REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin + # BSD 4.4 + #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec + # +@@ -512,6 +519,7 @@ + # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). + # + #STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. ++STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS + + ################################################################ + # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records +@@ -535,6 +543,7 @@ + # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. + + FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use ++FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON + + # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. + +@@ -631,6 +640,7 @@ + # lookups altogether, see the next section. + + PARANOID= -DPARANOID ++PARANOID= + + ######################################## + # Optional: turning off hostname lookups +@@ -644,6 +654,7 @@ + # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. + + HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME ++HOSTNAME= + + ############################################# + # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking +@@ -670,6 +681,7 @@ + # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. + # + # KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS ++KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS + + ## End configuration options + ############################ +@@ -677,9 +689,10 @@ + # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. + + SHELL = /bin/sh +-.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c ++.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c + +-CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ ++COPTS = -O2 -g ++CFLAGS = $(COPTS) -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ + $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ + -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ + -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ +@@ -712,10 +725,11 @@ + + config-check: + @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } +- @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ +- if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ +- then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ +- else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ ++ @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \ ++ if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \ ++ then rm cflags.new ; \ ++ else mv cflags.new cflags ; \ + fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null ++ @if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi + + $(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/13_shlib_weaksym b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/13_shlib_weaksym new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c089b33257 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/13_shlib_weaksym @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/Makefile 2004-05-02 15:37:59.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile 2004-05-02 15:31:09.000000000 +0200 +@@ -150,15 +150,15 @@ + + linux: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ +- LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= \ ++ LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ + NETGROUP="-DNETGROUP" TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= \ +- EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_STRERROR -DINET6=1 -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dss_len=__ss_len" all ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT -DINET6=1 -Dss_family=__ss_family -Dss_len=__ss_len" all + + gnu: + @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ +- LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= \ ++ LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \ + NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= \ +- EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_STRERROR" all ++ EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT" all + + # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. + hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: +@@ -713,7 +713,22 @@ + + LIB = libwrap.a + +-all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk ++shared/%.o: %.c ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ ++ ++SOMAJOR = 0 ++SOMINOR = 7.6 ++ ++SHLIB = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR) ++SHLIBSOMAJ = shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) ++SHLIBSO = shared/libwrap.so ++SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap ++ ++SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS) ++SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT ++SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ)); ++ ++all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB) + + # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. + +@@ -731,27 +746,33 @@ + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) + -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) + +-tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ) ++ rm -f $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ) ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ) ++ ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO) ++ ++tcpd: tcpd.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + + miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) + +-safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + + TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o + +-tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) + +-try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS) + + TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o + +-tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) +- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) ++tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB) ++ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS) + + shar: $(KIT) + @shar $(KIT) +@@ -767,7 +788,9 @@ + + clean: + rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ ++ libwrap*.so* \ + cflags ++ rm -rf shared/ + + tidy: clean + chmod -R a+r . +@@ -913,5 +936,6 @@ + update.o: mystdarg.h + update.o: tcpd.h + vfprintf.o: cflags ++weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h + workarounds.o: cflags + workarounds.o: tcpd.h +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h 2004-05-02 15:37:59.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 2004-05-02 15:37:49.000000000 +0200 +@@ -4,6 +4,15 @@ + * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + */ + ++#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H ++#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H ++ ++/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */ ++#include <netinet/in.h> ++#include <stdio.h> ++ ++__BEGIN_DECLS ++ + /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ + + #define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ +@@ -29,10 +38,10 @@ + char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ + struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ + struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ +- void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ +- void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ +- void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ +- void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ ++ void (*sink) (int); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ ++ void (*hostname) (struct host_info *); /* address to printable hostname */ ++ void (*hostaddr) (struct host_info *); /* address to printable address */ ++ void (*cleanup) (struct request_info *); /* cleanup function or 0 */ + struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ + }; + +@@ -70,20 +79,27 @@ + #define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ + #endif + +-extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ +-extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ +-extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */ +-extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ +-extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ +-extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ +-extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ +-extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ +-extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ ++extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request); /* access control */ ++extern void shell_cmd(char *); /* execute shell command */ ++extern char *percent_x(char *, int, char *, struct request_info *); ++ /* do %<char> expansion */ ++extern void rfc931(struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, char *); ++ /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ ++extern void clean_exit(struct request_info *); /* clean up and exit */ ++extern void refuse(struct request_info *); /* clean up and exit */ ++extern char *xgets(char *, int, FILE *); /* fgets() on steroids */ ++extern char *split_at(char *, int); /* strchr() and split */ ++extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(char *); /* restricted inet_addr() */ + + /* Global variables. */ + ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS ++extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ ++extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */ ++#else + extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ + extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ ++#endif + extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ + extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ + extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ +@@ -98,6 +114,8 @@ + #ifdef __STDC__ + extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); + extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); ++extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr, ++ char *client_user); + #else + extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ + extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ +@@ -121,20 +139,23 @@ + * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. + */ + +-extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ +-extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ +-extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ +-extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ +-extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ +-extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ ++extern char *eval_user(struct request_info *); /* client user */ ++extern char *eval_hostname(struct host_info *); /* printable hostname */ ++extern char *eval_hostaddr(struct host_info *); /* printable host address */ ++extern char *eval_hostinfo(struct host_info *); /* host name or address */ ++extern char *eval_client(struct request_info *);/* whatever is available */ ++extern char *eval_server(struct request_info *);/* whatever is available */ + #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ + #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ + + /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ + +-extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ +-extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ +-extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ ++/* look up endpoint addresses */ ++extern void sock_host(struct request_info *); ++/* translate address to hostname */ ++extern void sock_hostname(struct host_info *); ++/* address to printable address */ ++extern void sock_hostaddr(struct host_info *); + #define sock_methods(r) \ + { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } + +@@ -182,7 +203,7 @@ + * behavior. + */ + +-extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ ++extern void process_options(char *, struct request_info *);/* execute options */ + extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ + + /* Bug workarounds. */ +@@ -221,3 +242,7 @@ + #define strtok my_strtok + extern char *my_strtok(); + #endif ++ ++__END_DECLS ++ ++#endif +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/weak_symbols.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c 2004-05-02 15:31:09.000000000 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++ /* ++ * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50 ++ * ++ * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org> ++ */ ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS ++#include <syslog.h> ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; ++#endif diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/14_cidr_support b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/14_cidr_support new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0e1ecf5b4a --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/14_cidr_support @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2003-08-21 03:15:36.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2003-08-21 03:15:31.000000000 +0200 +@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ + pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the + range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. + .IP \(bu ++An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/mm' is interpreted as a ++`net/masklength' pair, where `mm' is the number of consecutive `1' ++bits in the netmask applied to the `n.n.n.n' address. ++.IP \(bu + An expression of the form `[n:n:n:n:n:n:n:n]/m\' is interpreted as a + `[net]/prefixlen\' pair. An IPv6 host address is matched if + `prefixlen\' bits of `net\' is equal to the `prefixlen\' bits of the +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.c 2003-08-21 03:15:36.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 2003-08-21 03:09:30.000000000 +0200 +@@ -417,7 +417,8 @@ + if ((addr = dot_quad_addr(string)) == INADDR_NONE) + return (NO); + if ((net = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE +- || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) { ++ || ((mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE ++ && (mask = cidr_mask_addr(mask_tok)) == 0)) { + #ifndef INET6 + tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok); + #endif +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/misc.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/misc.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/misc.c 2003-08-21 03:15:36.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/misc.c 2003-08-21 03:09:30.000000000 +0200 +@@ -107,3 +107,17 @@ + } + return (runs == 4 ? inet_addr(str) : INADDR_NONE); + } ++ ++/* cidr_mask_addr - convert cidr netmask length to internal form */ ++ ++unsigned long cidr_mask_addr(str) ++char *str; ++{ ++ int maskbits; ++ ++ maskbits = atoi(str); ++ if (maskbits < 1 || maskbits > 32) ++ return (0); ++ return htonl(0xFFFFFFFF << (32 - maskbits)); ++} ++ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c 2003-08-21 03:15:36.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 2003-08-21 03:09:30.000000000 +0200 +@@ -497,12 +497,12 @@ + int mask_len; + + if ((dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE +- || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) ++ || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE && cidr_mask_addr(mask) == 0) + && (!is_inet6_addr(pat) + || ((mask_len = atoi(mask)) < 0 || mask_len > 128))) + #else + if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE +- || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) ++ || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE && cidr_mask_addr(mask) == 0) + #endif + tcpd_warn("%s/%s: bad net/mask pattern", pat, mask); + } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/15_match_clarify b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/15_match_clarify new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..913ed987d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/15_match_clarify @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2004-04-25 12:17:59.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2004-04-25 12:17:53.000000000 +0200 +@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ + bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask + pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the + range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. ++`255.255.255.255\' is not a valid mask value, so a single host can be ++matched just by its IP. + .IP \(bu + An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/mm' is interpreted as a + `net/masklength' pair, where `mm' is the number of consecutive `1' diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/expand_remote_port b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/expand_remote_port new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e35fc7ecd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/expand_remote_port @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/eval.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/eval.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/eval.c 1995-01-30 19:51:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/eval.c 2004-11-04 13:59:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -98,6 +98,28 @@ + } + } + ++/* eval_port - return string with the port */ ++char *eval_port(saddr) ++#ifdef INET6 ++struct sockaddr *saddr; ++#else ++struct sockaddr_in *saddr; ++#endif ++{ ++ static char port[16]; ++ if (saddr != 0) { ++ sprintf(port, "%u", ++#ifdef INET6 ++ ntohs(((struct sockaddr_in *)saddr)->sin_port)); ++#else ++ ntohs(saddr->sin_port)); ++#endif ++ } else { ++ strcpy(port, "0"); ++ } ++ return (port); ++} ++ + /* eval_client - return string with as much about the client as we know */ + + char *eval_client(request) +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.5 2004-11-04 13:17:45.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 2004-11-04 13:55:32.000000000 +0100 +@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ + unavailable. + .IP "%n (%N)" + The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or "paranoid"). ++.IP "%r (%R)" ++The clients (servers) port number (or "0"). + .IP %p + The daemon process id. + .IP %s +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/percent_x.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_x.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/percent_x.c 1994-12-28 17:42:38.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_x.c 2004-11-04 13:19:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ + ch == 'n' ? eval_hostname(request->client) : + ch == 'N' ? eval_hostname(request->server) : + ch == 'p' ? eval_pid(request) : ++ ch == 'r' ? eval_port(request->client->sin) : ++ ch == 'R' ? eval_port(request->server->sin) : + ch == 's' ? eval_server(request) : + ch == 'u' ? eval_user(request) : + ch == '%' ? "%" : (tcpd_warn("unrecognized %%%c", ch), ""); +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h 2004-11-04 13:17:45.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 2004-11-04 13:19:13.000000000 +0100 +@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ + extern char *eval_hostinfo(struct host_info *); /* host name or address */ + extern char *eval_client(struct request_info *);/* whatever is available */ + extern char *eval_server(struct request_info *);/* whatever is available */ ++#ifdef INET6 ++extern char *eval_port(struct sockaddr *); ++#else ++extern char *eval_port(struct sockaddr_in *); ++#endif + #define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ + #define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ + diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/have_strerror b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/have_strerror new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..31c2b92278 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/have_strerror @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/percent_m.c 1994-12-28 17:42:37.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c 2003-08-21 02:45:31.000000000 +0200 +@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@ + + while (*bp = *cp) + if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { ++#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR ++ strcpy(bp, strerror(errno)); ++#else + if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { + strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); + } else { + sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); + } ++#endif + bp += strlen(bp); + cp += 2; + } else { diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/man_fromhost b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/man_fromhost new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..afaa9c8ac3 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/man_fromhost @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/hosts_access.3 2004-04-25 00:10:48.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 2004-04-25 00:09:36.000000000 +0200 +@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ + struct request_info *request_set(request, key, value, ..., 0) + struct request_info *request; + ++void fromhost(request) ++struct request_info *request; ++ + int hosts_access(request) + struct request_info *request; + +@@ -60,6 +63,7 @@ + is available, host names and client user names are looked up on demand, + using the request structure as a cache. hosts_access() returns zero if + access should be denied. ++fromhost() must be called before hosts_access(). + .PP + hosts_ctl() is a wrapper around the request_init() and hosts_access() + routines with a perhaps more convenient interface (though it does not diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/restore_sigalarm b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/restore_sigalarm new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ece7da35fe --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/restore_sigalarm @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/rfc931.c 2004-08-29 18:40:08.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 2004-08-29 18:40:02.000000000 +0200 +@@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ + char *cp; + char *result = unknown; + FILE *fp; ++ unsigned saved_timeout; ++ struct sigaction nact, oact; + + #ifdef INET6 + /* address family must be the same */ +@@ -134,7 +136,12 @@ + */ + + if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { +- signal(SIGALRM, timeout); ++ /* Save SIGALRM timer and handler. Sudheer Abdul-Salam, SUN. */ ++ saved_timeout = alarm(0); ++ nact.sa_handler = timeout; ++ nact.sa_flags = 0; ++ (void) sigemptyset(&nact.sa_mask); ++ (void) sigaction(SIGALRM, &nact, &oact); + alarm(rfc931_timeout); + + /* +@@ -223,6 +230,10 @@ + } + alarm(0); + } ++ /* Restore SIGALRM timer and handler. Sudheer Abdul-Salam, SUN. */ ++ (void) sigaction(SIGALRM, &oact, NULL); ++ if (saved_timeout > 0) ++ alarm(saved_timeout); + fclose(fp); + } + STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/rfc931.diff b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/rfc931.diff new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a926d0edfd --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/rfc931.diff @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/scaffold.c 2005-03-09 18:22:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c 2005-03-09 18:20:47.000000000 +0100 +@@ -237,10 +237,17 @@ struct request_info *request; + + /* ARGSUSED */ + +-void rfc931(request) +-struct request_info *request; ++void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) ++#ifdef INET6 ++struct sockaddr *rmt_sin; ++struct sockaddr *our_sin; ++#else ++struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; ++struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; ++#endif ++char *dest; + { +- strcpy(request->user, unknown); ++ strcpy(dest, unknown); + } + + /* check_path - examine accessibility */ +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpd.h 2005-03-09 18:22:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h 2005-03-09 18:21:23.000000000 +0100 +@@ -83,7 +83,11 @@ extern int hosts_access(struct request_i + extern void shell_cmd(char *); /* execute shell command */ + extern char *percent_x(char *, int, char *, struct request_info *); + /* do %<char> expansion */ ++#ifdef INET6 + extern void rfc931(struct sockaddr *, struct sockaddr *, char *); ++#else ++extern void rfc931(struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *); ++#endif + /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ + extern void clean_exit(struct request_info *); /* clean up and exit */ + extern void refuse(struct request_info *); /* clean up and exit */ diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5c8c9a1548 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +--- tcp-wrappers-7.6-ipv6.1.orig/safe_finger.c ++++ tcp-wrappers-7.6-ipv6.1/safe_finger.c +@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@ + #include <stdio.h> + #include <ctype.h> + #include <pwd.h> ++#include <syslog.h> + + extern void exit(); + + /* Local stuff */ + +-char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; ++char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin"; + + #define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ + #define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ + #define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ + #define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ + #define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ +-#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ ++#define UNPRIV_UGID 65534 /* Default uid and gid */ + + int finger_pid; ++int allow_severity = SEVERITY; ++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; + + void cleanup(sig) + int sig; diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger.8 b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..875616b9ea --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/safe_finger.8 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff +from finger servers +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B safe_finger [finger_options] +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.B safe_finger +command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this +program for automatic reverse finger probes from the +.B tcp_wrapper +.B (tcpd) +, not the raw finger command. The +.B safe_finger +command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root +privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH +environment. +.B safe_finger +will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some +finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in +the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere +on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps +sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines. +The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged. +.B safe_finger +takes care of all this badness. +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR hosts_access (5), +.BR hosts_options (5), +.BR tcpd (8) +.SH AUTHOR +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/sig_fix b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/sig_fix new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f286605bfd --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/sig_fix @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +* Mon Feb 10 2003 Harald Hoyer <harald@redhat.de> 7.6-29 +- added security patch tcp_wrappers-7.6-sig.patch + +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c.sig 2003-02-10 16:18:31.000000000 +0100 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c 2003-02-10 16:50:38.000000000 +0100 +@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ + + #define YES 1 + #define NO 0 ++#define ERR -1 + + /* + * These variables are globally visible so that they can be redirected in +@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ + return (verdict == AC_PERMIT); + if (table_match(hosts_allow_table, request)) + return (YES); +- if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request)) +- return (NO); +- return (YES); ++ if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request) == NO) ++ return (YES); ++ return (NO); + } + + /* table_match - match table entries with (daemon, client) pair */ +@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ + (void) fclose(fp); + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table); ++ match = ERR; + } + if (match) { + if (hosts_access_verbose > 1) diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/siglongjmp b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/siglongjmp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71be340a07 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/siglongjmp @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +diff -ruNp tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/rfc931.c 2004-08-29 18:42:25.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c 2004-08-29 18:41:04.000000000 +0200 +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static char sccsid[] = "@(#) rfc931.c 1. + + int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ + +-static jmp_buf timebuf; ++static sigjmp_buf timebuf; + + /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ + +@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ int protocol; + static void timeout(sig) + int sig; + { +- longjmp(timebuf, sig); ++ siglongjmp(timebuf, sig); + } + + /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ +@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ char *dest; + * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. + */ + +- if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { ++ if (sigsetjmp(timebuf, 0) == 0) { + /* Save SIGALRM timer and handler. Sudheer Abdul-Salam, SUN. */ + saved_timeout = alarm(0); + nact.sa_handler = timeout; diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/size_t b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/size_t new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4db40f4c7b --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/size_t @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/fix_options.c 2003-08-21 03:41:33.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c 2003-08-21 03:41:27.000000000 +0200 +@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ + #ifdef IP_OPTIONS + unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; + char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; ++#ifdef __GLIBC__ ++ size_t optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; ++#else + int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; ++#endif + struct protoent *ip; + int fd = request->fd; + unsigned int opt; +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/socket.c 2003-08-21 03:41:33.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c 2003-08-21 03:40:51.000000000 +0200 +@@ -90,7 +90,11 @@ + static struct sockaddr_in client; + static struct sockaddr_in server; + #endif ++#ifdef __GLIBC__ ++ size_t len; ++#else + int len; ++#endif + char buf[BUFSIZ]; + int fd = request->fd; + +@@ -421,7 +425,11 @@ + #else + struct sockaddr_in sin; + #endif ++#ifdef __GLIBC__ ++ size_t size = sizeof(sin); ++#else + int size = sizeof(sin); ++#endif + + /* + * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/tcpdchk_libwrapped b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/tcpdchk_libwrapped new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3beae39306 --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/tcpdchk_libwrapped @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +diff -ruN tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c +--- tcp_wrappers_7.6.orig/tcpdchk.c 2003-08-21 02:50:37.000000000 +0200 ++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c 2003-08-21 02:50:33.000000000 +0200 +@@ -53,6 +53,24 @@ + #include "inetcf.h" + #include "scaffold.h" + ++/* list of programs which are known to be linked with libwrap in debian */ ++static const char *const libwrap_programs[] = { ++ "portmap", "mountd", "statd", "ugidd", ++ "redir", "rlinetd", ++ "sshd", ++ "atftpd", ++ "diald", ++ "esound", ++ "gdm", "gnome-session", ++ "icecast", "icecast_admin", "icecast_client", "icecast_source", ++ "mysqld", ++ "ntop", ++ "pptpd", ++ "rquotad", ++ "sendmail", "smail", ++ NULL ++}; ++ + /* + * Stolen from hosts_access.c... + */ +@@ -147,8 +165,8 @@ + /* + * These are not run from inetd but may have built-in access control. + */ +- inet_set("portmap", WR_NOT); +- inet_set("rpcbind", WR_NOT); ++ for (c = 0; libwrap_programs[c]; c++) ++ inet_set(libwrap_programs[c], WR_YES); + + /* + * Check accessibility of access control files. diff --git a/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/try-from.8 b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/try-from.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9c8f30543e --- /dev/null +++ b/recipes/tcp-wrappers/tcp-wrappers-7.6/try-from.8 @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.SH NAME +try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B try-from +.SH DESCRIPTION +The +.B try-from +command can be called via a remote shell command to find out +if the hostname and address are properly recognized +by the +.B tcp_wrapper +library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI +on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through +.BR syslog (3) +and redirected to stderr. + +Example: + +rsh host /some/where/try-from + +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR hosts_access (5), +.BR hosts_options (5), +.BR tcpd (8) +.SH AUTHOR +Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. + |