diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta')
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/Fix-typo-introduced-by-a03f81f4.patch | 29 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian/ca.patch | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/parallel.patch | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2i.bb (renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb) | 7 |
7 files changed, 48 insertions, 345 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc index f83664c271..cb7ec0aac2 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl.inc @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ do_install_ptest () { ln -sf ${libdir}/ssl/misc/CA.sh ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps ln -sf ${sysconfdir}/ssl/openssl.cnf ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps ln -sf ${bindir}/openssl ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps + cp apps/server.pem ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps cp apps/server2.pem ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/apps mkdir -p ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/util install util/opensslwrap.sh ${D}${PTEST_PATH}/util diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch deleted file mode 100644 index df36d5fb37..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,286 +0,0 @@ -From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> -Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic - -A common idiom in the codebase is: - -if (p + len > limit) -{ - return; /* Too long */ -} - -Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and -limit == p + SIZE - -"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS -message). - -The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well -defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually -undefined behaviour. - -For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation -provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for -values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! - -Issue reported by Guido Vranken. - -CVE-2016-2177 - -Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2016-2177 - -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> - - ---- - ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- - ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- - ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- - 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c -index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 ---- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c -+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c -@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - - session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - -- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { -+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; -@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - /* get the session-id */ - j = *(p++); - -- if (p + j > d + n) { -+ if ((d + n) - p < j) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; -@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* cookie stuff */ -- if (p + 1 > d + n) { -+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - cookie_len = *(p++); - -- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { -+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; -@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - } - } - -- if (p + 2 > d + n) { -+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; -@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - } - - /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ -- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { -+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { - /* not enough data */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); -@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) - - /* compression */ - i = *(p++); -- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { -+ if ((d + n) - p < i) { - /* not enough data */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); -diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c -index b182998..54ee783 100644 ---- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c -+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c -@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - int r; - #endif - -- if (session_id + len > limit) { -+ if (limit - session_id < len) { - fatal = 1; - goto err; - } -diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c -index fb64607..cdac011 100644 ---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c -+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c -@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ - }; - -- if (data >= (limit - 2)) -+ if (limit - data <= 2) - return; - data += 2; - -- if (data > (limit - 4)) -+ if (limit - data < 4) - return; - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); -@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - return; - -- if (data + size > limit) -+ if (limit - data < size) - return; - data += size; - -@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - -- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) -+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; -@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - } else { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - -- if (data + len != limit) -+ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; -@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - if (data == limit) - goto ri_check; - -- if (data > (limit - 2)) -+ if (limit - data < 2) - goto err; - - n2s(data, len); - -- if (data + len != limit) -+ if (limit - data != len) - goto err; - -- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { -+ while (limit - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - -- if (data + size > (limit)) -+ if (limit - data < size) - goto err; - # if 0 - fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); -@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, - if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) - return 1; - -- if (data >= limit - 2) -+ if (limit - data <= 2) - return 1; - n2s(data, len); - -- if (data > limit - len) -+ if (limit - data < len) - return 1; - -- while (data <= limit - 4) { -+ while (limit - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - -- if (data + size > limit) -+ if (limit - data < size) - return 1; - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) - return 0; -@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); - # endif - -- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) -+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) - goto ri_check; - - n2s(data, length); -- if (data + length != d + n) { -+ if ((d + n) - data != length) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - -- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { -+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - -- if (data + size > (d + n)) -+ if ((d + n) - data < size) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) -@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - i = *(p++); -- p += i; -- if (p >= limit) -+ -+ if (limit - p <= i) - return -1; -+ -+ p += i; - } - /* Skip past cipher list */ - n2s(p, i); -- p += i; -- if (p >= limit) -+ if (limit - p <= i) - return -1; -+ p += i; -+ - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - i = *(p++); -- p += i; -- if (p > limit) -+ if (limit - p < i) - return -1; -+ p += i; -+ - /* Now at start of extensions */ -- if ((p + 2) >= limit) -+ if (limit - p <= 2) - return 0; - n2s(p, i); -- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { -+ while (limit - p >= 4) { - unsigned short type, size; - n2s(p, type); - n2s(p, size); -- if (p + size > limit) -+ if (limit - p < size) - return 0; - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - int r; --- -2.3.5 - diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 27ade4e7d2..0000000000 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From 399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi> -Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME - -Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in -order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA -implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for -certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing -attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key. - -CVE-2016-2178 - -Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> - -Upstream-Status: Backport -CVE: CVE-2016-2178 - -Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> - ---- - crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++---- - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -Index: openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -=================================================================== ---- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -+++ openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c -@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) - goto err; - while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ; -- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { -- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -- } - - if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p, -@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C - } else { - K = &k; - } -+ -+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { -+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -+ } -+ - DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, - dsa->method_mont_p); - if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/Fix-typo-introduced-by-a03f81f4.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/Fix-typo-introduced-by-a03f81f4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..04112966ab --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/Fix-typo-introduced-by-a03f81f4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From 581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> +Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 08:47:45 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo introduced by a03f81f4 + +Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/581215a519c66db7255ea360ed25bb00033ccd52] +Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com> +--- + crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c +index 65a74df..2a2b95c 100644 +--- a/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c ++++ b/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c +@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static int cryptodev_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) + if (fstate->mac_len != 0) { + if (fstate->mac_data != NULL) { + dstate->mac_data = OPENSSL_malloc(fstate->mac_len); +- if (dstate->ac_data == NULL) { ++ if (dstate->mac_data == NULL) { + printf("cryptodev_digest_init: malloc failed\n"); + return 0; + } +-- +2.1.4 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian/ca.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian/ca.patch index aba4d42983..fb745e4394 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian/ca.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/debian/ca.patch @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Index: openssl-0.9.8m/apps/CA.pl.in @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ foreach (@ARGV) { if ( /^(-\?|-h|-help)$/ ) { - print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-verify\n"; + print STDERR "usage: CA -newcert|-newreq|-newreq-nodes|-newca|-sign|-signcert|-verify\n"; + print STDERR "usage: CA -signcert certfile keyfile|-newcert|-newreq|-newca|-sign|-verify\n"; exit 0; } elsif (/^-newcert$/) { diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/parallel.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/parallel.patch index b6c2c148b1..f3f4c99888 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/parallel.patch +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/parallel.patch @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/plain/dev-libs/openssl/files/openssl-1 Upstream-Status: Pending Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> +Refreshed for 1.0.2i +Signed-off-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com> + --- openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/Makefile +++ openssl-1.0.2g/crypto/Makefile @@ -85,11 +85,11 @@ @@ -133,7 +136,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> fi; \ --- openssl-1.0.2g/test/Makefile +++ openssl-1.0.2g/test/Makefile -@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ +@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ tags: ctags $(SRC) @@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> apps: @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=apps all) -@@ -421,130 +421,130 @@ +@@ -438,136 +438,136 @@ link_app.$${shlib_target} $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(RSATEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO) @@ -309,13 +312,21 @@ Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> - @target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD) + +@target=$(CLIENTHELLOTEST) $(BUILD_CMD) + $(BADDTLSTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(BADDTLSTEST).o +- @target=$(BADDTLSTEST) $(BUILD_CMD) ++ +@target=$(BADDTLSTEST) $(BUILD_CMD) + $(SSLV2CONFTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLV2CONFTEST).o - @target=$(SSLV2CONFTEST) $(BUILD_CMD) + +@target=$(SSLV2CONFTEST) $(BUILD_CMD) + $(DTLSTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DTLSTEST).o ssltestlib.o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO) +- @target=$(DTLSTEST); exobj=ssltestlib.o; $(BUILD_CMD) ++ +@target=$(DTLSTEST); exobj=ssltestlib.o; $(BUILD_CMD) + #$(AESTEST).o: $(AESTEST).c # $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) -DINTERMEDIATE_VALUE_KAT -DTRACE_KAT_MCT $(AESTEST).c -@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ +@@ -580,6 +580,6 @@ # fi dummytest$(EXE_EXT): dummytest.o $(DLIBCRYPTO) diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2i.bb index c8444d39b9..c32f47296c 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2i.bb @@ -39,12 +39,11 @@ SRC_URI += "file://find.pl;subdir=${BP}/util/ \ file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \ file://configure-musl-target.patch \ file://parallel.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ file://openssl-util-perlpath.pl-cwd.patch \ + file://Fix-typo-introduced-by-a03f81f4.patch \ " -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919" +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "678374e63f8df456a697d3e5e5a931fb" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9287487d11c9545b6efb287cdb70535d4e9b284dd10d51441d9b9963d000de6f" PACKAGES =+ "${PN}-engines" FILES_${PN}-engines = "${libdir}/ssl/engines/*.so ${libdir}/engines" |