gnupg: integrate fix for CVE-2012-6085

From http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2012-6085:
"The read_block function in g10/import.c in GnuPG 1.4.x before 1.4.13 and 2.0.x
through 2.0.19, when importing a key, allows remote attackers to corrupt the
public keyring database or cause a denial of service (application crash) via a
crafted length field of an OpenPGP packet."

Patch taken from upstream git, which is identical in both branches.

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>

3 files changed, 74 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/cve-2012-6085.patch b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/cve-2012-6085.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b98a3c4f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg/cve-2012-6085.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Fix CVE-2012-6085 by backporting a patch from upstream's git repository.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
+
+
+From 498882296ffac7987c644aaf2a0aa108a2925471 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
+Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2012 09:43:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] gpg: Import only packets which are allowed in a keyblock.
+
+* g10/import.c (valid_keyblock_packet): New.
+(read_block): Store only valid packets.
+--
+
+A corrupted key, which for example included a mangled public key
+encrypted packet, used to corrupt the keyring.  This change skips all
+packets which are not allowed in a keyblock.
+
+GnuPG-bug-id: 1455
+
+(cherry-picked from commit 3a4b96e665fa639772854058737ee3d54ba0694e)
+---
+ g10/import.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
+index ba2439d..ad112d6 100644
+--- a/g10/import.c
++++ b/g10/import.c
+@@ -347,6 +347,27 @@ import_print_stats (void *hd)
+ }
+ 
+ 
++/* Return true if PKTTYPE is valid in a keyblock.  */
++static int
++valid_keyblock_packet (int pkttype)
++{
++  switch (pkttype)
++    {
++    case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
++    case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
++    case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
++    case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
++    case PKT_SIGNATURE:
++    case PKT_USER_ID:
++    case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
++    case PKT_RING_TRUST:
++      return 1;
++    default:
++      return 0;
++    }
++}
++
++
+ /****************
+  * Read the next keyblock from stream A.
+  * PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
+@@ -424,7 +445,7 @@ read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, KBNODE *ret_root )
+ 	    }
+ 	    in_cert = 1;
+ 	  default:
+-	    if( in_cert ) {
++	    if (in_cert && valid_keyblock_packet (pkt->pkttype)) {
+ 		if( !root )
+ 		    root = new_kbnode( pkt );
+ 		else
+-- 
+1.7.2.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_1.4.7.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_1.4.7.bb
index 41552b2ee6..befcc313ec 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_1.4.7.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_1.4.7.bb
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
            file://long-long-thumb.patch \
            file://configure.patch \
            file://mips_gcc4.4.patch \
-           file://curl_typeof_fix_backport.patch"
+           file://curl_typeof_fix_backport.patch \
+           file://cve-2012-6085.patch"
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b06a141cca5cd1a55bbdd25ab833303c"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "69d18b7d193f62ca27ed4febcb4c9044aa0c95305d3258fe902e2fae5fc6468d"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.0.19.bb b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.0.19.bb
index 996a8e80dc..6b0ce668f5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.0.19.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/gnupg/gnupg_2.0.19.bb
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ PR = "r4"
 
 inherit autotools gettext
 
-SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2"
+SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/${BPN}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
+           file://cve-2012-6085.patch"
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "6a8589381ca1b0c1a921e9955f42b016"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "efa23a8a925adb51c7d3b708c25b6d000300f5ce37de9bdec6453be7b419c622"