diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'meta')
3 files changed, 425 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f1834f6ce3 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +Description: extract the securetty logic for use with the "nullok_secure" option + introduced in the "055_pam_unix_nullok_secure" patch. + +Upstream-Status: Pending + +Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com> +=================================================================== +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 11:08:23.224483237 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 11:15:21.304486456 +0800 +@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ endif + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_securetty.la + pam_securetty_la_LIBADD = -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam + ++pam_securetty_la_SOURCES = \ ++ pam_securetty.c \ ++ tty_secure.c ++ + if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN + noinst_DATA = README + README: pam_securetty.8.xml +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c 2013-07-05 11:07:50.064483568 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c 2013-07-05 11:12:23.994483344 +0800 +@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ + /* pam_securetty module */ + +-#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty" +-#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/" + #define CMDLINE_FILE "/proc/cmdline" + #define CONSOLEACTIVE_FILE "/sys/class/tty/console/active" + +@@ -40,6 +38,9 @@ + #include <security/pam_modutil.h> + #include <security/pam_ext.h> + ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, ++ const char *uttyname); ++ + #define PAM_DEBUG_ARG 0x0001 + #define PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG 0x0002 + +@@ -73,11 +74,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p + const char *username; + const char *uttyname; + const void *void_uttyname; +- char ttyfileline[256]; +- char ptname[256]; +- struct stat ttyfileinfo; + struct passwd *user_pwd; +- FILE *ttyfile; + + /* log a trail for debugging */ + if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) { +@@ -105,50 +102,7 @@ securetty_perform_check (pam_handle_t *p + return PAM_SERVICE_ERR; + } + +- /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */ +- if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) { +- uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1; +- } +- +- if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) { +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE); +- return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling, +- this needs to succeed. But we still log the +- error. */ +- } +- +- if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) { +- /* If the file is world writable or is not a +- normal file, return error */ +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, +- "%s is either world writable or not a normal file", +- SECURETTY_FILE); +- return PAM_AUTH_ERR; +- } +- +- ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r"); +- if (ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */ +- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE); +- return PAM_SERVICE_ERR; +- } +- +- if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) { +- snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname); +- } else { +- ptname[0] = '\0'; +- } +- +- retval = 1; +- +- while ((fgets(ttyfileline, sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) +- && retval) { +- if (ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n') +- ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0'; +- +- retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline, uttyname) +- && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) ); +- } +- fclose(ttyfile); ++ retval = _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, uttyname); + + if (retval && !(ctrl & PAM_NOCONSOLE_ARG)) { + FILE *cmdlinefile; +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c +--- a/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c 1970-01-01 08:30:00.000000000 +0830 ++++ b/modules/pam_securetty/tty_secure.c 2013-07-05 11:14:21.534482900 +0800 +@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ ++/* ++ * A function to determine if a particular line is in /etc/securetty ++ */ ++ ++ ++#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty" ++#define TTY_PREFIX "/dev/" ++ ++/* This function taken out of pam_securetty by Sam Hartman ++ * <hartmans@debian.org>*/ ++/* ++ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software. ++ * July 25, 1996. ++ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3 ++ */ ++ ++#include <unistd.h> ++#include <sys/types.h> ++#include <sys/stat.h> ++#include <security/pam_modules.h> ++#include <stdarg.h> ++#include <syslog.h> ++#include <sys/syslog.h> ++#include <stdio.h> ++#include <string.h> ++#include <stdlib.h> ++#include <ctype.h> ++#include <security/pam_modutil.h> ++#include <security/pam_ext.h> ++ ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, ++ const char *uttyname); ++ ++int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *uttyname) ++{ ++ int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; ++ char ttyfileline[256]; ++ char ptname[256]; ++ struct stat ttyfileinfo; ++ FILE *ttyfile; ++ /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */ ++ if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0) ++ uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1; ++ ++ if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) { ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open %s: %m", ++ SECURETTY_FILE); ++ return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling, ++ this needs to succeed. But we still log the ++ error. */ ++ } ++ ++ if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) { ++ /* If the file is world writable or is not a ++ normal file, return error */ ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, ++ "%s is either world writable or not a normal file", ++ SECURETTY_FILE); ++ return PAM_AUTH_ERR; ++ } ++ ++ ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r"); ++ if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */ ++ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Error opening %s: %m", SECURETTY_FILE); ++ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR; ++ } ++ ++ if (isdigit(uttyname[0])) { ++ snprintf(ptname, sizeof(ptname), "pts/%s", uttyname); ++ } else { ++ ptname[0] = '\0'; ++ } ++ ++ retval = 1; ++ ++ while ((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) ++ && retval) { ++ if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n') ++ ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0'; ++ retval = ( strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname) ++ && (!ptname[0] || strcmp(ptname, uttyname)) ); ++ } ++ fclose(ttyfile); ++ ++ if(retval) { ++ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR; ++ } ++ ++ return retval; ++} diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..b285e96c27 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam/pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +Debian patch to add a new 'nullok_secure' option to pam_unix, which +accepts users with null passwords only when the applicant is connected +from a tty listed in /etc/securetty. + +Authors: Sam Hartman <hartmans@debian.org>, + Steve Langasek <vorlon@debian.org> + +Upstream-Status: Pending + +Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <ming.liu@windriver.com> +=================================================================== +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am +--- a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 09:51:31.014483164 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2013-07-05 10:26:12.884484000 +0800 +@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ if HAVE_VERSIONING + pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map + endif + pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \ +- @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) ++ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ $(NIS_LIBS) \ ++ ../pam_securetty/tty_secure.lo + + securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la + +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 2013-07-05 09:52:16.825108201 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 2013-07-05 10:28:34.724483774 +0800 +@@ -220,7 +220,14 @@ A little more extreme than debug\&. + .RS 4 + The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The + \fBnullok\fR +-argument overrides this default\&. ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service\&. ++.RE ++.PP ++\fBnullok_secure\fR ++.RS 4 ++The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The ++\fBnullok_secure\fR ++argument overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values found in /etc/securetty\&. + .RE + .PP + \fBtry_first_pass\fR +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml +--- a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 2013-07-05 09:52:38.775108523 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml 2013-07-05 10:30:23.084483630 +0800 +@@ -135,7 +135,24 @@ + <para> + The default action of this module is to not permit the + user access to a service if their official password is blank. +- The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default. ++ The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default ++ and allows any user with a blank password to access the ++ service. ++ </para> ++ </listitem> ++ </varlistentry> ++ <varlistentry> ++ <term> ++ <option>nullok_secure</option> ++ </term> ++ <listitem> ++ <para> ++ The default action of this module is to not permit the ++ user access to a service if their official password is blank. ++ The <option>nullok_secure</option> argument overrides this ++ default and allows any user with a blank password to access ++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of ++ the values found in /etc/securetty. + </para> + </listitem> + </varlistentry> +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README +--- a/modules/pam_unix/README 2013-07-05 09:51:52.205107846 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/README 2013-07-05 10:27:10.774484537 +0800 +@@ -57,7 +57,16 @@ nullok + + The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a + service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides +- this default. ++ this default and allows any user with a blank password to access the ++ service. ++ ++nullok_secure ++ ++ The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a ++ service if their official password is blank. The nullok_secure argument ++ overrides this default and allows any user with a blank password to access ++ the service as long as the value of PAM_TTY is set to one of the values ++ found in /etc/securetty. + + try_first_pass + +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2013-07-05 09:50:49.134482523 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c 2013-07-05 09:56:26.924484267 +0800 +@@ -84,14 +84,22 @@ int _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int fl + /* now parse the arguments to this module */ + + for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) { +- int j; ++ int j, sl; + + D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv)); + + for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) { +- if (unix_args[j].token +- && !strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) { +- break; ++ if (unix_args[j].token) { ++ sl = strlen(unix_args[j].token); ++ if (unix_args[j].token[sl-1] == '=') { ++ /* exclude argument from comparison */ ++ if (!strncmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token, sl)) ++ break; ++ } else { ++ /* compare full strings */ ++ if (!strcmp(*argv, unix_args[j].token)) ++ break; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -461,6 +469,7 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h + child = fork(); + if (child == 0) { + int i=0; ++ int nullok = off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl); + struct rlimit rlim; + static char *envp[] = { NULL }; + char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; +@@ -488,7 +497,18 @@ static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_h + /* exec binary helper */ + args[0] = strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER); + args[1] = x_strdup(user); +- if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */ ++ ++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) { ++ const void *uttyname; ++ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname); ++ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL ++ || _pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ { ++ nullok = 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (nullok) { + args[2]=strdup("nullok"); + } else { + args[2]=strdup("nonull"); +@@ -567,6 +587,17 @@ _unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, u + if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) + return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */ + ++ if (on(UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE, ctrl)) { ++ int retval2; ++ const void *uttyname; ++ retval2 = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, &uttyname); ++ if (retval2 != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (_pammodutil_tty_secure(pamh, (const char *)uttyname) != PAM_SUCCESS) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + /* UNIX passwords area */ + + retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt); +@@ -653,7 +684,8 @@ int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * + } + } + } else { +- retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)); ++ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, salt, ++ _unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)); + } + + if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) { +diff -urpN a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h +--- a/modules/pam_unix/support.h 2013-07-05 09:51:10.385107934 +0800 ++++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h 2013-07-05 10:23:54.815107842 +0800 +@@ -90,8 +90,9 @@ typedef struct { + password hash algorithms */ + #define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS 26 /* new password hashes will use blowfish */ + #define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN 27 /* min length for password */ ++#define UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE 28 /* NULL passwords allowed only on secure ttys */ + /* -------------- */ +-#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 28 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ ++#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 29 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */ + + #define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl)) + +@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C + /* UNIX_NOT_SET_PASS */ {"not_set_pass", _ALL_ON_, 0100}, + /* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0200}, + /* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600), 0400}, +-/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000}, ++/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0x10000000), 0x200}, + /* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000}, + /* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000}, + /* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000}, +@@ -127,7 +128,8 @@ static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_C + /* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 040000000}, + /* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000}, + /* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */ {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(0260420000), 0200000000}, +-/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000}, ++/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000}, ++/* UNIX_NULLOK_SECURE */ {"nullok_secure", _ALL_ON_^(0x200), 0x10000000}, + }; + + #define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag) +@@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ extern int _unix_read_password(pam_handl + ,const char *data_name + ,const void **pass); + ++extern int _pammodutil_tty_secure(const pam_handle_t *pamh, ++ const char *uttyname); ++ + extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, + unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, int *daysleft); + #endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */ diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb index 62ad7b16a2..3d8999de41 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/pam/libpam_1.1.6.bb @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://linux-pam.org/library/Linux-PAM-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://reflect-the-enforce_for_root-semantics-change-in-pam.patch \ file://add-checks-for-crypt-returning-NULL.patch \ file://libpam-fix-for-CVE-2010-4708.patch \ + file://pam-security-abstract-securetty-handling.patch \ + file://pam-unix-nullok-secure.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "7b73e58b7ce79ffa321d408de06db2c4" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bab887d6280f47fc3963df3b95735a27a16f0f663636163ddf3acab5f1149fc2" @@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ EXTRA_OECONF = "--with-db-uniquename=_pam \ CFLAGS_append = " -fPIC " -PR = "r2" +PR = "r3" S = "${WORKDIR}/Linux-PAM-${PV}" |